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1.1.1 Economic Growth and the Environment
Economic growth has always entailed an increasing demand for energy, of which elec-
tricity constitutes a major part. As a matter of fact, since 1970, each increase of 1%
in GDP has been accompanied by a 0.64% rise in energy consumption (IEA WEO,
2000). Even though United Nations forecasts estimate that the world population will
stabilize around 2075 due to ongoing demographic transition, economic growth itself
and the demand for rising living standards in developing and transition countries will
still form a considerable force propelling the need for ever increasing energy sources.
According to the IEA World Energy Outlook 2004, energy demand will be rising by
60% between 2002 and 2030. Especially developing countries such as China and India
will need and demand energy as they further industrialize and begin to prosper.
1
At the same time, most of the energy production worldwide still relies on fossil
fuels and some developing and transition countries have large and cheaply accessible
fossil fuel deposits, most notably in coal and oil. Furthermore, advanced nations like
Canada also still beneﬁt from technological advances that make e.g. the exploitation
of tar sands economical and thereby expand available oil sources at the country-level.
2
In fact, according to IEA projections, 85% of the aforementioned 60% increase in
energy demand will have to be met by the conversion of fossil fuels. While economists
1About two thirds of the projected 60% increase will be attributed to developing nations.
2It is thus questionable whether the ﬁniteness of resources would solve the problem of
increasing emissions and the ensuing consequences.
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might have feared the ﬁniteness of resources as a limit to economic growth in the past
(cf. Malthus (1798), Hotelling, (1931), Meadows et al (1972), etc), scientiﬁc evidence
brought forward these days shows that the externalities associated with the usage of
these resources are much more hazardous by inﬂicting damages not only on nature
and human health, but also to our economies, as Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions
continue to be accumulated in our atmosphere (e.g. Graßl et al (2003), Stern (2006),
etc).
The IEA notes that power generation has been the main source of CO2 emissions
over the last decades and projects that the share of power production in total CO2
generation will increase further from 40% to 45% in 2050 (IEA, 2006).The underlying
problem is that GHG emissions have been found to be the major reason for the in-
creased rates of global warming (see Section 1.2.1 for details). Most climate models
ﬁnd that a doubling of pre-industrial levels of GHG emissions will most probably re-
sult in a rise of between 2-5
◦C in global mean temperatures between 2030 and 2060
(Stern Review, 2006). This will initially lead to slight beneﬁts for some developed
countries in higher latitudes in terms of rising attractiveness for tourists, increased
yields from agriculture and lower heating needs, for example. However, as tempera-
tures rise beyond the ﬁrst 2-3
◦C, the damages will start to exceed the initial beneﬁts
signiﬁcantly. The economic costs of extreme weather (droughts, ﬂoods, storms, etc)
alone are estimated to lie approximately between 0.5 and 1% of world GDP around
2050 with an increasing trend for higher temperatures (e.g. Stern Review, 2006).
There are thus two conﬂicting priorities at stake here. On the one hand, economic
growth and the increasing demand for energy that accompanies this growth needs to
be sustained and fulﬁlled. On the other hand, the supply of more energy always also
implies a strain to the environment not only through the exhaustion of resources,
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but even more so in terms of increased emissions and accelerated global warming with
– to some degree – uncertain, but ultimately adverse eﬀects. The latter will then
aﬀect growth and welfare again in terms of the losses associated with the process
of global warming. There is therefore a delicate balance between growth beneﬁts
and environmental costs that can translate back into economic disadvantages. The
goal must thus be to maintain economic growth and ensure energy supply, while at
the same time preserving the environment and stabilizing GHG emissions at a level
associated with minimum damages. These ambitions have sometimes been referred to
as sustainable energy development. The Brundtland Report (1987) deﬁnes sustainable
development as the
[...] development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (World
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).
3The exhaustion of resources has lately often been associated with concerns of energy
security, implying that countries, which transit away from fossil fuels, will also be less depen-
dent on the supply of inputs from other countries. In this thesis such dependency hurts the
investors through rising and ﬂuctuating fossil fuel prices, but is not modeled through import
shortages as in some general equilibrium models, since this would be beyond the scope of our
analysis.Introduction 3
Applied to the energy sector, this would mean to keep growing, while supplying
more and more people with an increasing level of energy without compromising the
future situation of the following generations. Munasinghe’s (2004, page 789) deﬁnition
claims that
[...] sustainable energy development involves the harnessing of energy
resources for human use in a manner that supports lasting development.
While this deﬁnition clearly includes issues of natural resource exhaustion, the fo-
cus of this thesis is on the external eﬀects of using the resources for energy conversion,
since it has become clear that resource depletion might not be the primary environ-
mental problem that demands immediate action to preserve lasting development in
the long run. On the contrary, the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (2007) urges
policy makers to take on more stringent measures to restrict GHG emissions as fast as
possible. Therefore, the accumulation of emissions represents a relevant problem that
warrants thorough research for the creation of a more sustainable energy mix.
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In response to the increasing concerns about global warming and energy security,
many policy makers in Europe have already been promoting the use of electricity
from renewable sources over the last decades (e.g. through feed-in tariﬀs in Germany
and Austria, or renewables quotas in the United Kingdom), while at the same time
reducing the combustion of fossil fuels for power generation (e.g. by CO2 taxes or
caps on emissions and permit trading like in the European Union). Simultaneously,
international climate change negotiations for a post-1012 carbon policy aim at an
agreement, which comprises the key players in the world economy, in order to ensure
collective action against global warming. What policy can achieve in terms of changing
the incentives of investors in the electricity sector depends on how investors react to
changes and shocks in the key variables involved in their decisions. This also applies
for the hopes that policy makers might put in the advance of technological progress
and the volatility coming from fossil fuel prices. It is therefore necessary to develop a
sound and thorough understanding of decision-making in the electricity sector, before
any policy recommendations can be formulated.
In this thesis the focus will be on the generation of electricity because that is the
process contributing the most to global CO2 emissions. The generation of electricity
and how the composition of the sector’s production technology mix will develop is
contingent upon the decisions that investors have made and are making today. Since
investments in the electricity sector are lumpy and associated with large sunk costs
up front, electricity will be produced with whatever plants are installed now for the
coming decades. If investors opt for fossil-fuel-based generation technologies, they
will use them to serve the continuously rising demand and thereby constantly emit
more CO2, which will then be accumulated in the atmosphere, further accelerating
the process of global warming. This is the reason why it is important to analyze how
investment decisions and the timing thereof are formed in the electricity sector in order
to ﬁnd the right incentives in time. Uncertainty can aﬀect these decisions and their
4Moreover, the atmosphere can also be seen as an exhaustible resource – with the diﬀerence
that property rights are not assigned.4 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
timing profoundly. This includes uncertainty not only about fuel prices and other cost
items, but also uncertainty about the future stringency of policy and regulation and
uncertainty about the rate of technological progress.
1.1.2 Methodology
Earlier studies on investment under uncertainty (e.g. Hartman (1972), Abel (1983),
and Nickell (1978)) have found a positive eﬀect of uncertainty on investment (see
Chapter 2). In the electricity sector, this would imply that technologies exhibiting
uncertainty would be adopted earlier. If we think about uncertainty in the evolution
of fossil fuel prices, this is not a desirable outcome, since it would imply that fossil-
fuel-based technologies, which are also typically cheap in terms of capital, might be
favored over “zero-fuel-price” technologies, which are environmentally more friendly.
On the other hand, renewable energy carriers are an uncertain choice with respect
to the speed of their technological improvement. Depending on which uncertainty
represents the larger impact, either fossil-fuel-based or renewable technologies would
be invested into earlier.
More recent modeling approaches include real options theory, which typically ﬁnds
a postponement of investment as a response to uncertainty, and portfolio theory, which
tries to minimize risk for a given level of expected return, thereby focussing more on
the risk-return tradeoﬀ and allowing the investor to determine optimal combinations
of technologies at diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion.
This thesis is concerned with the analysis of investment under uncertainty in the
electricity sector with the goal of ﬁnding implications for the policy maker, who is
concerned about sustainable energy development. The electricity sector is character-
ized by uncertainties, large, up-front sunk costs and therefore irreversible investment,
and the freedom of investment to be brought forward or to be postponed (see Section
1.2.2 for more detailed information about the electricity sector). Therefore, it merits
special treatment, since a standard Net Present Value (NPV) analysis regards invest-
ment opportunities as “once-and-for-all” choices and does not take into account the
beneﬁts from waiting and diversiﬁcation entailed by uncertainty (see Chapter 2).
Real options theory is a tool, which is particularly suited to value the option of
being able to time investments diﬀerently. It is used here to investigate, which types
of uncertainty stimulate investment and what that implies for the policy maker. A
contribution to the existing literature is the way how we distinguish between expected
and actual values of the uncertain parameters that we analyze. This allows us to make
a clear distinction between the eﬀects emanating from diﬀerent types of uncertainty.
Standard mean-variance portfolio theory as has previously been applied to invest-
ment into non-ﬁnancial assets is myopic and looks at the risk-return trade-oﬀ at one
point in time. However, we think that useful additional insights can be gained from
allowing the investor to have diﬀerent preferences over risk and thus the composition
of his technology portfolio, since uncertainty will obviously create a demand for hedg-
ing. This diversiﬁcation property of portfolio theory is something, which cannot be
dealt with by using real options theory at a larger scale due to computational limi-The Players 5
tations. We therefore use elements from portfolio theory and integrate them into a
vintage setting (see Chapter 2 for a description of vintage modeling) to overcome the
disadvantage of standard mean-variance portfolio selection of being inherently static,
while reaping the beneﬁts of the portfolio framework to take into account gains from
diversiﬁcation.
5
The aim of this thesis is therefore twofold: on the one hand, we want to under-
stand decision-making under uncertainty in a sector having the peculiarities of the
electricity sector. After all, other sectors are also characterized by large up-front sunk
costs and sequential decision-making processes, which provides investors with a certain
degree of ﬂexibility. Examples include sectors, in which large research and develop-
ment (R&D) costs are required initially or where capital is expensive and task-speciﬁc.
Oil drilling projects, for instance, demand an expensive exploration phase, but also
costly machinery and equipment that cannot easily be resold. Coal mining and satel-
lite launches are similarly capital-intensive and therefore suitable for analysis in a real
options framework.
The insights gained from extending and reﬁning the methodologies in this thesis
can therefore have important implications for these sectors as well and for investment
theory in general. On the other hand, these insights can and shall be used to analyze
the impact of policies that are directed at preventing the eﬀects of accumulated GHG
emissions in the atmosphere (global warming, climate change and, further down in
the causal chain, rising sea levels, water shortages, more extreme weather conditions,
desertiﬁcation, etc). If these policies will have the desired eﬀect, when we account for
irreversibility considerations, ﬂexibility in sequential decision-making, diﬀerent quali-
ties and types of uncertainty and technological change, stands to question, especially
when there is uncertainty about the direction of policy-making itself.
In the remaining chapter there will ﬁrst be a description and analysis of the players
or parties that are involved. Furthermore, an overview of existing electricity generation
technologies and their contribution to the current energy mix will be given. Section
1.4 presents the contribution that this thesis attempts to make. Finally, there will be
an outline of the research, providing not only a plan of the thesis, but also giving a
short preview with respect to the results.
1.2 The Players
The electricity market and the players involved form a very complex, integrated system
of supply, transmission, distribution, end consumption and regulation. Moreover, the
electricity sector has undergone considerable changes in the past and continues to
be liberalized in some countries and regions. In this thesis the focus is on three
main categories of concerned parties: the production part of the electricity sector,
the climate and the government. By choosing such a focus, we obviously make some
important simpliﬁcations.
5Section 1.4 provides more details on the contributions of this thesis.6 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
First of all, we restrict our attention to the production rather than to the consump-
tion side and ignore the latter for the larger part. This does not imply that we think
that the consumption side does not make a diﬀerence for that matter. Quite on the
contrary, the greening of consumer attitudes has contributed amongst other factors
to increased political eﬀorts for preservation and sustainable development in Western
European countries. A concept called the Environmental Kuznets Curve (e.g. Selden,
1994, Copeland and Taylor, 2003, De Groot, 2000 and Smulders and Bretschger, 2000)
relies on this argument to explain the phenomenon that pollution increases with rising
levels of GDP, but often decreases after a certain threshold has been passed. The
idea is that the values of the society change in favor of environmental quality, once
people are provided with suﬃcient income to fulﬁll their basic needs in a satisfactory
way. However, even though we do acknowledge that changes in policy and also in
technology may be induced by voter interests and consumer demand respectively, we
think that the most important changes in the electricity sector still emanate from the
supply side and through government regulation, which is heavily inﬂuenced by climate
change considerations lately.
6
The reason for this choice is that electricity is still a commodity that is continuously
consumed at a constant level – and almost subconsciously: while many people actively
choose for relatively more expensive biologically cultivated food products and cars
with more fuel-eﬃcient engines, the share of people that choose for green energy by
switching their provider or selecting a so-called “green mix” from their current provider
is negligible, even though there are virtually no switching costs involved. In Germany,
for example, only 500,000 consumers have so far decided to switch their electricity
contracts to so-called “¨ Okostrom”, which is an energy mix that is based on zero- or
low-emission power generation technologies.
7 This represents a tiny market share of
only 1-2%, which is also the case in other European countries. Only the Netherlands
represent an exception, where the market share is almost 20%. If this is the situation
in “rich”, industrialized countries, it is more than questionable whether the developing
economies will accept environmentally friendly, but more expensive solutions for their
provision with energy. Therefore, we conclude that the focus of policy makers should
be on the supply side and more particularly on the investments that are taking place
now and in the near future.
Another simpliﬁcation that we make is that we concentrate on investment in power
plants and generation equipment, although the electricity sector involves many more
actors than the actual producer of electricity. The activities can be grouped into four
components: generation, transmission, distribution and end consumption.
8 One could
argue that the government also has the possibility of regulating the latter three parts
6Through the latter, consumers do indirectly exert inﬂuence, of course, but this is not
account for explicitly in the models developed here.
7See W¨ ustenhagen (2004) for more details on the concept of “¨ Okostrom” and an overview
of the market situation in other European countries, the United States, Canada, Japan and
Australia.
8A detailed overview of an electricity sector and all the individual tasks involved for the
participants can be found in Botterud (2003).The Players 7
of the electricity sector, which it actually does in particular cases.
9 However, we want
to abstract from these complications, since e.g. a regulation that requires distribution
companies to buy a certain percentage of renewable energy from the producers means
that the demand for renewable energy increases, which leads to a rising price and
therefore an incentive for the producers to invest in renewable energy carriers. While
this is not the same as imposing the restriction directly on the producer, the results
will ultimately go into the same direction. Nothing is lost in terms of analyzing the
eﬀects of regulations on the supply side, but much can be gained in terms reducing
model complexity and increasing transparency.
1.2.1 The Climate
The primary concern of this thesis is not only to contribute to the literature and
“toolbox” of (investment) decision-making under uncertainty, but also to tackle a
problem that has continuously gained importance and ultimately presents a severe and
urgent threat to human society. This problem is climate change and two questions
that we have to answer before beginning the analysis are: (1) what exactly makes the
climate change? And (2) why is climate change such a bad thing?
Concerning the ﬁrst question, it is now established that the climate changes due
to the warming of the atmosphere. The atmosphere warms up because of the so-
called Greenhouse Eﬀect. This eﬀect in turn is due to increased accumulation of GHG
in the atmosphere: normally, the sun sends radiation through the atmosphere and
warms the surface of the Earth. The Earth itself releases infrared radiation into space,
thereby cooling the temperature down again. This cycle is disturbed by the existence
of GHG emissions in the atmosphere. As these accumulate, radiation sent oﬀ from the
Earth cannot escape into outer space anymore, which ultimately leads to the above-
mentioned warming eﬀect because the sun continues to warm the surface. While it
has long been argued that the contribution of human beings to this process is only
minor or not existent at all, recent evidence (e.g. the Fourth Assessment Report by
the IPCC, 2007) leaves no doubt about this causality: the rate of natural warming is
signiﬁcantly increased by the additional GHG emissions generated by humans. This
occurs mainly through the combustion of fossil fuels (up to 80%) and politicians are
more aware of the problem than ever before.
On January, 10
th 2007, Jos´ e Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commis-
sion, proposed to strive for a 20% cut of EU CO2 emissions by the year 2020, aiming
at limiting global warming to 2
◦C. The German government is debating a ban on less
fuel-eﬃcient cars; France and the UK call for a renaissance of (carbon-free) nuclear
energy to replace coal- and gas-ﬁred energy generation; the list is long.
So what has made those politicians so alert? The debate about the human con-
tribution to climate change is not young at all. In fact, a Swedish scientists named
Svante Arrhenius was the ﬁrst to predict increased rates of global warming due to
9In Germany, for example, electricity producers are ensured by regulation to receive a
premium from transmission and/or distribution companies on the price of electricity generated
with speciﬁed renewables.8 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
the combustion of fossil fuels as early as 1896. Still, it took a long time until peo-
ple started believing that climate change is real and that it is – at least partially –
anthropogenic.
10 However, the recent IPCC report presents evidence that is diﬃcult
to ignore and more is accumulating (e.g. Schneider von Deimling et al, 2006). More
importantly, however, the eﬀects of global warming and climate change are already
materializing: ﬂoods, more extreme weather conditions, large-scale wood ﬁres, the
melting of the arctic ice sheet, rising sea levels and an increase in the energy of heavy
storms are only a few examples of the consequences of a warmer climate. Also here,
evidence is solidifying about the connection between global warming and the phenom-
ena that we increasingly observe: Rahmstorf (2006a and 2006b) does not only ﬁnd
a strong positive correlation between the energy of storms and the warming of the
oceans, but he also warns that the increase in ocean temperature will eventually have
an eﬀect on the circulation of the underlying streams (and a breakdown of the ther-
mohaline circulation would most probably have disastrous eﬀects, which are not easy
to estimate ex ante). Furthermore, the larger the diﬀerence between the air pressure
levels at the two poles, the more intensive the storms will get progressively. More
evidence about the rising storm intensity comes from Knutson and Tuleya (2004) and
Emanuel (2005). Recent storms such as Katrina in New Orleans have shown how large
the extent of (economic) damages can be in this case.
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While research about the exact relationships between climate change and the in-
tensity of storms is still underway, there are more precise estimates in other areas,
such as the rise of sea levels and what the economic losses for people living in coastal
regions would be. As more and more of these causalities and the extent of the conse-
quences become apparent, policy makers have realized that climate change will come
at a considerable cost. This explains the recent urge with which politicians have been
pressing for measures to decelerate the warming process by cutting emissions at higher
than previously agreed rates.
The uncertainties involved in these processes concern two aspects of climate change
in particular. First, climate change is irreversible. Warming is occurring and this
process cannot be stopped or reversed in the short or medium run.
12 Melted ice
10This attitude was enhanced by research often funded by the oil and coal industry trying
to disprove the causal relationship between global warming and the combustion of fossil fuels
or even the existence of the Greenhouse Eﬀect as such.
11Even the storm ‘Kyrill’ passing through Europe in 2007, which was by no means compara-
ble to Katrina, had devastating eﬀects that outperform previous storms in this season. In Ger-
many, at least eleven people were killed and hundreds were injured. Insurance companies esti-
mate the damages to amount to 1 billion eand this does not account for the losses due to power
cuts, the breakdown of the train system and the destruction of 40 million trees, which is a dis-
aster for the German forestry sector (see www.sueddeutsche.depanorama/artikel/877/98779,
“Orkan ‘Kyrill’: Versicherer sch¨ atzen Schaden auf eine Milliarde Euro” 20-01-07 accessed
10-02-2007; and www.tagesschau.de/aktuell/meldungen, “Kyrill f¨ allt mehr als 40 Millionen
B¨ aume” 22-02-07 accessed 10-02-07). Europe-wide at least 39 people died due to Kyrill and
the estimated damages are 5-6 billion e.
12Recently, this view has been challenged by proposing to use geoengineering to reverse
global warming. Nobel Laureate Paul J. Crutzen, for example, suggests that injecting sulfur
into the stratosphere could cool the planet to sustainable levels (Crutzen, 2006). However,
geoengineering is ﬁercely debated for the risks that such drastic approaches bear and seems
far from acceptance for now.The Players 9
sheets cannot be saved and risen sea levels cannot be forced back. However, there is
still hope that global warming could be decelerated and eventually stopped at tolerable
levels in the long run (see e.g. Rahmstorf, 2006a). The problem is that we are not yet
sure what the exact environmental thresholds are, beyond which climate change will
result in more fatal damages. Investors will not want to invest in mitigation assets and
cleaner technologies, if in the end it turns out that the environmental thresholds are
not that close. And even though all signs point into the direction that climate change
is real, the majority still wants to invest into cheaper and more “dirty” technologies.
Since investment in the electricity sector is mostly irreversible and the corresponding
capacity will be used until the end of its economic lifetime, ongoing accumulation of
emissions is the result. Therefore, the government will have to be the link between
the climate and the electricity sector. On the other hand, the investor him-/herself
is aﬀected by diﬀerent types of uncertainties in the face of which he will either bring
forward investments into environmentally more friendly technologies or postpone them.
In the latter case the risk of surpassing environmental thresholds increases, and the
models presented in this thesis therefore provide important insights for policy makers,
who want to give incentives to investors to develop a more sustainable energy mix.
1.2.2 The Electricity Sector
As already mentioned above, the electricity sector is a very complex, integrated system
with many diﬀerent actors, but we simplify this structure here for the sake of a clear
and straightforward analysis and also because the details vary between countries and
regions with diﬀerent organization and legislation. In general, the process of producing
and delivering electricity can be depicted as in Figure 1.1. The supply chain starts
with the generation of electricity. Then the output is fed into the grid of transmission
companies, who continue to channel it to the lower-voltage grids of the distributors.
Finally, the distribution companies serve the end consumers. These can be industrial
clients as well as households. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the terminology used to
describe the electricity sector and its corresponding operations, which will serve as a
glossary for the following chapters.
For reasons outlined in the introduction, we will abstract from impositions of
regulations in the transmission and distribution part. In addition, the corresponding
companies are often owned by the same companies anyway. It is a declared aim of the
European Commission, for instance, to create a clearer separation of energy production
from energy distribution in the near future. If we refer to the electricity sector on the
following pages, we therefore mean the generation part of the supply chain.
When characterizing the electricity sector, a remarkable characteristic is its capital-
intensity. Large investments have to be made before generation can take place, and
once the plants have been installed, most of the installation cost is sunk. This might
deter potential new entrants and protect incumbents leading to a situation that makes
it diﬃcult to maintain eﬃcient competition. On the other hand, many deregulation
and liberalization eﬀorts have been made over the last decades in order to reduce
the market power of individual utilities and enhance competition. In general, we10 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
Source: adapted from Canadian Clean Power Coalition (2004).
Figure 1.1: A Simpliﬁed Illustration of the Electricity Sector
can say that investment in the electricity sector is subject to a substantial degree of
irreversibility with respect to the capacity that needs to be installed up-front.
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Another feature of the electricity sector is connected to the nature of the commod-
ity electricity itself. Because the capability of storing electricity are up to date more
than limited, both generation and consumption occur virtually simultaneously. And
since the use of electricity essentially pervades most of our activities in our daily lives
(from switching on the lights in the morning, over using the computer during the day,
to cooking in the evening), power generation and provision has to be a continuous
process in order to cover a continuous demand that might itself evolve stochastically
while rising with increasing population and rising demand for higher living standards
(e.g. IEA, 2000).
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Most importantly, the electricity sector is inﬂuenced by a large number of uncer-
tainties aﬀecting each investment decision for the long term to a very high extent. As
has already been mentioned above, increased liberalization has led to volatile output
prices. At the same time, input prices are uncertain as well. A lot of fuel prices such
as oil and gas prices ﬂuctuate widely over longer periods of time, and economies lose
large amounts of money from these ﬂuctuations, since they depend on these fuels.
Jones et al (2004), who base their results on Hamilton (2003), for example, investigate
the eﬀect of the oil price on economic activity between 1947 and 1998 and ﬁnd that
the GDP elasticity with respect to oil price changes is -0.116. This implies that a 10%
increase in the price of oil produces GDP losses of 127.6 billion $ if we assume a GDP
of 11,000 billion $. An exhaustive overview of the empirical literature in this respect
and additional links to energy security can be found in Awerbuch and Sauter (2006).
13See e.g. Table 1.2 for an example of the extent of capital costs in the electricity sector.
14Of course, the hourly load varies substantially over the day, typically peaking around
noon and being low during the night. Even though the focus of this thesis is more on long-
term electricity provision and the investment plans associated with this, we extend the model
developed in Chapter 5 to take into account this aspect of the technological proﬁle of gen-
eration techniques in Chapter 6, since load characteristics will entice the investor to further
diversify, so that there will never be shortages during peaks.The Players 11
Term Deﬁnition
Base and peak loads Minimum and maximum loads respectively
experienced by an electric utility over a given
period of time.
Capacity factor Ratio of the actual (electrical) output over a
period of time and its output if it had operated
at full capacity over that same period.
CCS Carbon capture and storage techniques allow
utilities to ﬁlter out the CO2 during the gener-
ation process, so that it does not get released
into the atmosphere.
CHP Combined heat and power (CHP) plants are
plants, which produce both heat and electric-
ity.
Combustible Renewables Examples include biomass, but also certain
waste products.
Fossil Fuels Include (exhaustible reserves of) oil, coal and
gas, which all emit GHG gases during their
combustion.
GHG Greenhouse gas emissions, which are a
byproduct of fossil fuel combustion (see also
previous section).
Lead time Time it takes to complete construction.
Load Amount of electric power delivered or required
at any speciﬁed point or points on a system.
Load originates primarily at the power con-
suming equipment of the customer.
Load duration curve Curve that displays load values on the hori-
zontal axis in descending order of magnitude
against percent of time (on the vertical axis)
the load values are exceeded.
Load factor Ratio of the average load supplied over the
peak or maximum load during a designated
period.




Costs that relate to the normal operating,
maintenance and administrative activities of
the utility.
Renewables Non-exhaustible resources for energy genera-
tion, such as solar power, hydropower, wind
power and geothermal power.
Table 1.1: Electricity Terminology
They claim that the losses from fuel price ﬂuctuations could be reduced by including
more renewables into the energy mix. Their results suggest that such “loss savings”12 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
amount to between 58 and 106 billion $ for the US and EU combined.
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Other fuel prices (e.g. coal and biomass) are more stable and might be used to
hedge against the risks emanating from such price shocks. The idea might emerge that
renewable energy carriers are the solution to this problem, since their “fuel” comes
at zero cost (e.g. the sun for photovoltaic energy or wind for wind power). That
would simultaneously provide a remedy for the emissions problem. However, renewable
energy still suﬀers from quite high capital cost and, in addition, their eﬃciencies
and the times at which they are available represent a disadvantage (wind power, for
instance, needs wind in the ﬁrst place to generate some load at all). Table 1.2 shows the
characteristics of some technologies in order to illustrate these diﬀerences in cost more
thoroughly. Electric output is normalized to 3,285 TWh/year to make the numbers
more comparable.
Parameters Coal Gas Wind Solar
Electricity Output [TWh/yr] 3,285 3,285 3,285 3,285
CO2 Emissions [kt CO2/yr] 2,155 1,094 0 0
Fuel Consumption [TJ/yr] 23,188 19,710 0 0
Fuel Cost [e/TJ] 1,970 3,790 0 0
O&M Fixed Cost [1,000 e/yr] 40,250 15,250 19,667 45,938
Installed Capacity [MW] 500 500 1,389 1,563
Capacity Factor [%] 85 85 27 24
Capital Cost [1,000 e] 686,500 251,500 1,043,735 4,042,067
kt stands for kilo tonnes; TJ for Terajoule; TWh for Terawatthour; MW for Megawatts.
Source: “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 2005 Update”, OECD/IEA
Table 1.2: Power Plant Data
Evidently, capital costs are indeed considerably higher for renewables than for fossil
fuel technologies. Especially solar techniques are at a signiﬁcant disadvantage in this
respect. It costs almost six times more to install enough solar cells to produce the same
amount of electricity as a coal-ﬁred power plant per year. The CO2 ﬁgures only matter
in case the government enacts regulations or taxes because otherwise emissions are an
externality, which does not aﬀect the investment decision. In the case of CO2 taxes
or permit trading, the zero emissions property is a clear advantage for the renewables.
Please note however the low capacity factors of renewables: onshore wind turbines, for
example, have a factor of only 27%. As a consequence, 1,389 MW would be needed
to generate the same amount of electricity as the coal-ﬁred power plant, which is only
500 MW big. For a typical unit size of 1.5 MW per wind mill, this is a requirement of
926 wind mills! Obviously, there will therefore be maximum constraints on the usage
of wind farms, for reasons of limited space in densely populated European countries.
On the one hand, proponents of renewable energy are optimistic that technologi-
cal change might decrease their large capital costs and maybe improve their eﬃciency
rather soon. On the other hand, technological change itself is an inherently uncertain
15These results hold for a modest 10% rise in the renewables share in the energy mix.The Players 13
process that moves more erratically than linearly and smoothly, which adds to the un-
certainties inherent in investment decisions. Yet, there is some appeal in the thought
that established technologies relying on fossil fuels are in a later stage of maturity than
renewable technologies, which still have a lot of scope for improvement that might also
occur relatively faster initially. Oxera Consulting Ltd present studies in a report to
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of the UK that indeed ﬁnd evidence for
this hypothesis. They look at so-called progress ratios (PR), a concept which describes
the decrease in costs of generation technologies through the realization of economies
of scale and technological improvements. More precisely, the PR is the percentage of
initial unit costs that current costs will be resulting from a doubling of cumulative out-
put. The result is that gas turbines – during their R&D phase – had a PR of 80%, i.e.
costs fell by 20% each time cumulative production doubled. In their commercialization
phase, the PR was only 90%, i.e. costs fell only by 10% for each doubling of cumulative
output. This suggests that technological progress decelerates, as technologies mature.
Concerning renewables, the European Wind Energy Association (2004) projects a PR
of 83% to 91% for the capital costs of onshore wind generation. While this indicates
large potential (up to 17% capital cost reductions for each doubling of cumulative pro-
duction, which is currently not at high levels), the wide range in the projections also
points to the uncertainty associated with these promising rates of progress.
16 Thus,
fossil-fuel-based technologies might have more moderate prospects for technological
advances, but these are at least occurring at a relatively certain rate, which can be an
incentive for investors to opt for fossil fuels, even if renewable energy carriers promise
high expected returns (exhibiting more volatility). A portfolio approach is obviously
warranted to analyze the beneﬁts of diversiﬁcation in this context.
This thesis oﬀers new insights into the importance and eﬀects of technological
uncertainty. By incorporating this into a vintage setting with elements from portfolio
selection, we ﬁnd that a decrease in technological uncertainty generally leads to a
postponement of investment because investors want to maximize the beneﬁts that
they can reap from technological change that is now occurring with more certainty by
waiting for these advances to materialize (see Chapters 5 and 6). Uncertainty about
fuel prices has the opposite eﬀect, which would represent an advantage for renewables.
The same uncertainties, but then in a real options framework (see Chapter 4), lead to
earlier investment in both cases.
Other sources of uncertainty are related to policy-making, which in turn is related
to uncertainties about global warming and its eﬀects and uncertainties emanating
from international climate change negotiations. If electricity generators cannot be
sure whether they will face a higher price for CO2 emissions (no matter if it comes in
the form of taxes or emission permits) over the course of their planning period, they
need to adapt their decisions in order to avoid considerable losses in any event.
It is important to note that there is a close relationship between the eﬀects of
irreversibility of investment and uncertainty that reinforces the need for special frame-
16See also Junginger et al (2004) for a detailed study on cost reduction projections for wind
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works dealing with investment decision-making in the electricity sector. If the installa-
tion cost of a power plant were not sunk, decisions could be revised or at least updated
by the time that uncertainties are resolved. However, irreversibility makes it impossi-
ble to build a gas-ﬁred turbine at ﬁrst and dismantle it in favor of a wind mill, the day
that gas prices peak. Standard NPV optimization is therefore not an option because
it treats an investment as a one-time opportunity and does not take into account the
merits from postponing an investment rather than discarding it immediately. (see
Chapter 2 for a more detailed analysis of this aspect). What is needed is also a frame-
work that takes into account the dynamic nature of the problem of capacity planning
(especially when e.g. technological change and increasing and stochastic fuel prices
are involved). Once investments have been made, electricity generators are more or
less “stuck” with their choices, so they need to account for uncertain developments of
key variables ex ante in order to avoid unpleasant surprises ex post.
1.2.3 The Government
As has already become apparent in the characterization of the climate and the elec-
tricity sector, the government has a special role of “mediating” between these two
“parties”. The investor in the electricity sector has no incentive to install exclusively
environmentally friendly technologies if the government does not entice him/her by im-
posing regulations or taxes on the use of fossil fuels or the generation of emissions or by
making renewable energy carriers a more attractive option through granting subsidies
or tax allowances.
17 Without regulation, the pollution created during the electricity
generation process is external to the ﬁrm’s investment and production decisions.
The tools and instruments that the government has at its disposal to inﬂuence the
investment incentives in the electricity sector can be grouped into two broad classes:
instruments that punish the use of fossil fuels, such as CO2 taxes or permit trading,
18
and instruments that support the adoption and diﬀusion of renewable energy such
as subsidies and obligations. In the UK, for example, both types of policy tools are
actually applied. The so-called Climate Change Levy is a tax imposed on the use of
fossil fuels. Such a tax along with permit trading is regarded as an eﬀective way of
imposing a price on CO2 emissions. In addition, the government has implemented the
Renewables Obligation, a regulation which requires a minimum percentage of produced
electricity to be based on renewable energy carriers. This percentage had ﬁrst been
10%, but has subsequently been adapted and raised. In Chapter 7 we will present
an analysis of the Renewables Obligation in the UK in an extended version of the
vintage-portfolio model developed in Chapter 5. Other examples of policy measures
are feed-in tariﬀs, which is a sort of legislated guarantee that a pre-speciﬁed amount of
“green” electricity will be bought oﬀ producers for a ﬁxed price that enables generators
17Thereby, the government is also an indirect way for consumers to inﬂuence the supply
side of the electricity sector.
18The latter is often referred to as the “cap-and-trade regime”, i.e. emissions are capped
and the corresponding number of permits is computed on the basis of the allowed amount of
emissions. The permits are then either allocated or auctioned oﬀ and subsequently traded at
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to cover their expenses.
Gao et al (2005) and Madlener and Gao (2005) explore the diﬀerences in eﬀects
when using diﬀerent policy instruments to support renewable energy and make a dis-
tinction between price and quantity controls. More speciﬁcally, they look at guaran-
teed feed-in tariﬀs (such as in Germany) and tradable permits and ﬁnd that subsidies
always outperform permits when technological innovation is possible.
In this thesis the primary interest is not in the diﬀerence in impact when diﬀerent
policy instruments are used, even though Chapter 3 analyzes the inﬂuence of stochas-
ticity of CO2 prices and the implications of price caps as a “safety valve”.
19 Instead,
the main focus is on the eﬀect of changes in investment incentives in general and the
impact of the uncertainties associated with the policy making process. For example,
if international climate change negotiations are underway and investors do not know
if they will be successful or not, they are eﬀectively unsure about the direction that
future policy will take. Similar uncertainties would arise in case of changes in ex-
isting regulations in response to changes in government and lobbying by industries,
for example. Furthermore, a switch in measurement procedures and deﬁnitions also
represents an uncertainty of the same type to the investor. These uncertainties can be
classiﬁed as “policy uncertainty” therefore. Fluctuations in the CO2 price that arise
e.g. during permit trading, on the other had, are referred to as “market uncertainty”
and might in a Knightian sense (Knight, 1921, Keynes, 1921) be called risk or soft
uncertainty because we can use historical time series to form expectations based on
past trends and empirically motivated probability distributions. While people have
generally been concerned that the risk associated with ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price
might lead investors to postpone their decision to invest in “green” technologies, we
ﬁnd that – for CO2 price processes that are volatile, but overall rising – the opposite
is true: investors optimize under incomplete information and therefore tend to invest
earlier.
20
1.3 Current Electricity Technologies & Future
Outlook
The bulk of the electricity generated in the world today comes from coal-ﬁred capacity
accounting for some 40% of total generation. The fraction of oil-ﬁred production had
been decreasing sharply after the oil price shocks in the 1970s and the remaining
capacity is mainly situated in developing countries. 19% are produced by gas-ﬁred
plants and only 16% is nuclear energy. Of the 18% renewable energy, the lion’s share
19This analysis is mainly motivated by the policy debate whether a price cap on the CO2
permit price is warranted to protect CO2-emitters from the risks associated with CO2 price
volatility.
20If expected prices are rising stochastically, the investment threshold is exceeded by up-
wards spikes and investment is thus triggered earlier than in the case of a smoothly rising price.
Then, even if the price that the investor actually faces behaves non-stochastically, investment
will always occur earlier than optimal, i.e. earlier than in the case where optimization occurs
under non-stochastic prices.16 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
is due to hydropower, so only 2% are produced by wind farms, solar panels, geothermal
plants, tide and wave installations etc.
Furthermore, 97% of all coal-ﬁred electricity generation uses pulverized coal, most
of which is subcritical. However, Integrated Gasiﬁcation Combined Cycle (IGCC)
plants are commercially used now as well, and these plants produce signiﬁcantly less
CO2. Such plants are more expensive to build than less modern coal-ﬁred power plants,
but are increasingly used in the developed countries.
21 In addition, the possibility
to retroﬁt existing capacity with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) facilities, or
to install new plants with in-built CCS, oﬀers even more scope for carbon emission
reductions.
The cost of CCS is very much dependent on the type of plant. The most cost-
eﬀective technologies will have capture costs between $20 and $40 per ton of CO2,
but this does not include transport (about $10/ton of CO2) and storage (between
$1 and $2 per ton of CO2). The storage costs are dependent on the site where the
CO2 is supposed to be stored, of course. In many cases there might actually be quite
substantial beneﬁts in terms of enhanced oil recovery. However, carbon capture has
proven to be economically viable only for plants that operate at a relatively large scale
with a relatively high eﬃciency so far. Since there are many diﬀerent CCS technologies
(e.g. pre- versus post-combustion capture) that are currently being developed and
R&D eﬀorts to improve eﬃciency and costs are vast, this will most deﬁnitely not
remain the case and CCS is generally seen as a promising way to reduce carbon
emissions substantially in the near future.
Biomass-ﬁred generation capacity combined with CCS can even lead to a net re-
moval of CO2 from the atmosphere, since the growing of biomass sequesters more CO2
than is emitted in a plant with CCS. While this is a promising outlook, some countries
might encounter natural limits to the production of biomass as a fuel on a large scale.
The import of biomass as a solution to this problem is also debateable on the grounds
of the emissions that transportation would cause.
The IEA provides technical and cost data for these technologies and also projects
how they will develop in the future given current R&D eﬀorts and scope for improve-
ment (e.g. IEA (2006) or IEA (2005), where the latter is based on surveys of existing
plants in various countries). These are used in the models of the ﬁrst half of this thesis,
as we think that they are the most up to date, most accurate and most consistent data
that can possibly be obtained for this purpose.
In the second half of the thesis we are interested in a larger set of technologies
and we adopt the view of a country, more precisely of the UK in Chapter 7.
22 While
coal still accounts for the largest portion of electricity generation there as well, the
UK is considering a renaissance of nuclear energy to bridge the gap between an energy
21As a “rule of thumb”, the IEA ﬁnds the largest fossil fuel users to be those with the most
ineﬃcient plants at the same time. If China, for example, would use more eﬃcient coal-ﬁred
power plants, they would combust 20% less coal. Similar calculations apply to Russia’s gas
use (IEA, 2006).
22The cost data are speciﬁc to plants used in the UK and come from the same source
(Anderson and Winne, 2004), but these had to be complemented by data from the DTI for
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system based on fossil-fuel-based electricity and one that relies on renewable energy
(e.g. DTI, 2007a). This transition to a less carbon-intensive energy mix is diﬃcult
because the potential for hydropower is almost exhausted and also the acquisition of
suﬃcient biomass is questionable. With other renewables still being rather expensive
or unattractive because of low capacity factors, nuclear energy represents one alterna-
tive for relatively carbon-free energy generation. Furthermore, since fuel eﬃciency is
rising and current uranium deposits are estimated to last for over 80 years at current
consumption, nuclear energy would also serve the goal of enhanced energy security,
which has high priority for the UK as well.
On the other hand, nuclear energy exposes the society to the risk of accidents
with catastrophic consequences and other problematic issues such as the question of
waste disposal. After the Three Mile Island incident in 1979 and the 1986 Chernobyl
accident, many countries initiated the phase out of their own nuclear capacity. Since
then it has been politically diﬃcult to consider nuclear energy as an alternative in
many countries, while others like France even produce a surplus and export this to
other countries. Even though advanced light-water reactors feature enhanced safety
already, it is clear that technological progress has to bring further improvements in
that direction.
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Given the currently existing mix of generating capacity described above and the
outlined potential of individual technologies in the future, it is important to note that
the existing power plant stock in OECD countries is ageing and will need replacement
over the next 10 to 20 years (IEA, 2006). This diﬀers between countries, of course, and
some of the existing plants might also be refurbished to extend plant life. However,
growing energy demand (as indicated in the introduction) will add to the amount
of capacity needed in the near future. Therefore, investment into new capacity will
be decisive for the carbon-intensity of the future energy mix and it is important to
develop an understanding of investment decision-making in this sector in order to avoid
a lock-in to a carbon-intensive energy system for the coming decades.
1.4 Contribution of this Thesis
The discussion of methodologies above has outlined diﬀerent investment theories and
focussed on two methods in particular that take uncertainty into account. These
two methods are real options theory and portfolio selection. Real options theory
is a dynamic theory, where the control is the timing of investment. Uncertainty is
represented by stochastic input or output prices or other parameters. Standard mean-
variance portfolio selection as far as applied to non-ﬁnancial assets, on the other hand,
analyzes investment at one point in time and is therefore inherently myopic. The
advantage from a technical point of view is that the analyst can consider many diﬀerent
technologies, of which the portfolio could be composed, and therefore accounts for the
gains from diversiﬁcation. These technologies may have diﬀerent fuel price paths or
23This has to be kept in mind in the analysis presented in Chapter 7, where the focus is
on the cost side and issues of safety risks are not accounted for.18 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
diﬀerently developing rates of technical change that can be correlated. In a real options
framework, two (correlated) price processes make the model already relatively complex
from a practical point of view. So, unless we are focussing at parameters that aﬀect all
technologies to the same extent (e.g. electricity prices or CO2 prices are the same (or
zero) for all technologies, but fuel prices follow a diﬀerent path for each technology),
it becomes too complex to include many technologies.
24 Still, the advantage that real
options models can actively value the option of postponing investment is unique to
this sort of approach. It is therefore an indispensable tool in decision-making under
uncertainty, and especially in the electricity sector, where huge sunk costs are involved
in investing in new plants and equipment.
In this thesis, real options theory is used to assess the impact of uncertain electric-
ity and CO2 prices on investment behavior. There are not only contributions from a
scientiﬁc point of view, but also in the area of policy making where much research is
needed at relatively short notice because people are only realizing the need for change
when the symptoms of the problem have already started to materialize. Methodolog-
ically, the contribution of the thesis in this respect is that uncertainty is not only
analyzed in terms of stochastic processes and their variance, but also in terms of ex-
pected and realized processes, i.e. the processes, which are used in the optimization
procedure, and the processes that the investor actually faces when picking the deci-
sions according to his optimal strategy.
25 This is very relevant when it comes to policy
making, since – unlike electricity prices – the price of CO2 might not follow the same
trend as it has done over the last one or two years.
26 On the contrary, regulations
might be adapted and procedures redeﬁned. This may lead to a sudden change of slope
or even direction of the CO2 price (as will be seen in Chapter 3) and it is important
to understand, which eﬀect this type of uncertainty exerts on investment plans. At
the same time, the industry has expressed concerns that markets for emissions per-
mits lead to a volatile CO2 price, which might provide disincentives for investors to
acquire environmentally friendly technologies. This type of uncertainty is called “mar-
ket uncertainty” in our framework and it turns out that it actually results in earlier
investment for upward trending CO2 prices. “Policy uncertainty” on the other hand,
leads to the postponement of investment into environmentally friendly technologies
and thereby to prolonged periods of accumulating emissions at high levels because the
option value more than outweighs the losses that are made by postponing investment
in the face of rising CO2 prices. It is therefore the type of uncertainty that matters
for the actual outcomes and thus also for the very eﬀectiveness of policies.
Even though Markowitz mean-variance portfolio theory has a number of disadvan-
tages when dynamics are important, the advantage over real options theory is that
the return-risk tradeoﬀ for multiple technologies can be determined in a very straight-
24However, including diﬀerent technology investment options in one and the same frame-
work implies that the options will be valued in the presence of each other. Fuss et al (2008) ﬁnd
that the option value of individual technologies therefore also become dependent on factors
that drive other options’ values.
25See Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3 for the precise setup of this framework.
26Empirical series for CO2 prices are typically short (less than two years of daily data)
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forward way, even when diﬀerent price processes apply to diﬀerent technologies. In
this thesis we use these elements of portfolio theory and combine them in a vintage
setting (see Chapter 2 for an explanation of vintage modeling) in order to overcome
this deﬁciency and beneﬁt from the advantages of portfolio theory, while still being
able to come up with dynamic portfolios. The idea is to not only ﬁnd portfolios that
maximize returns subject to a speciﬁed level of risk or vice versa in order to ﬁnd the
optimum composition of technologies at a point in time, but to determine the opti-
mum path of development of such a portfolio over time, given changing input prices
and ongoing technological progress and uncertainty about these processes. In other
words, we ﬁnd the optimum portfolio not only over technologies, but also across time
and quality (represented by subsequent vintages). What we actually ﬁnd is that this
type of setting also generates an “implicit option value” of waiting: in the presence of
ongoing (exogenous) technical advances, there is a value to waiting if these advances
are more certain to occur. Therefore, one can say that – for the particular set-up of our
model – we ﬁnd a positive relationship between uncertainty and investment, which is
not a typical result in real options theory, but which could have favorable implications
for the adoption of renewable energy technologies, which typically suﬀer from tech-
nological uncertainty (see Chapter 4). An investigation of the diﬀerence between the
traditional option value and the value of waiting arising in the portfolio-vintage setting
provides interesting additional insights for modeling investment under uncertainty.
The combined approach of vintage modeling and portfolio selection is thus an
improvement over existing approaches in the sense that it takes into account a lot of
additional features of the electricity sector: dynamically evolving prices and rates of
technical change, embodiment of technological progress and investment irreversibility.
Real options theory, on the other hand, is more explicit in considering these as-
pects and actively values the ﬂexibility of timing an investment diﬀerently. Further-
more, while portfolio optimization is methodologically typically interesting for large
investors, who diversify their investments over diﬀerent technologies (or at the country
level as in Chapter 7), real options are more helpful to analyze how the individual in-
vestor incorporates uncertainty into his/her decisions. Chapter 5 studies how the new
vintage-portfolio approach compares to a “standard” Markowitz mean-variance port-
folio framework with uncertain fuel prices and rates of technical change. This analysis
demonstrates how the two diﬀerent frameworks work in detail and emphasizes the
contributions of the new approach.
1.5 Research Outline
The thesis is organized in two parts. Table 1.3 on the next page gives a rough overview
















































1 – Sustainable Energy Develop-
ment under Uncertainty
Introduction: problem deﬁnition, description of contributions and research outline I
2 – Investment Theory under
Uncertainty & Irreversibility
Literature review: orthodox models, real options theory, portfolio selection and vintage
approach; applications to electricity planning.
I
3 – Energy Investments under
Market & Climate Policy Uncer-
tainty
Real options model with stochastic CO2 and electricity prices. Diﬀerent qualities of uncer-
tainty are distinguished, namely market and policy uncertainty.
I
4 – Fuel Price & Technological
Uncertainty in a Real Options
Model for Electricity Planning
Technical change reduces the investment cost of a renewable energy technology, where in-
novations arrive according to a Poisson process. Uncertainty leads to later adoption. If
existing capacity needs to be replaced by either the renewable or a fossil-fuel-based tech-
nology suﬀering from stochastic fuel prices, renewable energy turns out to be less proﬁtable
than fossil-fuel-based energy. CO2 prices can be used to make renewable energy attractive
nonetheless.
I
5 – An Integrated Vintage-
Portfolio Approach to Electricity
Investment
Combination of a portfolio selection approach with a vintage setting, which allows not only
to determine the optimal technology mix at a certain point in time, but also optimizes the
adoption and scrapping of new and existing capacity. Detailed comparison with a standard
Markowitz portfolio model with the same types of uncertainties and the same set of (stylized)
technologies.
II
6 – Technological and Price
Uncertainty in the Vintage-
Portfolio Model – A Compara-
tive Study
An extended version of the vintage-portfolio model developed in Chapter 5 with two types
of technical change and uncertainty in both fuel and investment prices. Theoretical exercises
show that fuel price uncertainty leads to later investment, while uncertainty about technical
change triggers adoption in the concerned technology earlier.
II
7 – An Extended Vintage-
Portfolio Approach to Electricity
Investment and Climate Change
Policy in the UK
Extended version of the modeling approach introduced in Chapter 6 with an application to
UK data with multiple technologies. Uses scenario analysis to include demand uncertainty,
adds load proﬁle (peak vs base), considers (cumulative) emissions and policy issues connected
to this and includes maximum capacity constraints. Analyzes UK policies and implications
of uncertainty about fuel prices and technological advance.
II
8 – Conclusion The conclusion summarizes the results and emphasizes how these relate to climate change
policy.
II
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The ﬁrst part starts out by deﬁning the problems addressed in this thesis, gives an
overview of the contributions (Chapter 1) and reviews the relevant literature (Chapter
2). The remainder of part I is devoted to frameworks based on principles from real op-
tions theory and contains Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 presents a model, in which we
deal with diﬀerent types of uncertainty aﬀecting the investor. In liberalized electric-
ity markets, investors nowadays do not only face uncertainty from volatile electricity
prices, but also from the possibility of stricter climate change policy. We investigate
this in a real options framework with two types of power plants (both coal-ﬁred, but
one with a carbon capture and storage module, which therefore emits less CO2), where
the prices of electricity and CO2 emissions are stochastic. In particular, we analyze
the response of long-term investment to (higher) uncertainty about CO2 prices, which
can come from two sources: price ﬂuctuations around an average, rising price that
might as well be market-driven, and uncertainty about the actions of the government,
which can lead to sudden price jumps or drops. We ﬁnd that producers facing market
uncertainty optimize under incomplete information and invest into the carbon-saving
technology earlier than they would have done if they had known what the prices indeed
are, while policy uncertainty leads to postponement of investment, as the option value
of waiting for the revelation of the policy outcome more than outweighs the losses
associated with ongoing, continuously rising CO2 costs.
Chapter 4 is about a real options model, which considers both fuel price risk
and technological uncertainty to determine the optimal investment strategy for an
individual investor. The power plants under consideration are fossil-fuel-ﬁred and
based on renewables respectively, where the ﬁrst one obviously suﬀers from fuel price
risk, whereas the latter is subject to technical change and therefore also to technological
uncertainty. While technical change itself is embodied and leads to a postponement
of investment, uncertainty leads to further delays in the adoption of the concerned
technology.
The second part of the thesis is occupied with applying portfolio selection to in-
vestment in the electricity sector. Chapter 5 presents an alternative to the real options
modeling approach used in the ﬁrst part of the thesis. By integrating ideas from ﬁnan-
cial portfolio theory into a vintage model of investment and production, interesting
insights are gained into the pattern of decision-making of investors in the electricity
sector.
The basic idea is that the methods by which fuels can be converted into electricity
all belong to diﬀerent “technology families”: the “gas-ﬁred-turbine-family”, the “coal-
ﬁred-turbine-family”, etc. Each family consists of diﬀerent generations of technologies,
as in a vintage model. Within a family, the latest generation embodies the most recent
level of knowledge, becoming outdated as new generations arrive. Producers face the
problem of composing their portfolio of families to minimize risk-adjusted costs of
investment and production under a given demand constraint. Risk emanates only from
capital-saving technical change and volatile fuel prices, so this is a very simple model
to illustrate principles ﬁrst. The cumulative nature of embodied technical change
provides some new insights that have so far been neglected in the literature. This22 Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty
becomes very clear when we set up a “standard” Markowitz framework with the same
characteristics and the same type of technologies, which helps us to work out the
diﬀerences between this and the new approach and to stress the advantages that the
latter has over the former.
Chapter 6 then presents a vintage-portfolio model that takes into account not
only capital-saving technical change and fuel price uncertainty, but also fuel-saving
technical change and investment prices. While all these processes are surrounded by
uncertainty, the investment response is quite diﬀerent. This chapter therefore serves to
further illustrate the workings of the new approach and to disentangle the causes of the
eﬀects that we observe. It becomes evident that it is necessary to make a distinction
between the diﬀerent types of cost and technical change when we want to apply the
model reliably to a real world analysis in Chapter 7. Another important conclusion
that we can derive from this version of the model is the importance of diversiﬁcation
opportunities that apply not only across technologies, but also over time and vintages,
where later vintages represent a higher degree of quality with respect to productivity.
Chapter 7 is an extension of the model of Chapter 6 to capture more realistically
all essential features of an electricity sector and to apply it to more precise data from
the United Kingdom. Even though the data set is rather limited in some respects,
this is a very useful illustration of the more theoretical principles obtained in Chapter
6 and provides a number of new insights. Moreover, its predictions compare favorably
to those of larger macroeconomic models. In particular, we implement several features
of present UK policy in order to illustrate the principles involved. We ﬁnd that the
reduction of risk goes together with an increase in total costs. We also ﬁnd that for
increasing values of risk-aversion, investors would be willing to adopt nuclear energy
at earlier dates than otherwise would have been the case.
27 In addition to this, we ﬁnd
that the embodiment of technical change, in combination with the expectation of a
future switch towards another technology, may actually reduce current investment in
that technology (while temporarily increasing current investment in competing tech-
nologies). The latter enables rational but risk averse investors to maximize produc-
tivity gains by waiting for ongoing embodied technical change to take place until the
moment they plan to make the switch and then investing more heavily in the newest
vintages associated with that technology at the time of the switch.
Chapter 8 ﬁrst summarizes the results of the previous chapters, puts them into
perspective with respect to climate change policy, and – most importantly – reviews
and emphasizes the contributions and novel results. Being able to understand better
how investors can respond to uncertainty, governments can better target their policies
in order to obtain favorable results in terms of reduced CO2 emissions and maybe
ultimately a stabilization of cumulative emissions arising from electricity generation.
Furthermore, the chapter concludes and explains how the work of the thesis comple-
ments and extends existing work in the same ﬁeld.
27This implies that nuclear energy is used as a “bridge” during the transition from a fossil-
fuel-dominated mix to a mix of renewable energy technologies – a role which would be impaired
if other risks relating to nuclear energy generation (safety issues, waste disposal problems, etc)





This chapter is devoted to a literature review of investment theory with particular fo-
cus on irreversibility and issues connected to uncertainty. It starts out with orthodox
investment modeling approaches and then explains the theories used in this thesis in
more detail in the following sections. In particular, real options theory is presented as
a framework that allows to consider both uncertainty and investment irreversibility by
timing the exertion of the investment option optimally. Second, portfolio approaches
value the beneﬁts from diversifying across technologies, so that a risk averse planner
can determine the optimal (in the sense of maximizing return at a speciﬁed level of risk
or minimizing risk for a particular return) mix of technologies at the corresponding
degree of risk aversion. Third, a portfolio approach can be complemented by elements
from vintage modeling, so that investors are not only able to diversify across tech-
nologies, but also across time and degrees of quality where later vintages are of higher
quality with respect to productivity.
Moreover, applications to investment in the electricity sector are presented and
reviewed along with the theory, which helps to put the contributions of this thesis
further into perspective. Appendix A describes some tools that are used in large-
scale energy planning to integrate uncertainty into otherwise deterministic models. In
Chapter 7 we use scenarios, for example, to account for demand uncertainty, while
fuel price risk and technological uncertainty is captured by the stochastic variables
underlying the portfolio optimization procedure. Table 2.1 summarizes the outline of
this chapter.
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Section Subsection Content
1 – Introduction
2 1 The Jorgenson (1963) model (does not incor-
porate uncertainty and irreversibility)
2 Hartman (1972), Nickell (1978), Abel (1983)
(extended investment models; also consider
uncertainty and irreversibility)
3 1 Demonstration of Methodology
2 Early Literature (how real options theory
evolved; seminal studies)
3 More recent frameworks focussing on (1)
technological uncertainty, (2) environmental
uncertainty, (3) policy uncertainty and (4)
electricity-speciﬁc applications.
4 Uncertainty-investment relationship
4 1 Theoretical background of portfolio theory
(with detailed explanation of the Markowitz
(1952, 1959) framework)
2 Applications of portfolio theory to real assets
(focus on investment in the electricity sector)
3 Uncertainty-investment relationship
5 – Vintage models (basic structure, embodied
technical change, scrapping rules and how we
can borrow elements to combine them with
portfolio theory)
6 – Conclusion (emphasizing the contributions of
the thesis to the reviewed literature again, see
also Chapter 1)
Appendix A – Large-scale frameworks used in electricity
planning (description of tools used in large-
scale models to account for uncertainty such
as scenario analysis)
Appendix B – Technical illustration of the value-matching
and smooth-pasting conditions as shown in
Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
Table 2.1: Organization of Literature Review
2.2 Orthodox Investment Theories
Traditional economics literature about investment started with Jorgenson (1963). In
a nutshell, his approach, which is based on the neoclassical theory of optimal capitalOrthodox Investment Theories 25
accumulation,
1 compares the value of the marginal product of capital in each period
of time with the user cost of that capital. Equating those terms then delivers the
optimal capital stock, from which we can derive the rate of investment. Tobin (1969)
follows an essentially similar approach, founding the so-called q-theory of investment.
He calculates the capital value of marginal investment and divides it by its replacement
cost. The result is the so-called “q-ratio”. If q > 1, then investment is warranted, if q <
1 the existing capital stock should be reduced. Both approaches, the Jorgenson (1963)
model and the q-theory, do not take into account adjustment costs, however. This is
a substantial drawback when considering that investment is often lumpy and usually
irreversible in sectors like the electricity sector. Also, it ignores the fact that most
industries exhibit speciﬁc dynamics, which cannot be taken into account in frameworks
that are inherently static. Furthermore, these models do not consider the eﬀects of
uncertainty on the investment decision. Work that has followed from these seminal
studies (e.g. by Sandmo, 1971, and Leland, 1972) have incorporated uncertainty and
analyzed the eﬀects on output and prices. These studies too suﬀer from the lack of
dynamics and the failure to consider irreversibility in their models, however.
In the 70s and 80s, the theory was extended by a number of seminal studies that
ﬁnally acknowledged the importance of adjustment costs to give a realistic account of
investment behavior. Most notably, Hartman (1972), Nickel (1978) and Abel (1983)
have all developed investment models, which are suitable to analyzing the eﬀects of
uncertainty on investment in frameworks where adjustment costs are non-zero. Their
shortcoming lies in the assumption that the investment decision is a “once-and-for-all”
opportunity. Lensink et al (2001) point out that this is the reason why these models
have generally performed rather poorly when applied econometrically. The ﬂexibility
to time investments diﬀerently implies that foregoing the opportunity to invest at a
later point in time by investing now should be valued accordingly. This has been
ignored in these studies.
This section is organized as follows:
2 we will ﬁrst give an outline of the neoclas-
sical Jorgenson (1962) model, followed by a description of how uncertainty has been
incorporated in this framework by other authors. Then we will turn to the models
including adjustment costs that have been mentioned above: Hartman (1972), Nickell
(1978) and Abel (1983).
2.2.1 The Jorgenson (1963) Model
The neoclassical investment model focusses on a ﬁrm facing perfect competition and
having two factors at its disposal. These factors are labor L and capital K, and they
can be substituted for each other. The production function has constant returns to
1Even though the neoclassical approach to optimal capital accumulation (i.e. that produc-
tion and investment plans are based on the maximization of utility over time) was receiving
more acceptance than before by that time, not much had been achieved in terms of formulating
it consistently and the econometric literature fell short of this as well.
2These sections will draw on the expositions in Lensink et al (2001), and more particularly
the chapter about uncertainty in investment decision processes.26 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
scale as e.g. in the Cobb-Douglas case. Also, the Inada conditions are satisﬁed.
3
Contrary to vintage theory (see Section 2.5), the stock of capital is homogenous and
its productivity does not depend on its age. Moreover, it depreciates at a rate δ. Cash
ﬂows are revenues less the cost:
π = p   Y (K,L) − w   L − r   I (2.2.1)
where p is the output price, r the purchasing price of capital
4 and w the wage rate.
I is investment, which can be broken up into replacement investment, δ   K, and net




{p   Y − w   L − r   (
dK
dt
+ δ   K)}   e
−ρtdt (2.2.2)
where ρ is the discount rate. The problem is that net investment must be bounded for
a solution to exist, so Jorgenson assumes that there are no spikes in net investment.
The marginal productivity conditions that can be found when maximizing Equation
(2.2.2) subject to the production function are well-known. The marginal products are
equal to the ratio of factor and output prices, where in the case of capital discounting













These conditions apply in each period t. However, as Lensink et al (2001) point
out, the Jorgenson (1963) approach is not dynamic: since the optimality conditions
(2.2.3) involve only current period variables, the neoclassical model is inherently static.
In other words, the investor can make the optimal decision without considering the
future, which hinges on the assumption that capital is rented. Also, as the neoclassical
approach assumes perfect foresight, it precludes any treatment of the impact that
uncertainty might have on the investment decision.
Leland (1972) and Sandmo (1971) extend the work by Jorgenson (1963) to incor-
porate uncertainty. Since the basic model can jump deliberately to a new optimum
capital stock, the eﬀects of uncertainty on investment decisions cannot be analyzed.
What Leland (1972) and Sandmo (1971) therefore focus on is the eﬀect of uncertainty
on production plans. In particular, Leland (1972) looks at demand uncertainty. He
ﬁnds that, facing uncertainty, it is very important to know which type of ﬁrm we are
dealing with. For a competitive ﬁrm, which is able to set the quantity, that quan-
tity has to be ﬁxed before the ﬁrm knows how demand varies, whereas the price is
determined ex post. His main conclusion is that a risk averse ﬁrm will produce less
output if it faces uncertainty than in the case where demand is known with certainty.
Sandmo (1971) has a similar framework with a price-setting ﬁrm, but the results are
3The Inada conditions are: Y ′(0) = ∞, Y ′(∞) = 0 and Y (0) = 0
4The ﬁrm thus owns the capital stock rather than renting it.Orthodox Investment Theories 27
the same: uncertainty leads to a more cautious output plan, if the investor is averse
to ﬂuctuations in the price.
2.2.2 Models with Irreversible Investment and Uncertainty
In this section, three studies that have been very inﬂuential in the literature on in-
vestment theory including adjustment costs will be reviewed. The ﬁrst is by Hartman
(1972), who proposes a model with a perfectly competitive and risk neutral ﬁrm that
faces uncertainty with respect to wages and the prices for output. Adjustment costs
are steadily increasing over time, but even more so with the size of the (dis)investment.
In case there is no (dis)investment, the adjustment cost will of course be zero as well.
Again, gross investment is equal to the sum of net investment and replacement invest-
ment. The value function that the investor thus maximizes is the same as in Equation
(2.2.2) in the Jorgenson (1963) model, but for the adjustment cost C(It)
5 and the fact








dt + δ   K, i.e. the same capital accumulation equation as before holds.
The ﬁrst order condition that is derived under uncertainty is an equality between
the expected present value of the net return on the marginal unit of capital and the
marginal adjustment cost. In other words, the beneﬁts that emanate from the purchase
of one more unit of capital at time t should be equal to the cost of adjusting the capital











′ − rt (2.2.6)
where t
′ > t. While
  ∞
t pt′  
∂Yt
∂Kt   e
−(δ+ρ)(t′−t)dt
′ represents the present value of the
revenue from investing into one more unit of capital at time t, rt is the cost of doing
so.





∂k . Following Lensink et al (2001), Equation (2.2.6) can then be rewritten












)} − rt (2.2.7)
with αt′,t as the discount factor. By using Jenson’s inequality, it can then be shown
that an increase in the (mean-preserving) spread of wages and/or prices will lead to




pt′ )} as well.
6 This implies that uncertainty is a stimulus to
5This function is increasing in the absolute size of investment, i.e. both investment and
disinvestment are costly for the ﬁrm because the adjustment cost function is convex and has
a minimum at zero for zero gross investment only.
6Jenson’s inequality says that if pt is a random variable and f(pt) is a convex function,
then E{f(pt)} > f{E(pt)}. For example, if f(pt) is the square of the price, and this price
is distributed as [1,3] at time t, but at time t′ it has a larger spread such as [-1,5], then28 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
investment, if the marginal revenue product of capital is convex in wages and prices.
While the Hartman (1972) model regards prices as random variables and there-
fore unknown at all times, Abel (1983) considers only future prices to be unknown;
everything that has already occurred or is occurring is known with certainty. For the
rest, Abel’s (1983) assumptions coincide with those of Hartman (1972): the ﬁrm under
consideration is competitive, risk neutral, maximizes proﬁts under price uncertainty
and produces under constant returns to scale. His results show that investment is a
linear and increasing function of the marginal revenue product of capital, where the
latter rises as the variance of the price process increases. In other words, investment
is raised by higher price uncertainty, which is in line with the conclusion by Hart-
man (1972). Again, this only holds if the function to be maximized is convex in the
stochastic variable(s). Caballero (1991) shows that the results derived by Hartman
(1972) and Abel (1983) depend crucially on the assumptions of perfect competition
and constant returns to scale.
The model by Nickell (1978) is similar to those by Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983).
However, it also acknowledges that risk neutral behavior might not be the standard
among ﬁrms and that risk aversion may possibly turn the eﬀects of uncertainty on
investment negative. Nickell (1978) incorporates risk averse behavior by maximizing
a value function of proﬁts rather than proﬁts as such. In his model the value of the
ﬁrm is equal to the present value of the expected value of proﬁts less the variance
and covariance of cash ﬂows. In other words, uncertainty is actively valued in the
objective function now. He uses his new objective function and applies it to the
Hartman (1972) model to derive a comparable optimality condition. The results show
that, for risk averse ﬁrms, the rate of investment is lower than for risk neutral ﬁrms.
Therefore, under particular circumstances, the eﬀect of uncertainty on investment
might be negative instead of positive when assuming that investors are averse to risk.
The following section will describe in more detail, which tools have been devel-
oped so far and how they have been applied to the speciﬁc case of the electricity
sector. While large-scale energy assessment models have typically relied on linear-
programming models (see Appendix A), smaller (partial equilibrium) models adopt-
ing tools from ﬁnance have proven very useful to analyze the eﬀects of uncertainty,
especially in combination with issues of irreversibility.
2.3 Real Options Theory
The special features of the electricity sector (uncertainty, irreversibility and the ﬂex-
ibility to postpone investments) make standard investment rules relying on the Net
Present Value (NPV) inappropriate because they treat investment opportunities as
“once-and-for-all” chances and therefore ignore the options involved in the sequence
of decisions. As an example, Pindyck (1993) presents a case where an investment of
$1 is required at ﬁrst, after which there is a probability of 50% that the project will be
ﬁnished successfully. However, there is also a 50% chance that another investment of
f(E{pt}) = 4 and E{f(pt)} = 10/2 = 5. And f(E{p′
t}) = 4 still, but E{f(p′
t)} = 26/2 = 13.Real Options Theory 29
$4 will be necessary to complete the project. The completed project will have a certain
payoﬀ of $2.8, so with an expected cost of $3 the NPV is negative and the traditional
NPV rule would advise not to invest. More precisely though, the investor would take
into account that he has the option to abandon the project after phase one and so
the NPV adjusted for the option value is 50% ($2.8)-$1=$0.4, which is greater than
zero, so at least the ﬁrst phase should be undertaken. The option value can then be
calculated as the diﬀerence between the traditional and the adjusted NPV. According
to Pindyck (1993) this reasoning can be used to explain the fact that so many new
nuclear power plants close to completion were canceled in the United States in late
1982, a time during which there was much uncertainty about construction costs, which
had started to rise considerably after some projects had already been launched.
7 It is
important to note that the term “option” in this context should not be understood as
a synonym for choice or alternative. An option as it is meant here is the right, but not
an obligation, to realize an investment opportunity.
A very simple, graphical example illustrates this very clearly. In Figure 2.3 an
investment option that can be exercised at time zero will deliver a proﬁt of π imme-
diately. However, at time t
′ two diﬀerent scenarios are possible and only at time t
′
the uncertainty will be resolved, which of the two will materialize. In one case the
proﬁts rise to π
′, in the other case there will be a loss of π
′′. Thus, by postponing
investment, the investor might forgo the striped area of immediate proﬁt ﬂows, but
can at the same time avoid the loss represented by the dotted area. As long as the
latter exceeds the ﬁrst, i.e. the gains from waiting exceed the opportunity costs of not
investing, waiting will be optimal.
Source: adapted from Blyth (2007).
Figure 2.1: Graphical Example of the Option Value
7Of course, uncertainty pervades the decisions of most investors. However, the interaction
with large sunk cost and the ﬂexibility to time investments diﬀerently combined with the large
extent of the uncertainties surrounding investment in power generating equipment, makes the
electricity sector a particularly interesting area of application for real options models.30 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
2.3.1 Methodology and Terminology
The electricity sector exhibits a number of special features as explained in Chapter 1.
These include the relative irreversibility of investments, the ﬂexibility of timing invest-
ments
8 and the uncertainty surrounding the decisions to install power plant equipment.
These characteristics make the standard NPV rule for investing inappropriate, as will
be shown in this section. Real options theory provides a framework, in which invest-
ment under uncertainty can be investigated when irreversibility and ﬂexibility with
respect to the timing of sequential decisions are involved. This section describes the
basic ideas and methodology,
9 reviews some of the existing literature on real options
theory and the applications to the electricity sector, and gives a preview on how we
want to use these principles for our purposes.
Originally developed for valuing ﬁnancial options in 1970s (e.g. Black and Scholes,
1973), economists soon realized that option pricing also provided considerable insight
into decision-making concerning capital investment. Hence the term “real” options.
Early frameworks were developed by McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1988,
1991, 1993), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
10
The basic idea is that standard investment theory relying on NPV calculations
generally do not take into account the interaction between three important character-
istics of numerous investment decisions: the irreversibility of most investments, which
implies that a substantial portion of the total investment cost is sunk, the uncertainty
surrounding the future cash ﬂows from the investment, which can be aﬀected by e.g.
the volatility of output and input prices, and the opportunity of timing the investment
ﬂexibly.
11 Regarding the opportunity to defer an investment as an option means that
we can assign a value to waiting. In other words, investors gain more information
about the uncertainty that surrounds economic decisions as time passes by, as in the
example in Figure 2.3, where the investor learns about the level of proﬁts only in pe-
riod t
′. Therefore, staying ﬂexible by postponing decisions has an option value if the
degree of uncertainty faced is big enough. This value increases if the sunk cost that
has to be incurred to launch the project is high, but also in times of larger uncertainty
associated with future cost or revenues. In this case it pays oﬀ to wait and see how the
conditions have changed, especially if they are expected to be rather stable afterwards.
In order to demonstrate the principles of the approach, ﬁrst consider an investor,
who can postpone the decision to invest. Furthermore, the value of the investment
8By ﬂexibility we mean the possibility to postpone investment or to bring it forward in
time.
9This part draws heavily on Dixit and Pindyck (1994), McDonald and Siegel (1986) and
the survey by Carruth et al (2000).
10For a comprehensive treatment and overview of both ﬁnancial and real options theory
see Trigeorgis (1996). More advanced and with several applications is Schwartz and Trigeorgis
(2001).
11It is the interaction between those characteristics that matters because only the combina-
tion of these factors creates an option value: if the investment was not irreversible, uncertainty
would not represent such a big problem for the investor, since he could easily adjust the capital
stock at low cost. Also, if there was no uncertainty, the ability to postpone investment would
not be worth much. Vice versa, if the investor was not ﬂexible, waiting would not be a way
to overcome (some of this) uncertainty.Real Options Theory 31
is uncertain, and once committed, the cost of the investment cannot be recovered
anymore. This implies that the investor can possibly gain by waiting until some of
this uncertainty is resolved. In other words, there is a “wedge” between the standard
NPV of a project – i.e. the value of the project considering the investment as a “once-
and-for-all” opportunity – and the current value of the project to the investor taking
into account the possibility of deferring the investment to a later point in time. If
V is the present value (PV) of the project to be undertaken and C is the cost of the
investment to be made, then the traditional NPV rule indicates that investment should
only be conducted if V ≥ C. However, if V evolves stochastically, the true current
value of the project will most likely be higher, since we also have to value the option to
postpone the investment. Suppose V follows a geometric Brownian motion,
12 where
dV is the change in V ,  
13 is a drift parameter, σ is the volatility parameter and dw
the increment of a Wiener process.
14
dV =  V dt + σV dw dw = ǫt
√
dt,ǫt ∼ N(0,1),E(ǫiǫj) = 0 ∀i,j i  = j (2.3.1)
The expected PV of the option to invest shall now be maximized. Following
Pindyck (1991), we denote the option value by a function F(V ):
F(V ) = maxt E{e
r t   (V − C)} (2.3.2)
where we omit to denote the dependence of V on t for simplicity. t has to be chosen
so as to maximize the expected value of the project.
15 r is the discount rate. The
expected return from postponing investment is
E{dF(V )}
dt , which has to be equal to the
opportunity cost (i.e. the interest that could be earned on F(V ), which is received





− r   F(V ) = 0 (2.3.3)
Intuitively, you could explain Equation (2.3.3) by the fact that it equates the marginal
costs of waiting with the marginal beneﬁts of doing so. In other words, the investor
12This process is simply the exponential of a Brownian motion with drift and was initially
suggested by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973b) as a response to the weakness of
the standard Brownian motion with drift to also assume negative values (since it is a Gaussian
process after all), which is not a realistic property for modeling price behavior, which is what
we intend to use this approach for.
13Pindyck (1991) splits µ up into the sum of the dividend rate and the expected capital
gain. For our illustrative purposes, this more simplistic presentation is completely suﬃcient.
14See e.g. Mikosch (1999) for a comprehensible introduction into stochastic calculus and
in particular the ﬁrst three chapters for stochastic processes, the Itˆ o Lemma and Itˆ o stochas-
tic diﬀerential equations, respectively. Another excellent treatment of stochastic diﬀerential
equations is by Øksendahl (2003).
15Alternatively, the control could be a variable denoting e.g. a particular decision such as
“invest the full amount of available funds”, “do not invest at all”, ‘invest ﬁrst in R&D and
only in case of success into a new plant”, etc.
16Dixit and Pindyck (1994) amongst others call this the Bellman equation because they use
the so-called principle of optimality found by Bellman to derive it. In general, the Maximum
Principle can also be used instead of dynamic programming. However, the Maximum Principle
approach is much more suited for problems in continuous time and without uncertainty and
less so for the situations that we want to explore in this chapter (Dixit, 1990).32 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
can earn F(V ) upon immediate investment and earn interest on that amount, but if
investment is postponed these gains are foregone. These opportunity costs therefore
have to be equal to the gains from waiting, which accrue from changes in F(V ) – a
sort of “appreciation” of the underlying asset. Since we need to diﬀerentiate F(V ) to
ﬁnd the solution, we make use of Itˆ o’s Lemma (see Mikosch (1999), page 115).







Now we substitute the expression for dV from Equation (2.3.1) into Equation (2.3.4)
and take expectations. It is important to note that E(dz) = 0 by deﬁnition of the
process (see above), so the terms related to dz drop out. This delivers





2   V
2   F
′′(V )dt. (2.3.5)
Substituting (2.3.5) into Equation (2.3.3) gives





2   V
2   F
′′(V )] − r   F(V ) = 0 (2.3.6)
The corresponding boundary conditions can be found in Equation (2.3.7), where a tilde
denotes the value of a variable at the optimum. The ﬁrst condition conveys that the
option value will be zero, if the project has a value of V = 0. The second one requires
F(V ) to be smooth and continuous around the optimum point, which only applies if
the increase in F at ˜ V is equal to the increase in V at its optimum, i.e. if the slopes
are equal. Since the derivative of V with respect to ˜ V is 1 at this point, F
′(˜ V ) has
to be equal to 1 as well. This condition is also widely known as the “smooth-pasting”
condition (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Appendix B explains how Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) show that the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions indeed need to
hold at the optimum point. Finally, at this optimum point, the payoﬀ, V , net of the
cost, C, will be equal to the option value, F(V ). This is best illustrated graphically,
as in Figure 2.2.
F(0) = 0
F(˜ V ) = ˜ V − C
F
′(˜ V ) = 1
(2.3.7)
For this problem, we are able to solve Equation (2.3.6) subject to the constraints
in 2.3.7.
17 We do so by following Pindyck (1991), who guesses a functional form and
determines by substitution ex post. In this case, bringing r   F(V ) to the right and
dividing by r, we see that the solution to Equation (2.3.6), which satisﬁes the ﬁrst
17To solve more complicated versions of the Bellman equation, such as typically the sum
of the expected value of immediate proﬁts and the continuation value of a project, sophisti-
cated computing methods are needed. The approach via partial diﬀerential equations may not
always be the most eﬃcient or even possible way to deal with this. Therefore, dynamic pro-
gramming is often combined with Monte Carlo simulation techniques or multinomial decision
trees in order to ﬁnd the most eﬃcient and ﬂexible solution algorithm.Real Options Theory 33
boundary condition, can be expressed as V with an unknown exponent and multiplied
by a constant factor:
F(V ) = a   V
β, (2.3.8)
where a can be derived by substituting Equation (2.3.8) into boundary condition
number 2 in (2.3.7). a is therefore equal to
˜ V −C
˜ V β . Similarly, ˜ V is the result of plugging





  C. (2.3.9)
β is composed of the parameters as follows.
19 Note that it will always be larger
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σ2 (2.3.10)
In order to illustrate the diﬀerence between the standard NPV rule and the real
options rule again, remember that we realized that there is a wedge driven between
the NPV and the “true” current value of the project by the existence of uncertainty
and the ﬂexibility of timing the investment diﬀerently. Looking back at the boundary
conditions in Equation (2.3.7) we have derived Equation (2.3.9). If we were following
the standard NPV rule, then this equation would be ˜ V = C,
20 so the wedge we were
referring to earlier is exactly deﬁned as
β
β−1, which will always be greater than 1.
Therefore, we can conclude that under uncertainty the value of the project at the
exercise date must exceed the mere cost of the investment. Furthermore, an increase
in uncertainty, proxied by an increase in σ will actually raise the wedge and, other
things equal, lead to a postponement of investment because there is more to gain by
waiting longer.
To illustrate the principles presented graphically, consider Figure 2.2, where the
value of the project increases with time (maybe due to rising output prices). The
option value, denoted by F(V (t)), starts out at zero because it can never be negative,
as the investor can always choose not to exercise the option, i.e. F(V (t)) = 0. In
contrast, the standard NPV can very well be negative, as long as the cost of exercising
the option, C, exceeds the current value of the project, V (t). Investment under the
standard NPV rule therefore occurs where (V (t) − C) crosses the x-axis, i.e. where
V (t) = C. The option value F(V (t)), however, is higher than the simple NPV, since
the wedge
β
β−1 exceeds 1 as explained above, i.e. ˜ V > C (see Equation (2.3.9)).
The optimal exercise time therefore is at the point where the F(V (t))-curve crosses
the (V (t) − C)-schedule, which is much later than the optimal point in time when
18 ˜ V −C
˜ V β · ˜ V β−1 = 1
β ⇔
˜ V −C
˜ V = 1
β.
19It is derived by plugging Equation (2.3.8) into Equation (2.3.6). After canceling out, the
quadratic equation σ2
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σ2 . However, due
to our conditions, the second solution can be excluded, since it would imply that β < 0.
20This is the point at which it becomes proﬁtable to invest; any ˜ V ≥ C also qualiﬁes for
investment, of course.34 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
the NPV rule is applied. More precisely, what can be gained from waiting can be
measured as the vertical diﬀerence between F(V (t)) and (V (t) − C): at the point
where (V (t) − C) crosses the x-axis, F(V (t)) > (V (t) − C), so the beneﬁts of waiting
are larger than zero. As (V (t)−C) continues to rise, however, these beneﬁts diminish
and it is optimal to invest when F(V (t)) = (V (t) − C).
The optimal exercise time occurs later with an option value rule than with a standard NPV
criterion.
Figure 2.2: Option Value versus Standard NPV
Figure 2.3: More Uncertainty Makes the F(V(t))-Schedule Rotate Upwards.
An increase in uncertainty rotates the F(V (t))-curve upwards, since the option to
wait gets more valuable by Equation (2.3.9), where
β
β−1 will increase in response toReal Options Theory 35
a higher σ (see Equation (2.3.10)). As a consequence, the investment date is shifted
farther into the future as indicated by the arrow in Figure 2.3.
Real options theory has been applied in a vast number of ﬁelds, such as the valua-
tion of exploration projects of natural resources like e.g. oil (Diaz, 2004), the weighing
of irreversibilities in natural damages versus the irreversibilities involved in commit-
ting resources to mitigation eﬀorts (Kolstad, 1996a, 1996b, Ulph and Ulph, 1997), and
the planning of infrastructure (Garvin and Cheah, 2004). In this thesis, however, we
are primarily concerned with the use of real options methods for electricity planning.
2.3.2 The Early Literature
Options pricing had originally been developed to value ﬁnancial options in the 1970s
(Black and Scholes, 1973, and Merton, 1973). Already at that time, economists real-
ized that the irreversibility involved in many economic decisions concerning investment
also creates an option value for non-ﬁnancial assets. Arrow and Fisher (1974) incorpo-
rate irreversibility and uncertainty into a model where decisions about environmental
preservation need to be made (the irreversibility is then associated with pollution that
cannot be cleaned up ex post, with the loss of a form of life or the destruction of a
unique geomorphological phenomenon). They conclude that
[...] the expected beneﬁts of an irreversible decision should be adjusted to
reﬂect the loss of options it entails (Arrow and Fisher, 1974).
Likewise, Henry (1974) investigates what he calls the “irreversibility eﬀect”, by
which he means that decisions that previously appeared to be economical become
unattractive when irreversibility is taken into account. Furthermore, he ﬁnds that the
irreversibility eﬀect is enhanced by an increase in uncertainty.
Later models in which ﬁnancial option pricing was deliberately adapted to the
valuation of “real” assets can be found in Pindyck (1980), Brennan and Schwartz
(1985), McDonald and Siegel (1986), Majd and Pindyck (1987) and many others.
McDonald and Siegel (1986) propose a model in which the investor has to commit
resources for a project with value V . The investment decision is irreversible, so the
cost of the project I is sunk. Both the value of the project and the investment costs
are stochastic variables growing in time. When the ratio of the two variables reaches
a critical level ˜ (V/I), the opportunity cost of committing resources has shrunk to zero
and it is optimal to exercise the option, i.e. to invest. In a similar vein, Majd and
Pindyck (1987) develop a model in which sequential investments can be analyzed. The
option to abandon the project midstream can be considered in the same way as the
example by Pindyck (1993) described above. Again, the value of the project after
completion follows a stochastic process. More speciﬁcally, it is the cost that makes
this value stochastic.
Brennan and Schwartz (1985) investigate whether and when it is optimal to take
a copper mine into operation when the price of copper follows a stochastic process.
Similarly, Pindyck (1980) uses real options to compute the optimal exploitation strat-
egy for an exhaustible resource, but in this case it is not only the future cash ﬂow, but36 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
also the level of the resource reserve that can vary stochastically. The applications to
resource extraction projects have been vast in real options theory. Many authors have
focussed on the oil business, where considerable investment outlays for exploration
and the building of platforms have to be made. The earliest reference that can be
found in this speciﬁc area goes back as far as 1979, when a PhD student by the name
Tourinho wrote his dissertation “The Valuation of Reserves of Natural Resources: An
Option Pricing Approach” (see e.g. Slade, 2001 or Armstrong et al, 2004). Even
though the extractive sector had long known that standard NPV analysis systemati-
cally undervalues mineral properties, it was only from then on that a multitude of real
options valuations for speciﬁc projects in natural resource extraction started to arise.
One of the many examples that have been analyzed is the valuation of the option to
temporarily close down a mine if output prices plunge into an unexpected trough or
to abandon a mine altogether (as e.g. Brennan and Schwartz (1985), see above). Most
applications have been made in the oil sector, of course. Paddock et al (1988), for
example, focus on undeveloped oil reserves and ﬁnd that, empirically, the real options
valuation performs better than the traditional discounted cash ﬂow (DCF) method.
Other important contributions are by Pindyck (1988) and Pindyck (1991), where
the latter also gives a very good overview of the literature on irreversible investment at
that time. The former adds to the literature mentioned above (e.g. Majd and Pindyck,
1987, Brennan and Schwartz, 1985, etc) by not only considering a discrete project that
can be invested into or not, but also the possibility to invest into smaller factories
and expand later on. In other words, Pindyck (1988) focusses on the incremental
investment decision rather than on a complete investment plan. The value of the
marginal unit of a unit of capacity includes the value of the option to leave that unit
idle. The full value of the marginal unit must be equal to its full cost. The full cost
is composed of all costs related to purchase and installation and the option to invest,
i.e. the opportunity cost of exercising the investment option. An important ﬁnding is
that (demand) uncertainty has two eﬀects: on the one hand, it increases the value of
a unit of capacity. On the other hand, it increases the value of the ﬁrm’s investment
options, since irreversible investment becomes more costly in terms of the opportunity
cost of exercising that option. The latter eﬀect is much larger than the former, which
is why the ﬁrm’s optimal capacity is reduced in the face of uncertainty. The option
to expand existing capacity later on are called “growth options” by Pindyck (1988).
With the help of some numerical simulations, he ﬁnds that these growth options are
very valuable assets for the ﬁrm and that it is therefore important to account for them
adequately. However, considering only one source of uncertainty (about demand) and
making the strong assumption that all investment is incremental (while it is actually
lumpy in many sectors) makes this study more of an illustrative than an applicable
character for our purposes, although useful theoretical insights can be gained from the
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2.3.3 More Recent Frameworks
Revenue and Technological Uncertainty
While much of the work from the 1980s focussed on uncertainty about the value of a
project or a ﬁrm, where the timing of sunk costs of known magnitude was optimized,
the 1990s brought more elaborate frameworks, where the investment cost itself could
be uncertain and where distinctions between diﬀerent types of uncertainty became
possible.
The paper by Pindyck (1993) already mentioned above, for example, acknowledges
the fact that for large projects or projects that require initial R&D phases, investment
cost uncertainty might play a larger role than the value upon completion. Also, for
projects that take time to complete, there are considerable uncertainties connected
to the actual cost and construction time.
21 He therefore makes a distinction between
technical uncertainty, which applies when investment takes place, and input cost un-
certainty, which matters even if there is no new investment, and allows for the oppor-
tunity to abandon the project midstream. Input costs comprise the cost of materials
and labor, which can ﬂuctuate regardless of the investment rate. The investment rule
that he derives tells the investor to invest only if the expected total cost falls below
a critical value. He then determines then how this critical value is inﬂuenced by the
diﬀerent types of uncertainty. He ﬁnds that technical uncertainty has a positive eﬀect
on the critical cost level, i.e. it becomes proﬁtable to invest already at a relatively
high cost level. Technical uncertainty and investment are therefore positively related.
Numerical results
22 show, however, that this eﬀect is moderate and that a substantial
increase in uncertainty would be needed to signiﬁcantly raise the critical cost level.
For input cost uncertainty, no analytical solution can be found at all. The numeri-
cal results reveal that even for low values of input cost uncertainty, the critical cost
is reduced enormously, i.e. costs need to be very low in order for investment to be
triggered.
23 Input cost uncertainty and investment are therefore negatively related.
The intuition behind these results is that technical uncertainty always conveys
the possibility that the actual cost to completion might become low enough to make
the investment proﬁtable.
24 Furthermore, the truth about these costs will only be
revealed if investment takes place. This, combined with the option to abandon the
project when the cost turns out to evolve unfavorably leads to a higher critical cost and
therefore earlier investment, i.e. investment is triggered already at a relatively high
cost level. Input cost uncertainty will hit the investor regardless if the investment
is carried on and therefore has a much more profound eﬀect. In this thesis, we ﬁnd
similar results for the eﬀects of input cost uncertainty, but the concern with technical
21An example could be an unforeseen circumstance that requires additional expenses for
exploration or R&D midstream.
22An analytical solution can only be found in the special case where the interest rate is
zero.
23If the correlation with the market is taken into account, this eﬀect is even enhanced, i.e.
investment is further depressed.
24Even though not modeled here in this way, the cost might become so low as a result of
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uncertainty is diﬀerent from Pindyck’s (1993). What we want to focus on is not so
much the (adverse) developments that might occur during construction and how they
can aﬀect total completion cost, but more the uncertainty that emanates from the
process of technical change. Since the electricity sector is marked by an overwhelming
inﬂuence of fossil-fuel-based electricity generating equipment, of which a major part
has already reached technological maturity, it is interesting to explore if the promising,
but uncertain progress of new technologies based on renewable energy carriers can
make a diﬀerence for total future electricity provision.
Another study that includes uncertainty about technology into a real options model
is by Farzin et al (1998). They extend the basic model presented in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994) to include technical change. More speciﬁcally, producers generate a homoge-
nous good, for which there is a technology parameter that follows a jump process. That
implies that technological progress itself is uncertain, but also the size of the jump will
be unknown. In other words, the speed of improvement and also the degree to which
the new technology outperforms the old one are both uncertain. In a numerical exam-
ple they compare their new investment criterion (the critical value of the technology
parameter) with the NPV criterion. The result is that the former leads to slower
technology adoption than the latter. Contrary to Pindyck (1993), they therefore ﬁnd
a negative relationship between investment and uncertainty and argue that this result
is due to the fact that the option value of waiting increases with uncertainty. When
Farzin et al (1998) extend this result for multiple switches between technologies, they
ﬁnd that this does not hold anymore: the standard NPV rule suddenly coincides with
the one adjusted for the option value. However, this ﬁnding is only due to a mistake
in their calculations as has also been pointed out by Doraszelski (2004) in detail.
Farzin et al (1998) provide a simple and therefore straightforward treatment of
technical change in a real options setting that comes closer to our endeavors than
Pindyck (1993) and even though we are not so much interested in the eﬀect of the dif-
ferent components (rate of progress versus magnitude of changes) of technical progress,
the model delivers useful theoretical insights for economic decision-making and pro-
vides a benchmark real options model that we can compare the results obtained with
our new framework in Chapter 6 to. In particular, the real options model cannot take
into account that less uncertainty may also depress investment by making waiting for
more certain technical improvements more proﬁtable – a feature which we are able to
integrate in the new model developed in Chapter 6.
Other studies that focus exclusively on technological uncertainty are by Balcer
and Lippman (1984), an older paper which is similar to Farzin et al (1998), and
Grenadier and Weiss (1997). The latter do not only consider stochastic innovations,
but investors that adopt new technologies in their model also become able to beneﬁt
more from future innovations, which can be regarded as a learning eﬀect. Their results
show that an increase in volatility has the eﬀect of delaying investment, which is in
line with the ﬁndings of Farzin et al (1998) and also Balcer and Lippman (1984) (and
also our conclusions in Chapter 4).
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(2004) include learning curves for renewable energy into their real options framework.
They ﬁnd that for Turkey the diﬀusion of renewable energy technologies will only occur
if policies are directed to that cause because these technologies still suﬀer from high
capital cost. On the other hand, active promotion of green technologies will accelerate
learning and result in a higher extent of adoption of these technologies than initially
because the decrease in costs will occur faster. By acknowledging the fact that the
ﬂexibility to delay investments can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the diﬀusion of renewable
technologies and at the same time incorporating price uncertainty, they provide a very
rich model. However, their treatment of uncertainty is conﬁned to uncertainty about
fuel and electricity prices only. The inclusion of the learning curves as a proxy for
future rates of technological improvements remains deterministic.
Madlener et al (2005) develop a model, where uncertainty pertains to ﬂuctuations
in demand, peak load capacity, generation costs and the price of electricity. In par-
ticular, they model the expected value of these items as discrete stochastic processes
and use a dynamic programming approach. Their results are based on data for the
Turkish electricity sector, where a signiﬁcant amount of gas-ﬁred capacity has been
installed lately, which the authors ﬁnd to be a suboptimal choice because coal prices
are much less volatile than gas prices in Turkey.
A recent paper by Murto (2007) wants to bridge the gap between what he calls
“revenue uncertainty” (with McDonald and Siegel, 1986, Pindyck, 1988, and many
more in this category) and “technological uncertainty” (with Grenadier and Weiss,
1997, and Farzin et al, 1998, in this category). He models the revenue stream as a
geometric Brownian motion and innovations arrive according to a Poisson process.
Innovations reduce the cost of investment, so the investor has to decide whether the
investment cost is low enough and the revenue is high enough to exercise the option
to invest, i.e. he solves the optimal stopping problem, where stopping refers to exer-
cising the option (i.e. to stop holding it), arising from this setup. His results show
that technological uncertainty itself does not matter decisively for the timing of in-
vestment. It only has an impact in combination with revenue uncertainty, i.e. when
revenue streams are certain, technological uncertainty has no impact. The combined
eﬀect is to postpone investment. Murto (2007) shows that this has to do with the
fact that in his model it is not the uncertainty, but technological progress itself that
aﬀects the optimal investment threshold. Only when revenue uncertainty is included,
does technological uncertainty come into play therefore. In this thesis the treatment of
technological change is similar. However, revenues are not assumed to rise necessarily.
On the contrary, technologically mature, fossil-fuel-ﬁred plants will eventually becomes
less proﬁtable due to increasing fuel costs while renewables enjoy more improvement
in investment cost due to technical change and have therefore mostly rising revenues.
We ﬁnd that fuel price uncertainty is not a necessary condition for technological un-
certainty to have an eﬀect. However, we can conﬁrm that the eﬀect is a postponement
of investment also in our real options model in Chapter 4.40 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
Environmental Uncertainty
Another area where real options theory has been applied, is the valuation of “environ-
mental assets”. These assets include inland waters and oceans, land, forests, species,
the ozone layer and last but not least the atmosphere. The idea behind using real
options frameworks for decisions concerning environmental assets is that damage to
them will mostly be characterized by irreversibility. In the context of global warming,
often cited irreversible damages are the potential shutdown of the thermohaline circu-
lation, rise in sea levels as glaciers and the Antarctic melt, unforeseeable changes in
weather and wind patterns, and so forth. The uncertainty surrounding these potential
eﬀects is magniﬁed by the lack of knowledge of the thresholds, beyond which these
scenarios become possible. Another complication is the long time horizon we have to
look at and the time lags, with which actions take eﬀect.
Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) have already been mentioned as pi-
oneers in this area. In their case the irreversibility is due to the impossibility of
cleaning up pollution. More recent applications are Ulph and Ulph (1997), Kolstad
(1996a, 1996b) and Pindyck (2000). The ﬁrst two derive conditions under which an op-
tion value associated with environmental preservation exists. Kolstad (1996a, 1996b)
does not only consider irreversibility in terms of accumulated emissions, but also in
terms of the sunk cost character of investment into abatement capital. He looks at
what he calls “quasi-option value” in accordance with Hanemann (1989). That is the
value that we can assign to the option to wait if our actions today could possibly
constrain our opportunities tomorrow. In other words, if the accumulated emissions
could compromise the utility in the future, then emitting today reduces the oppor-
tunities tomorrow. All, Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974) and Ulph and Ulph
(1997) only consider environmental irreversibility and ﬁnd that it always leads to a
decision in favor of the environment. Kolstad (1996a) adds capital irreversibility and
acknowledges the fact that the importance of irreversibility might be inﬂuenced by
the rates of learning and capital depreciation. In a dynamic two-period model, where
learning about the true value of a random parameter occurs between the two periods,
he proves that only if the extent to which investors are uncertain and the rate of learn-
ing are such that negative emission rates would be optimal in the second period (i.e.
such that the stock of emissions should be reduced from a utility point of view), then
there is an irreversibility eﬀect demanding preservative action in the ﬁrst period. As
regards the irreversibility of capital, there will be none unless the rate of depreciation
is suﬃciently large enough compared to the rate of learning.
While this area of tackling environmental uncertainty is deﬁnitely not exhausted
research-wise, as more and more uncertainties about the behavior of the environmental
system are resolved, the focus of this thesis is on the irreversibility arising in the
context of investment or what Kolstad (1996a, 1996b) calls capital irreversibility. We
are interested in the uncertainties that the investor faces and how it results in diﬀerent
patterns of investment because the power plants that are installed now are going to
be the source of electricity for the next few decades to come. By continuously running
these plants to ﬁll the growing demand of industrialized (and even more so developing)Real Options Theory 41
countries, the trend in emissions will be predetermined through today’s investment
decisions. However, as will be seen in the following section, environmental uncertainty
has an impact on the investor as well, namely by making the actions of policy-makers
that have to cope with insuﬃcient information uncertain as well.
Policy Uncertainty
As has been mentioned in the previous section, it is inherently uncertain how exactly
the environment responds to the GHG emissions that increasingly accumulate in the
atmosphere. While there is a growing body of evidence providing support that global
warming is occurring and that the anthropogenic fraction of GHG emissions accelerates
the rate at which this is happening, there is still disagreement about the exact extent of
the damages associated with this process, the speed of the warming and the behavior
of the system with respect to abatement measures. Although even the environmental
awareness of the public has recently been stirred by Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC,
2007) again, lobbying of interest groups against CO2 policies is continuing. All this
creates a more than diﬃcult position for the policy maker, who is not an expert in
the science of global warming and climate change. With a ﬂood of more and less
useful information and impressions from the media and counselors, it is diﬃcult to
form a clear opinion and to distill the right signs for policy action. Further down in
the causal chain, investors in the electricity sector can therefore not be sure about
how the government will behave in the future and how that might eﬀectively reshape
the business environment and the investment situation. Will the government join a
post-Kyoto carbon agreement? If not, it would not be wise to invest into expensive,
relatively carbon-free technology today that might be a stranded investment tomorrow.
On the other hand, if the government turns out to follow a stricter, “green” policy
stance than previously assumed, higher carbon prices will punish those that have
invested into more carbon-emitting equipment.
This type of uncertainty is less “predictable” in the sense that policy, such as the
level or trend of the CO2 price, could change quite drastically at some point in time.
Modeling uncertainty by letting the price follow a stochastic process is not suﬃcient
to account for such a large extent of uncertainty. In Chapter 3 an analysis is presented
that investigates the eﬀects of such more profound uncertainty on the investment
decision. We think that this type of problem is not analyzed suﬃciently in the ﬁeld
of real options modeling for investment in the electricity sector. An exception is by
Reedman et al (2006). They look at the Australian electricity sector and try to ﬁnd out
whether the timing of introducing a CO2 tax has an eﬀect on the investment decision
concerning the addition of carbon capture facilities to existing plants emitting CO2.
However, the only source of uncertainty in this setup comes from assuming that a
constant carbon tax will be imposed with a 10% probability within the next ten years.
The framework that is developed in Chapter 3 is much more complex, acknowledging
the fact that carbon penalties – once introduced – are likely to increase over time.
Also, permit trading and other processes will lead the CO2 price to rise stochastically.
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major source of uncertainty, since the dates of new negotiation rounds and policy
agendas are publicly known (the next date being 2012). We think that uncertainty
about the policy outcome itself is the main impact on investors in the electricity sector.
De Jong et al (2004) propose that the real options approach is a valuable method
to analyze how ﬂuctuations in future emissions prices aﬀect investment patterns. In a
simple and highly stylized example, they illustrate that if the NPV is adjusted for the
options to defer and abandon an investment into a plant emitting less CO2, a more
volatile emissions price will always lead to postponement of that investment, whereas
we think that a distinction needs to be made between ﬂuctuations around a known
trend and uncertainty about the trend itself. Furthermore, we make a distinction
between expected and actual ﬂuctuations in the price of CO2, which allows us to
make more precise statements about investment responses to uncertainty.
While De Jong et al (2004) present a good illustration of the principles involved,
other authors have gone more in depth in modeling this problem. Laurikka (2006) and
Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) acknowledge that emissions trading in the European
Union will have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on investors’ cost, on the market price of energy
and on potential extra revenues coming from trading free emissions permits. In order
to capture this in a real options framework and to evaluate the situation of Finland as
a case study, they distinguish between three diﬀerent categories of options: the option
to switch between fuels (if the plant is multi-ﬁred), the option to switch outputs (if
the plant is a combined heat and power installation), and the option to alter the scale
of operation. Comparing a coal-ﬁred and a gas-ﬁred power plant in the Finnish power
market, they show that the valuation of the gas-ﬁred plant depends heavily on the
assumed price level of emission permits, which is conﬁrmed by our analysis, and the
allocation of free permits. In a scenario where the price of permits was relatively
high, the option value of investing into the gas-ﬁred plant became positive, while
the option value of investing into the coal-ﬁred plant was not aﬀected at all. They
conclude that the uncertainty about the EU Emissions allowance Trading Scheme’s
(ETS) (where allowance eﬀectively means permit) inﬂuence on operational costs might
well reduce the attractiveness of gas-ﬁred plants. While Laurikka and Koljonen (2006)
assume both electricity prices and CO2 permit prices to be mean-reverting processes,
we think that a geometric Brownian motion is a much better representation of the CO2
price, since with increasing emissions (see e.g. the predictions in Riahi et al, 2007)
and the need to stabilize them at a relatively low level, a continuous rise in the price
of CO2 is the only way to achieve this. Also, our analysis comprises an investigation
of uncertainty that cannot be represented by ﬂuctuations around a mean (trend), but
which is due to indecisiveness about the direction of the price path as well. Moreover,
Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) focus very much on the trading scheme, i.e. they also
include the impact on cash ﬂows from having free permits allocated to the producers,
where the number of these free permits is an uncertain number. In our framework,
CO2 prices can be seen as a carbon tax that is progressively adjusted or as the price
for a permit that you would have to buy on the carbon market. The number of permits
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A similar case study, but then for Japan, is conducted by Kiriyama and Suzuki
(2004). They also investigate the uncertainty emanating from potential national emis-
sions trading schemes. In particular, they compare nuclear power, wind power and
photovoltaic power, since these types of power plants do not emit carbon dioxide
and might thus become feasible earlier than traditionally assumed if emissions are a
negative externality valued by the decision-maker. It turns out that nuclear power
would be the most proﬁtable alternative. The study diﬀer from our work in various
respects, however. In the Kiriyama and Suzuki (2004) framework, the value function
explicitly includes the stock of CO2 emissions as a negative externality, so the beneﬁt
of installing carbon-free power plants does not just derive from cost savings due to
lower expenses for CO2 permits. Furthermore, each project (nuclear, photovoltaic and
wind) is valued separately. It is not an option to switch between alternatives, which
is an important feature of our study. In our studies, we model this diﬀerently because
we think that investors do not incorporate externalities into their objective functions
voluntarily.
Outside electricity planning, Hassett and Metcalf (1999) also investigate a sort of
policy uncertainty by looking at changes in investment tax credit. In their framework,
a Poisson jump process describes discrete changes in the tax regime. This idea has been
taken up for other applications such as foreign direct investment where uncertainty
emanates from the legal instability of the host country, for instance. An example is by
Chen and Funke (2003). They ﬁnd that FDI decisions are indeed severely inﬂuenced
by political instability and the resulting uncertainty for the business environment.
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This review shows that there is still scope for further research in the ﬁeld of policy
uncertainty, and particularly so in connection with climate change policy, which will
have a grave impact on investment patterns in the electricity sector in the near future.
It is worthwhile to analyze how investment responds to changes in the trend of a
process and not only how diﬀerent types of stochastic processes can be used to mimic
policy uncertainty. Policy makers can then use this information to adapt their own
behavior corresponding to the goals that they want to achieve, while investors can
extract useful insights for their own way of forming investment strategies.
Real Options Models in Electricity Planning
Real options studies, which are explicitly designed to analyze investment behavior
in the electricity sector are numerous and focus on very diﬀerent issues: in their
book, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 51-54) already demonstrate the usefulness of
this approach to support decision-making in electricity planning. Tseng and Barz
(2002) and Hlouskova et al (2005) and Deng and Oren (2003) amongst many others
have analyzed the eﬀects of e.g. variability in loads and the inclusion of speciﬁc
operational constraints on investment. Especially recently, interest has shifted more
to long-term planning again. One example is by Fleten et al (2007). They show that
25However, a shortcoming of their analysis is its partial equilibrium character because the
investment strategy might be inﬂuenced even more heavily by the fact that there are many
other ﬁrms that are able to seize considerable market share by moving early. Then, the option
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investment in power plants relying on renewable energy sources will be postponed
beyond the traditional NPV break even point when a real options approach with
stochastic electricity prices is used.
A selection of some other interesting applications concern research ﬁnancing, elec-
tricity trading and the importance of market structure. Davis and Owens (2003)
optimize the amount of renewable energy R&D by valuing the potential savings from
developing renewable energy in the face of ﬂuctuating fossil fuel prices. Chaton and
Doucet (2003) incorporate the trade of electricity and consider also demand and fuel
price uncertainty, load duration curves and equipment availability. Keppo and Lu
(2003) investigate how a large electricity producer forms his decision to produce some
planned quantity of power and how this can aﬀect the market price of electricity.
2.3.4 Remarks on the Investment-Uncertainty Relation-
ship in Real Options Modeling
As a last group of papers in this section, it is important to mention that while the
general conclusion from real options modeling has been that irreversibility leads to
postponement of investment in the face of uncertainty, there have also been some
contributions that have suggested that the investment-uncertainty relationship might
actually be positive. Sarkar (2000), for example, presents a real options model, in
which the probability of investment occurring within a speciﬁc time interval, in terms
of the parameters of the economy as well as the project, is positively aﬀected by higher
uncertainty. More speciﬁcally, uncertainty has the eﬀect of increasing the probability
that the investment threshold will be passed. Therefore, the probability that invest-
ment occurs within a speciﬁed time period increases, i.e. it is actually the amplitude
of the swings that triggers investment when uncertainty is high. In summary, Sarkar
(2000) ﬁnds a negative relationship between uncertainty and investment.
Other examples include Abel and Eberly (1999), who point out that the eﬀect of
uncertainty on investment might be ambiguous in the long run. While irreversibility
and uncertainty increase the user cost of capital and therefore reduce the capital stock,
irreversibility can also prevent the ﬁrm from selling capital, even when the marginal
revenue product is low and the ﬁrm would want to sell capital. Abel and Eberly (1999)
call the latter eﬀect the “hangover eﬀect” and the former the “user cost eﬀect” and ﬁnd
that neither of the two dominates globally, so eﬀect of uncertainty and irreversibility
remains ultimately ambiguous.
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In the models presented in Chapters 6 and 7, we also ﬁnd a positive relationship
between investment and uncertainty, but for diﬀerent reasons than the ones mentioned
here. In our case, the eﬀect arises from the embodiment of technological change in
new equipment, which is neglected by Sarkar (2000) and Abel and Eberly (1999).
26Ghosal and Loungani (2000) stress another source of non-linear or positive investment-
uncertainty relationships – the degree of capital market imperfections that might impose
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2.4 Portfolio Theory
2.4.1 Theoretical Background
Portfolio theory had been pioneered by Nobel laureate Harry Markowitz as early as
1952 in an article entitled “Portfolio Selection” in the Journal of Finance.
27 Seminal
work followed by Merton (1969, 1971, 1973a), Samuelson (1969) and Fama (1970).
As much as the foundations of real options theory are rooted in ﬁnance originally,
the same is true for portfolio theory. Even though there have been applications to
investment in real assets as well lately and the focus of this thesis is not on ﬁnancial
assets either, it is still useful to present the main lines of thought underlying portfolio
theory to begin with.
This theory starts out from the fact that most investors are generally risk averse,
i.e. they refrain to a certain extent to buy assets that exhibit a large variance in their
returns. To quote Markowitz himself:
[...] the investor does (or should) consider expected return a desirable
thing and variance of return an undesirable thing (Markowitz, 1952, page
77).
Typically, an investor would therefore compose his portfolio of assets that exhibit
lower expected rates of return, which are relatively certain to be realized, and assets
that have a very high expected rate of return, but this rate is also more uncertain to
materialize. It is the tradeoﬀ between expected return and variance that matters for
the investor and leads to a diversiﬁcation of the portfolio.
Now, in order to explore this argument more deeply, we ﬁrst need to deﬁne the
variance of a portfolio.
28 If we have a portfolio composed of N assets, total portfolio







where xi stands for the extent to which the portfolio is composed of asset i; likewise
xj is the fraction of asset j in the portfolio. σij is the covariance between assets i
and j, and if i = j, σij is just the variance of asset i. In ﬁnance, a stock’s risk is
then measured by its beta, which is the covariance between the stock’s and the market
return relative to the variance of the market return.
29 A β larger than 1 implies that
this stock will amplify the movements in the market, whereas a stock with β smaller
than 1 will move in the same direction as the market, but at a lower rate. In general,
the market portfolio exhibits a relatively low degree of variability, which is also more or
less constant. We call it therefore “market risk”. At the same time, smaller portfolios
with only a few individual securities will be more risky. The diﬀerence between the
two measures of volatility is called “unique risk”. The more securities are added to the
27See also Varian (1993) about Markowitz’ work.
28This part is rather formal for the sake of clarity and to make more transparent in later
chapters, which elements we borrow from the theory of portfolio selection. The illustration
draws heavily on the background provided by Brealey and Myers (2005).
29The market return is measured by the portfolio return of a large number of representative
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portfolio, the more it becomes diversiﬁed and the more will this unique risk decline,
until the portfolio risk is equal to the market risk. This is best illustrated in Figure
2.4.1.
Source: adapted from Brealey and Myers (2005).
Figure 2.4: Increasing Diversiﬁcation Leads to a Fall in Unique Risk
The more assets are added to the portfolio, the more does diversiﬁcation help to
reduce risk. However, it is not possible to reduce the unique risk beyond the market
risk. This is because the more assets are included, the more covariance terms enter
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where N is the number of securities. Average (co)variance is computed as the sum of all













N(N−1). Then, as N rises, the second term of the
sum in Equation (2.4.2) increases in importance relative to the ﬁrst term. In other
words, there are more and more covariances and only a linearly increasing number
of variances. Only if the covariances would all be equal to zero, would it be possible
to construct a portfolio holding so many assets that the risk would tend to zero, but
even though this is potentially valid as a theoretical consideration, this will never be
a possible scenario in reality because there will always be non-zero covariances, which
cannot be “diversiﬁed away”.
30
Now that we have deﬁned and explained the concepts involved, we can continue
to describe Markowitz’ theory of portfolio selection. By suggesting that the average
investor is a risk averse and proﬁt-maximizing agent, he was referring to a relationship
between return and risk that we will outline here. Looking at Figure 2.5, there are a
number of securities listed in a graph with expected return R on the vertical and return
volatility measured by the standard deviation σpf =
 
Vpf on the horizontal axis. By
30See page 173 in Brealey and Myers (2005) or pp. 109ﬀ in Markowitz (1959) or page 58
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composing a portfolio with diﬀerent shares of these securities, any point within the
heavy line can be attained. However, what a risk averse and return-maximizing in-
vestor will do, is to opt for any possibility that moves him vertically up (higher return)
and to the left (lower standard deviation). Consequently, he will always prefer a port-
folio on the heavy line over one that lies inside the line. Markowitz therefore calls all
portfolios along the heavy line “eﬃcient” portfolios and the line itself is known as the
eﬃcient frontier. The reason why the eﬃcient frontier (also called the portfolio possi-
bilities curve) is concave above the point where the risk the minimal is straightforward:
it can be shown (see e.g. Elton et al, 2003) that combinations of assets cannot exhibit
more risk than the level of risk found on a straight line connecting two assets, i.e. the
eﬃcient frontier can never become convex above the point where we ﬁnd the global
minimum variance portfolio. If two points in Figure 2.5 were connected by a straight
line, this would imply that their returns are perfectly correlated. For any correlation
factor smaller than 1, the curve must therefore be concave.
If the investor can lend at a risk-free rate, rf (e.g. by buying treasury bonds),
which is typically smaller than the risk-free rate at which he can borrow, r
′
f (e.g. from
the bank), the shape of the eﬃcient frontier will be diﬀerent: all combinations of risk
free lending and borrowing lie on straight lines with rf and r
′
f as origins, as can be
seen in Figure 2.5. The straight line emanating from rf is tangent to the eﬃcient
frontier in point B and the borrowing line touches the curve in point A. Beyond A
the eﬃcient frontier will therefore be a straight line through point C and before B the
frontier will be a straight line starting from rf. Only in between points A and B is a
concave part, where it would be optimal for the investor to hold combinations of risky
assets.
Risk averse investors prefer eﬃcient portfolios along the frontier, which are therefore superior
to the points marked inside the frontier.
Figure 2.5: Eﬃcient Frontier48 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility




Ri   xi (2.4.3)
where Ri is the random yield of a particular security i and the rest of the notation is
unchanged. To use Markowitz’ (1952) own notation, let  i be the expected return on




 i   xi (2.4.4)
And the corresponding variance is as in Equation (2.4.1) above.
For ﬁxed (probability) beliefs about the development of  i and σij, the eﬃcient
portfolio can then be calculated by maximizing Equation 2.4.4 subject to Equation
(2.4.1).
31 The diﬀerent combinations of E(Rpf) and Vpf that solve this problem will
then trace out the eﬃcient frontier introduced in Figure 2.5. Markowitz calls this the
E-V rule:
The E-V rule states that the investor would (or should) want to select
one of those portfolios which give rise to the (E,V) combinations [...] with
minimum V for given E or more and maximum E for given V or less
(Markowitz, 1952, page 82).
Even though the mean-variance approach by Markowitz (1952) is capable of ex-
plaining diversiﬁcation and the risk-return tradeoﬀ in a very straightforward manner,
there are a number of disadvantages associated with this sort of framework, which have
led to multiple changes and extensions to the basic model over the last decades. The
ﬁrst ﬂaw is that the mean-variance approach maximizes only quadratic utility, i.e. it
is not a valid method to tackle problems involving preferences for higher-order return
moments. As an example, return distributions might be skewed and have fat tails,
which would imply higher losses beyond a certain threshold. Furthermore, and very
important in the light of the purposes of this thesis, mean-variance portfolio theory
is inherently myopic in the sense that it focusses on a portfolio at a single point in
time.
32 In electricity planning, planning periods of more than 30 years are typically
the rule, and there are dynamic developments that also call for a dynamic treatment
of the portfolio of technologies. While we realize the beneﬁts of portfolio theory as
such for the application to the problems addressed in this thesis, we also know that we
have to take into account these shortcomings. Therefore, we do not employ portfolio
31Conversely, it is also possible to minimize equation (2.4.1) subject to a given expected
return. This will also deliver all optimal combinations of E(Rpf) and Vpf.
32It is true that Merton (1969) has developed an intertemporal version of the portfolio
approach. However, since Merton’s model is not trivial to solve and thus diﬃcult to apply,
it did not really displace the Markowitz framework in ﬁnancial planning at that time. Only
recent advances in analytical and numerical methods have changed this situation (Campbell,
2000) and enabled applications in e.g. pension fund management. More importantly for
this thesis, the translation of these methods to investment into real assets such as electricity
generating capacity has been diﬃcult. In fact, most models continue to rely on mean-variance
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theory in its completeness, but borrow only elements from the general approach and
combine it with other investment modeling methods.
2.4.2 Applications of Portfolio Theory to Real Assets
Being a principle from ﬁnance very much like options theory was previously developed
to value ﬁnancial options, portfolio selection approaches have also been framed and
applied to non-ﬁnancial assets. The resulting literature is by far not as vast as that for
real options yet, but there are a number of very interesting applications that need to
be reviewed here. Examples include the valuation of oﬀshore oil leases (Helfat, 1988)
and the valuation of ﬁnancing long-term projects (Seitz and Ellison, 1995). More
interesting for this thesis, however, are the applications involving energy planning.
Even though the ﬁrst attempt dates back as long as 1976 (Bar-Lev and Katz, 1976),
interest in the topic has only arisen again very lately (e.g. Awerbuch and Berger,
2003). A full account of this work is given in a recent article by Awerbuch (2006).
In general, these models use Equations (4.3) and (2.4.4) in the way described above
to test whether the portfolios of electricity generating capacity used by a certain region
or country are eﬃcient. Bar-Lev and Katz (1976) ﬁnd that in the United States electric
utilities are more or less eﬃciently diversiﬁed in each region. However, their results
show that utilities tend to combine high rates of expected return with high levels
of risk. This willingness to accept more risk is attributed to the large number of
regulations, which the authors claim to be a threat to investors, so that they feel
forced to take on higher risks. In particular, the regulatory process that leads to this
result is that utility services are priced by oﬃcial authorities. If the suppliers then
claim that output prices should be raised, they will have to go through a lengthy,
oﬃcial process. In order to evaluate the performance of the utility to get a judgement
if a price increase would be warranted, the authorities generally place more weight on
the ex post return based on the cost of the inputs rather than focussing also on the ex
post risk. Therefore, it is in the interest of utilities to have the highest return possible,
which entails accepting higher levels of risk.
Humphreys and McClain (1998) reﬁne the approach by Bar-Lev and Katz (1976)
by building a GARCH-type model, which allows the covariance matrix to be system-
atically updated over time as new events occur. This leads to the result that in times
of e.g. oil price shocks (like the spike during the Persian Gulf War) a diversiﬁcation
away from oil-intensive generation equipment is found to be eﬃcient. Moreover, even
though the electric utilities in the United States have been operating at a minimum
variance position by the end of the 1990s according to the authors, overall energy con-
sumption has been far from eﬃcient during that time. As a consequence, Humphreys
and McClain (1998) recommend a higher portion of coal to be used in the fuel mix – a
result which is changed, of course, once potential environmental regulations are taken
into account.
Awerbuch and Berger (2003) conclude after a similar exercise, but without dy-
namic covariances, that the existing portfolio of EU power generating technologies is
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with higher returns. Furthermore, they ﬁnd that fuel price risk always dominates the
other types of risk (e.g. about O&M costs) that they examine, which has important
implications for energy security. Awerbuch and Sauter (2006), for example, point out
that the ﬂuctuations in the prices of fossil fuels depress macroeconomic activity as
measured by GDP growth, employment and inﬂation. Thus, energy portfolios that
have high shares of fossil fuel technologies are more vulnerable to this volatility and
therefore reduce energy security.
33 This is taken up in Awerbuch (2006), who focusses
on issues of energy security making a case for a higher proportion of renewable en-
ergy to be chosen for the overall energy mix. Using Figure 2.6 depicted below, he
argues that if a country or a region starts from a portfolio based on fossil fuels (1),
adding renewable energy carriers will reduce the risk (measured by year-to-year cost
volatility) bringing the electricity sector to (2). Then, reshuﬄing the portfolio, so as
to reproduce the initial level of risk, will bring the sector down to (3), where lower
generating cost is combined with the same level of risk as before, i.e. (1) was not an
eﬃcient portfolio. In the terminology developed in the previous section, this means
that the amount of electricity generated by the fossil portfolio can also be produced
by the third portfolio, which exhibits the same level of risk, but is less costly than the
fossil fuel portfolio.
Source: Awerbuch (2006), page 699
Figure 2.6: Risk and Cost of Generating Portfolios
Empirically, he ﬁnds that compared to the performance of the EU and the US,
Mexico and other developing countries have or plan to have much less eﬃcient gener-
ating portfolios. There is no explanation for this result by the author. However, it is
evident from the calculations that this result is (at least partially) due to the plan to
33Another way how to view energy insecurity is to associate it with sudden disruptions in
the supply of fossil fuels as an input to the production process. However, this could also be
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include a substantial portion of oil-based energy into the generation portfolio, which
lowers the return at the same level of risk compared to the eﬃcient frontier. This
decision might have to do with strategic and political considerations, as much as with
the fact that existing equipment might not be easily scrapped and costly to replace by
renewable alternatives – especially in less advanced countries that might lack access
to the most recent technology.
Roques et al (2006) apply a similar framework to UK diversiﬁcation in electricity
sector investment, but they extend their focus to include also the risks associated with
carbon price ﬂuctuations and electricity price volatility. Furthermore, they employ
Monte Carlo simulation to obtain the corresponding NPVs for underlying stochastic
electricity, fuel and carbon prices, where they pay particular attention to three scenar-
ios. The ﬁrst scenario has independent, stochastic price processes, while the second
scenario also takes into account that the price processes might be correlated. The
third scenario has a ﬁxed electricity price in order to assess the impact of long-term
purchase contracts. In terms of their conclusions, it remains questionable whether the
market can provide incentives to investors to opt for a socially optimal fuel mix. At
the same time, it becomes apparent that the correlations between the price processes
inﬂuence the results signiﬁcantly.
All these applications of mean-variance optimum portfolio theory in the style of
Markowitz (1952, 1959) suﬀer from the disadvantages pointed out in the previous sec-
tion: they neglect the dynamics underlying investment decisions in the electricity sec-
tor – a problem that we tackle in Chapter 6 by developing the vintage-portfolio model
mentioned above and which we compare to “standard” mean-variance Markowitz ap-
plications to energy planning in Chapter 5.
2.4.3 Remarks on the Investment-Uncertainty Relation-
ship in Portfolio Modeling
While we have concluded from our presentation of the real options approach that in-
vestment and uncertainty are mostly negatively correlated, a similar statement can be
made about the investment-uncertainty relationship in optimum portfolio models: as
the uncertainty associated with one asset increases, its proportion in the asset portfo-
lio should be decreased by either decreasing investment into that asset or increasing
investment in less risky assets in order to maintain the maximum expected return for
a speciﬁed level of uncertainty or to minimize the uncertainty for a speciﬁed level of
expected return.
For the case of volatile fuel prices, for example, we have already illustrated this
concept with the help of Awerbuch (2006). He demonstrates that increasing the share
of renewable energy sources in the generating portfolio can reduce the risk associated
with the portfolio at the same level of expected return for a number of countries. This
implies that the current energy mixes are not always eﬃcient in the sense of Markowitz
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2.5 Vintage Models
There is another body of literature that provides useful insights into the dynamics
behind investment behavior. While the models mentioned so far all treat the existing
and future capital stock as being homogenous, vintage models take into account the
fact that new vintages of capital typically embody the latest beneﬁts of technological
change. The core idea is that investors have to install a new piece of equipment,
before they are able to beneﬁt from the technical progress that has made that piece
of equipment more eﬃcient than the one that was previously used.
Neoclassical models, on the contrary, suggest that the capital stock will immedi-
ately be changed as the factor price ratio changes. This is of course unrealistic in the
electricity sector because of the irreversibility involved in investment decisions. As
early as 1973, Gregory and James therefore already pointed out the usefulness of vin-
tage modeling for the electricity sector. The reason they mention is amongst others the
substantial initial investment cost required to start production (Gregory and James,
1973, page 1134). Thus, even though vintage models per se do not deal with uncer-
tainty and the composition of multiple capital stocks (as they would arise in the case
of diﬀerent technologies for the generation of electricity), we think that vintage mod-
eling provides a very suitable framework that we want to combine with elements from
portfolio theory in order to investigate investment patterns in the electricity sector. In
this section we will ﬁrst describe the basic model structure and sketch a brief history
of vintage modeling and then continue to review some more recent applications.
In vintage models capital is heterogeneous, although it had been treated as if it was
homogeneous in earlier growth models (e.g. Solow, 1956 and 1957). Vintages therefore
do not only depreciate in the physical sense, but they will also become obsolete, as
newer vintages arrive. The latter are more eﬃcient by deﬁnition and will drive out
the older ones eventually, which is referred to as “creative destruction” by Aghion and
Howitt (1992).
34 Figure 2.5 displays the evolution of output, Y , per unit of employed
capital, K, in plants of vintage t. The arrival of an innovation opens up new capacity,
thus more capital is accumulated. The width of each segment depends on the volume
of investments, while the height of the columns reﬂects the eﬃciency of the vintages.
The height of the columns is magniﬁed by a factor representing the rate of (exogenous)
technical change. The area of each rectangle is thus the capacity of the most recent
investment. It is important to emphasize that in this setting, the full beneﬁts of
technical change can only be realized in response to a 100% immediate diﬀusion of the
newly developed capital goods. In other words, technical change is embodied in the
new capacity.
35
Even though the earliest reference dates back to 1959, when Johansen developed
the ﬁrst vintage model, we start out with Solow (1960) here, who was also among the
ﬁrst economists criticizing not only the exogeneity of technical progress, but also its
34Actually, creative destruction is a phenomenon ﬁrst found by Schumpeter (1942) and
later “popularized” by Aghion and Howitt (1992).
35Note the similarity to the practice of ordering equipment according to ascending operating
cost in the electricity sector – the co-called merit order (see Chapter 1).Vintage Models 53
Source: adapted from Solow (2000).
Figure 2.7: Evolution of Output per Unit of Employed Capital for Successive
Vintages
availability at zero cost. He consequently designed a more sophisticated conception
of technical change and its transmission to the economy. Technology progresses at a
constant rate, which only aﬀects new capital goods. More speciﬁcally, the rate of new
investment inﬂuences the rate of technical change because the latter is embodied in
the new capital goods, at which this investment is directed. Old capital goods co-exist
along with the new ones, until they have completely depreciated – in the physical
sense.
The distinctive feature of Solow’s (1960) model is that technical change does not
occur as time proceeds, but according to the rate of arrival of new vintages. To be more
precise, technical change itself is still exogenous, but the diﬀusion of new technology
becomes endogenous. Once these vintages are put into operation, their productivity
does not change anymore, i.e. disembodied technical change not taken into account.
Solow (1960) further assumes the labor market to be perfectly competitive, where labor
itself is homogeneous. Equilibrium therefore occurs when workers are allocated across
vintages in such a way that their marginal productivities are the same in operating any
vintage. Note that this implies that there is always perfect factor substitution. Solow
(1960) thus assumes a putty-putty production structure, i.e. substitution possibilities
ex ante and ex post are described by the same isoquant. Shifts in the isoquant are
due to embodied technical change before instalment.
36, This also means that there
is no economic reason to scrap vintages, since the capital-labor ratio can always be
changed, even after instalment. It is clear that the putty-putty structure represents
an extreme form of substitutability, whereas the other extreme is no substitutability
at all. In clay-clay model, input factors cannot be substituted for each other – neither
ex ante, nor ex post. This can be represented by a single moving point in factor space.
An example of such an approach is given by Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962), although
their analysis is not focussed on a production function, but on a technical progress
function, in order to emphasize their view that shifts in the production function cannot
36Disembodied technical change, which occurs after instalment due to e.g. learning by
doing or the accumulation of technology-speciﬁc know-how, would shift this isoquant ex post
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represent the eﬀects of technical progress in a satisfactory way. In Chapters 6 to 7
we will adopt the same clay-clay structure for investment decisions in the electricity
sector in order to account for the irreversibility of investment decisions.
37
Since in the Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) model coeﬃcients are ﬁxed ex post, eco-
nomic scrapping becomes an issue. One way to investigate this is to apply the zero-
quasi-rent condition. This condition simply states that a vintage should be scrapped
if the variable costs it incurs are larger than the returns it generates. The second
possibility of scrapping is formalized by Malcomson (1975) and therefore also usually
referred to as Malcomson scrapping rule. With this rule, the total marginal cost of
a new vintage is compared to that of an older vintage. Proﬁts can be increased by
substituting the new vintage for the older one if its marginal cost is lower than that
of its predecessor. This ultimately leads to a lower lifetime of vintages under the Mal-
comson scrapping rule than under the zero-quasi-rent condition.
38 It also implies that
an increase in the rate of technical change will depress the lifetime of existing vintages,
which is again a realization of the “creative destruction” eﬀect mentioned above.
Greenwood and Jovanovic (2000) focus on the adoption of new technologies and
show that productivity slowdowns occur because producers do not want to upgrade
their technology portfolio too often, although they could do so easily. The problem
is that the producer has acquired an associated level of expertise at operating his
technology grade, and it increases over time due to learning by doing. Switching
to a new grade then implies a loss of expertise. Adoption costs might thus be a
considerable factor in an investment decision. While this can be seen as an eﬀect due
to the irreversibility of human capital investment and thus provides an explanation or
the slow adoption of new (and sometimes more eﬃcient) technologies, we think that
– in the electricity sector – the slow diﬀusion of new technology is rather due to the
irreversibility associated with the power generating capital stocks, where investments
are lumpy and the larger part of technical change of the embodied type. By taking
switching costs into account, Greenwood and Jovanovic (2000) overcome one of the
most important deﬁciencies of traditional vintage growth models named by Soete and
Turner (1984). This disadvantage of traditional vintage models is comparable to the
shortcomings of the orthodox investment models without adjustment costs in a wider
sense. Other points of criticism these authors mention are that vintage models neglect
the uncertainty about its future pay-oﬀs. The latter is particularly important for
electricity-generating technologies. If you think of renewable energy carriers, it is not
only the up-to-date high capital cost that has been an obstacle to more widespread
diﬀusion of e.g. wind-or solar-based technologies, but also the uncertainty surrounding
37Johanson (1959) remarked that existing (non-vintage) models relying on ﬁxed proportions
ex ante and ex post or assuming complete substitutability between factors ex ant and ex post
were far too extreme and thus unrealistic, so he developed another type of (and actually the
ﬁrst) vintage model assuming a putty-clay production structure, implying that substitutions
ex ante can be described by an isoquant, which moves and changes its form due to embodied
technical change. Ex post, there is only one point in factor space, which may move as a
result of disembodied technical change. Another advocate of the putty-clay approach is Salter
(1960), who ﬁnds that the rate of investment is a major determinant of the speed of adoption
and the internalization of the gains from technical advance.
38In the models presented in Chapters 6 to 7, we use the Malcomson scrapping rule.Conclusion 55
their future rate of technological improvement. In Chapter 6 we develop a model that
adds elements from portfolio theory to take this aspect of a technology’s “investment
proﬁle” into account. Another simpliﬁcation by traditional vintage models is that there
is only one (heterogenous) capital stock, while we would expect that there is a portfolio
of diﬀerent technologies and therefore diﬀerent types of capital. What can be gained
from combining elements from portfolio theory with elements from vintage modeling is
therefore not only the valuation of diversiﬁcation beneﬁts across technologies, but also
the gains from diversifying across time (by bringing investment forward or postponing
it) and technologies.
With respect to diﬀusion rates, it is interesting to note that these are found to be
particularly low in energy markets. More speciﬁcally, Jaﬀe and Stavins (1994) ﬁnd
that the diﬀusion of such new technologies is a lengthy process and that a lot of ﬁrms
continue to invest in older vintages. This is what they call the “Energy Eﬃciency
Paradox”: although more eﬃcient technologies do actually already exist, they might
not be used, or only be adopted gradually, in small steps. The temporary loss in
expertise, which Greenwood and Jovanovic (2000) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996)
describe, is one of the traditional explanations for this paradox. Others are oﬀered
by Mulder et al (2003), for example that uncertainty and irreversibility considerations
might create an option-value of waiting, which points to the usefulness of real options
models in this context.
2.6 Conclusion
With this more detailed literature review in mind, it is more straightforward to put
the contribution of this thesis into perspective. In particular, we will extend and apply
two existing frameworks for investment decision making to investment in the electric-
ity sector. We have chosen real options theory and portfolio selection in combination
with vintage modeling as basis for our modeling approaches, since they allow us to
take full account of the uncertainties and irreversibility pervading investment deci-
sions. Moreover, real options theory is particularly suited to investment subject to
irreversibility when the investment date can be chosen ﬂexibly. Even though compu-
tations become complex relatively quickly, this approach has the advantage of being
inherently dynamic, whereas portfolio theory produces “only” a myopic picture of
the optimal investment decision. However, the advantage of portfolio theory is that
it takes account of the beneﬁts from diversiﬁcation. In other words, investors can
hedge against the impact of uncertainty arising from e.g. fuel prices and technological
progress by adding technologies to their portfolio that have a more secure expected
return. While portfolio theory has generally already been applied to investment in the
electricity sector (e.g. Awerbuch and Berger, 2003, and Roques et al, 2006), the nov-
elty of the models presented in this thesis is the combination with vintage modeling,
which allows us to make the portfolio perspective dynamic while taking into account
the irreversibility of investment and the embodiment of technological change at the
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The innovation in the real options models presented in this thesis is the (relatively
new) type of uncertainty that we incorporate, namely the uncertainty emanating from
unclear policy signals with respect to climate change policy (see also Blyth and Hamil-
ton, 2006). If investors do not know whether carbon emissions will be priced more
heavily in a post-2012 carbon agreement, it will be diﬃcult for them to make their
decisions with respect to capacity expansion and replacement. We ﬁnd that this type
of uncertainty is more fundamental and needs to be clearly distinguished from the
uncertainty that arises because of the ﬂuctuations associated with input and output
prices, which we call market uncertainty. From a methodological point of view the
novelty is here that we make a distinction between the expected and the actual level
of volatility. In other words, we allow for the circumstance that investors might have
to choose a strategy (i.e. optimize) under uncertainty, which means that they have
incomplete information to base their decision upon. It turns out that this leads to
suboptimal decisions, which are costly for the investor, but need not jeopardize envi-
ronmental objectives. In addition, we shed some light on the discussion about price
caps and the right design of carbon prices.
We use both the vintage-portfolio model and the real options framework to an-
alyze the impact of fuel price and technological uncertainty on investment patterns.
What we ﬁnd is that in the vintage-portfolio model, fuel price uncertainty leads to a
decrease in investment into fuel-intensive technologies, while technological uncertainty
is positively related to investment now and negatively related to future investment.
This can be explained by the embodiment of technological change in the latest vin-
tage of equipment: if technological improvements are more certain to be realized, the
beneﬁts of waiting and buying the improved equipment later on are high compared
to a situation, where it is not clear whether and when such improvements will occur.
In the real options framework this is diﬀerent: larger uncertainty always leads to a
higher option value of waiting, i.e. investment is postponed. Another interesting ﬁnd-
ing is that technological change itself has an adverse eﬀect on investment, which can
be explained by the same embodiment argument as before: if technical improvement
needs to be bought and paid for, it pays oﬀ to wait and seize the beneﬁts of what has
been going on. The conclusion would be diﬀerent if we had modeled technical change
as a process of learning-by-doing, i.e. if it had been possible to realize cost reductions
after the equipment had been installed.
By feeding real-world data into our models, we can test the validity of our ﬁndings
for actual investments, even though the models remain highly stylized and the results
should be taken as an illustration rather than as a numerical analysis to be taken at
face value. Also the policy recommendations have a suggestive character, even though
it is remarkable that we actually do not seem too far oﬀ in terms of our predictions: in
Chapter 4, for example, we ﬁnd that the price of one ton of CO2 would need to triple in
order to make an early transition from coal-ﬁred capacity to wind energy possible. The
recent Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007) actually also forecasts that CO2
prices will have to rise to at least 100$ per ton of CO2 in order to achieve stabilization
of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at relatively “harmless” levels. One might takeConclusion 57
this an indication that the models presented in this thesis can be used as tools to
develop a sound understanding of investment patterns in the electricity sector and
thus as an aid for policy makers to provide the right incentives to support sustainable
energy development as explained in Chapter 1.58 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
Appendix A: Using Sensitivity & Scenario Analy-
sis in Investment Models for Electricity Planning
The purpose of this appendix is to give an overview of investment models that have
particularly been designed and used for decision-making and forecasting of investment
patterns in the electricity sector in practice. These are typically linear programming
models, and early versions did not consider uncertainty explicitly. Yet, there are
some tools, which allow the analyst to consider the model’s behavior under diﬀerent
circumstances, which conveys an idea about the impact that uncertainty can have on
investment patterns. More speciﬁcally, we will ﬁrst give a brief history of electricity
planning models and then describe the merits of scenario and sensitivity analysis that
can be used in combination with existing models or for the sake of robustness checks.
The ﬁrst investment models for electricity planning were based on linear program-
ming. Ku (1995) reviews the beginnings of capacity expansion modeling: the French
electricity industry was ﬁrst in using linear programming for its capacity planning
process. This model comprised only ﬁve variables and four constraints. The whole ap-
proach is described by Mass´ e and Gibrat (1957). However, already at that time, there
were modeling eﬀorts including much higher numbers of variables and constraints.
Dantzig (1955) had a comparable model with 70 constraints and 90 variables.
Nowadays, small linear programming models are no longer used in energy mod-
eling. Bigger econometric models such as the global E3 model (E3MG) designed to
examine energy policies are used to analyze GHG mitigation policies under endogenous
technological change, for example (UK Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research).
Even more detailed are the systems engineering optimization models that can inves-
tigate the energy system on a national or regional level. MARKAL, for example, is a
large-scale linear programming model computing the development of the energy sec-
tor (also including transportation) over a period of around 40 to 50 years. Usually,
the objective function that is used for the calculations for the electricity sector is the
minimization of the (mostly deterministic) cost of supplying electricity, but other ob-
jectives can be substituted if needed. The inputs that the model requires are energy
demand and estimated future resource costs. This does not account for uncertainty, of
course. As a ﬁrst step into that direction, however, the MARKAL model can be run
several times in order to analyze how the composition of the energy sector changes
when an emissions cap is introduced, for example.
Alternative ways of incorporating uncertainty into decision-making in electricity
planning in practice include scenario analysis, which is a useful method of dealing
with demand uncertainty or uncertainty about the amount of emissions that need
to be saved to decelerate global warming. Scenario analysis means that more than
one and ideally many model runs are carried out in order to test the model with a
variety of parameter sets. In this way, diﬀerent scenarios of what the future could look
like are created and policies can be tested for their robustness across these scenarios,
for example. Rockafellar and Wets (1991) deﬁne scenario analysis as the process of
modeling uncertainty about system parameters by a small number of (perturbed)Appendix A 59
versions of subproblems derived from an underlying optimization problem. Then, “[..]
by studying the diﬀerent subproblems and their optimal solutions one may be able to
discover similarities and trends and eventually come up with a “well-hedged” solution
to the underlying problem, something which can be expected to perform rather well
under all scenarios, relative to some weighting of scenarios.” (Rockafellar and Wets,
1991, page 119). The weights of the scenarios can be interpreted mathematically as
(subjective probabilities). Van Asselt (2000) ﬁnds this to be a point of criticism: even
though the weighting scheme will not be drawn completely arbitrarily (the IPCC for
example analyzes scenarios, as well and the probabilities that are attached to these
scenarios are based on expert opinion and thorough analysis by multiple instances),
the ﬁnal judgement remains subjective.
39
Another – and more basic – way of testing whether and how investment patterns
change in response to changes in the underlying parameters is to change one of the
parameter values slightly, while keeping the others unchanged. Even though such a
sensitivity analysis does not incorporate uncertainty into the optimization procedure,
it gives us at least an idea of how higher or lower parameter values would inﬂuence the
ﬁnal investment decision. On the one hand, multiple uncertainties and diﬀerent types
of uncertainties cannot be investigated properly, since a sensitivity analysis rests on the
requirement that all other variables have to be kept at their base run values. On the
other hand, sensitivity analysis is a good way of determining ex ante, which variables’
volatility will have the greatest inﬂuence on the outcomes and which should therefore
be modeled stochastically in more sophisticated, but possibly smaller scale models. Ex
post, this methodology can also provide conclusions about the magnitudes in response
to higher uncertainty. It should therefore not be dismissed as a tool to elaborate on
investment under uncertainty. It could for instance also be combined with scenario
analysis, so that joint changes in system parameters could be examined.
40 Also, it can
serve to check how robust the results are to changes in the underlying assumptions
with respect to parameter values.
39Large-scale systems engineering optimization models such as MARKAL described above
can also be adapted to generate scenarios. A model that is typically used for this purpose is the
MESSAGE model. MESSAGE can be used for medium- and long-term energy system planning
(Messner and Strubegger, 1995). The model does not only consider the electricity sector, but
overlooks the whole energy system and also its relations with other systems and minimizes the
costs of operating the complete system subject to a vast number of constraints. The output of
the computations is the development of the installation of capacity and composition thereof,
production plans, transactions between sectors, emission paths, etc.
40As an example, if we have diﬀerent demand scenarios, across which we want to determine
a robust GHG emissions reductions policy, we can vary another parameter as well. If the
response to this sensitivity test is larger in one demand scenario compared to another one,
this implies that the results are sensitive to changes in both items and that there is a correlation
between them that warrants further investigation.60 Investment Theory under Uncertainty & Irreversibility
Appendix B: Value-Matching & Smooth Pasting
This section is based on the explanations in Dixit and Pindyck (pages 130-132, 1994).
They consider an optimal stopping problem of the type described in this chapter with
the following Bellman equation:
F(x,t) = max{Ω(x),π(x,t)dt + (1 − ρdt)F(x,t) + ε[dF]}.
where x follows an Itˆ o process, Ω(x) is the payoﬀ upon termination (i.e. when the
option to invest is exercised) and π(x,t)dt+(1−ρdt)F(x,t)+ε[dF] is the continuation
value (i.e. the proﬁt streams that will accrue if the investment option is not exercised
or in other words the value from waiting). ρ is the discount factor and ε[dF] is the
expectation of changes in F.
Let us deﬁne the threshold value of x as x
∗(t), so that continuation is optimal
for x > x
∗(t) and stopping is optimal if x < x
∗(t). By continuity, if we suppose
F(x
∗(t),t) < Ω(x
∗(t),t), then F(x(t),t) < Ω(x(t),t) also holds for a value of x slightly
above x
∗. However, this is a contradiction to our deﬁnition of x
∗ as the investment
threshold: if F(x(t),t) < Ω(x(t),t), it would be optimal to stop and realize the ter-
mination payoﬀ, which exceeds the continuation payoﬀ, but with x > x
∗(t) the in-
vestment option should not be exercised. The same argument applies the other way
around, i.e. if x < x
∗(t). Therefore, the value-matching condition is necessary to
ensure that the x
∗(t) that we ﬁnd is really optimal.
The smooth pasting condition can be defended by means of Figure B.1. In the
left panel, if x was only marginally above the investment threshold x
∗, then continuity
would imply that F(x(t),t) < Ω(x(t),t), i.e. it would be optimal to terminate and
invest rather than wait, even though x > x
∗, which would imply the opposite. This
contradiction shows that there cannot be an upward-pointing kink in the F(x(t),t)-
and Ω(x(t),t)-schedules.
Source: from Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, page 131
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In the right panel, if you were at the kink, you could do better by continuing
(i.e. by not exercising the option to invest) for a small time interval. Moreover,
two points marginally above and below the threshold x
∗ (denoted by ∆h in Figure
B.1) constitute an average that exceeds the value at x
∗. However, this means that
x
∗ cannot be the optimum investment threshold. One might think that this is not
true because the value that is realized time ∆t later needs to be discounted and so
the value is reduced by the eﬀect of discounting. It is therefore important to note
that the eﬀect of discounting is proportional to ∆t, while the gain from waiting is
proportional to the square root of ∆t, i.e. for small ∆t the gain more than outweighs
the eﬀect of discounting.
41 We can conclude that there can also be no downward-
pointing kink in the F(x(t),t)- and Ω(x(t),t)-schedules. Therefore, the two lines must
meet tangentially, which demonstrates clearly the necessity of smooth pasting.
41Dixit and Pindyck (1994) prove this point algebraically, so the interested reader is referred
to pages 131 and 132 of their book for the formal proof.Chapter 3
Energy Investments under
Market & Climate Policy
Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction†
The emissions from electricity generation, which are mostly CO2, NOx and SO2, con-
stitute a considerable fraction of total anthropogenic emissions on a global scale. In
Europe (OECD) this fraction for the case of CO2 amounts to 26%, while in the US
this percentage is as high as 37% (Farrell, 2004). In addition, CO2 emissions are
found to be the primary cause of global warming and there is mounting evidence of
the extent of the damages and their irreversibility, such as the melting of the icecaps
and the accompanying rise in sea levels. Even though there is still much uncertainty
about the cause-and-eﬀect relationships involved in global warming, there is common
agreement among scientists that further accumulation of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) in
the atmosphere will come at a considerable cost to nature and humanity. Stern (2006),
for example, has recently given an estimate that has alarmed policy makers and the
public. According to this estimate, 0.5-1% of GDP might be lost per year due to more
extreme weather conditions by the year 2050. As temperatures rise further, so will the
damages.
Therefore, policy makers have become alert regarding the urgency, with which
preventive action must be taken. The President of the European Commission Barroso,
for example, has made a proposal in 2007, in which he declares that the EU shall
strive for a 20% cut of its CO2 emissions by the year 2020. The aim of this action is to
limit global warming to 2
◦C. In a similar vein, the last G8 summit in Heiligendamm
has called for stronger action on the emissions reduction side. Individual European
†This chapter is based on the article “Investment under Market and Climate Policy Un-
certainty” by Fuss et al (2008).
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countries have already taken measures to reduce their CO2 emissions. The United
Kingdom, for example, has enacted the so-called Renewables Obligation, requiring
a minimum percentage of electricity sales to be generated from renewable sources,
starting at 3% in 2002 and rising to 10.4% by the year 2010 (Edge, 2006) and the
new Energy White Paper from 2007 has spelled out even more ambitious goals for
mitigation and abatement. Furthermore, international climate change agreements are
negotiated in order to ensure collective action also internationally. Most notably, the
Kyoto Protocol phase is coming to end very soon and there is large uncertainty as
to the outcomes of new negotiations and the possible design of a 2012 post-Kyoto
carbon agreement. If the US will join the EU in their stabilization eﬀorts is not clear
and China and India do not seem enthusiastic about drastic measures that would put
them at an economic disadvantage compared to industrialized countries either. Even
developed countries such as Canada will continue to rely on fossil fuels to a large
extent, ranking second after Saudi Arabia in terms of extractable oil reserves these
days (Drexhage, 2007). Considering all these diﬀerent interests and the diﬃculties
that have been encountered during previous climate change policy negotiations, it is
by far not clear what direction climate change policy will take in individual countries
after 2012.
In liberalized electricity markets, this implies that investors do not only face uncer-
tainty from volatile electricity prices, but also from potentially stricter climate change
policy in the near future, i.e. both output prices and costs at the production side
are subject to uncertainties. As we have already pointed out above, climate change
policy is inherently uncertain. The main argument why policy-makers have not been
urged to make clear commitments yet is that the science of climate change is still not
suﬃciently advanced to distill clear signals for action: predicting exactly the required
timing and the extent of mitigation measures remains diﬃcult. Thus, further down
in the causal chain, climate policy signals to energy producers are highly uncertain.
Un- or overambitious actions may – due to technological path-dependencies
1 and lags
of policy responses to uncertain global warming signals – fundamentally reshape fu-
ture market positions of energy companies. The energy producer may want to avoid
costly investments by waiting for climate policy uncertainty to diminish. On the other
hand, this uncertainty may squander the chance to an early-mover advantage laying
the foundation for a strong and possibly less volatile growth path. At the same time,
overly ambitious actions can lead to scarce resources being irrecoverably committed,
which might have been more proﬁtably spent on other opportunities than implement-
ing mitigation technologies.
To be more speciﬁc about the types of uncertainties that we will concentrate on in
this chapter, the uncertainty that is associated with electricity prices could be called
“risk” in a Knightian sense, since it deals with ﬂuctuations in the electricity price.
Market forces will eventually turn the electricity price back to its equilibrium, even if
temporarily disturbed by small shocks. This is why we model electricity prices as a
1This ties back to the irreversibility of investment and the fact that if huge sunk costs
are involved, as in the case with power plants, they will most likely also be fully utilized
throughout their lifetime.Introduction† 65
mean-reverting process and call the uncertainty emanating from the volatility of the
price process “market uncertainty”.
However, even though we want to account for the volatility of output prices, we
are mainly interested in the “market uncertainty” with respect to CO2 prices. The
ﬂuctuations associated with the CO2 price can have diﬀerent origins. The most simple
one would be a trading scheme, where the CO2 price is the price of an emissions
permit. Alternatively, the volatility could arise from small changes in regulations on
a regional or national scale, e.g. when procedures of measurement change. However,
these ﬂuctuations would be more sporadic and we prefer to think of the CO2 price as
the outcome of permit trading.
More fundamentally, we are also looking at “policy uncertainty” and this is not
about the ﬂuctuations around a mean or a trend, but about the direction of the
CO2 price development and the eﬀect that shifts in prices can have on the investment
behavior. The direction of the (previously rising) CO2 price can change, for example, if
a government is engaged in post-2012 carbon agreement negotiations and the investor
is not sure if these negotiations will be successful or not and if the government will
ultimately commit to further increases in carbon prices or abolish such measures at
all. While the government might initially have been raising the CO2 price slightly
on a national basis, it might decide that more stringent (and thus further rising)
CO2 prices are not an economic option for its country and therefore keep the CO2
price at the old level or even decrease it. Another explanation why the direction may
change is a change in regulations such as an increase in the number of permits or
a change in the allocation mechanism. Figure 3.1 shows such a sharp drop for the
European CO2 price, for example. While prices had been rising from the end of 2005,
they fell abruptly in the ﬁrst half of 2006 and ﬂuctuated widely around 16eduring
the second half of 2006. The reason for this development was that some European
countries distributed too many permits to their industries. The resulting surplus in
permits and an announcement by the Commission that more CO2 emissions had been
saved than necessary led to a sharp decrease in CO2 prices. So, another reason for
such a shift can also be the way in which a policy is carried out.
2 The fact that
national allocation schemes were not monitored led to a very unstable CO2 price and
thus uncertainty for the investor. Since such trading schemes and also other national
policy instruments are still in their infancy, it is diﬃcult to predict if another drop of
this magnitude might occur again, even though Phase II prices have developed in a
much more stable way so far. In the same vein, there might also be sharp increases,
as more evidence about the urgency to reduce emissions accumulates. We ﬁnd that
the uncertainty-investment relationship is actually diﬀerent for these diﬀerent types
of uncertainty. While market uncertainty typically leads the investor to act earlier
(as long as prices are not exhibiting a decreasing trend), policy uncertainty raises
2The same is true for the way subsidies are handled. If they are determined periodically
and the investor is not sure whether he will be eligible for the subsidy in the next period,
there is a value to waiting for the decision to be revealed before investments are made. This
has led to cyclical investment patterns in the German solar industry, for example (Bakshi,
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the option value of waiting substantially and therefore leads to a postponement of
investment into environmentally friendly technology.
Source: European Energy Exchange Corporation (EEX) in Leipzig, Germany.
Figure 3.1: CO2 Permit Prices in e/EUA (1 EUA = 1 ton of CO2)
In this chapter we illustrate the importance of stable climate policy signals for
the diﬀusion of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology in the electricity sector
using real options theory. Furthermore, we analyze the eﬀects of CO2 price volatility on
investment decisions because it has been claimed that this type of market uncertainty,
which could arise from permit trading, might lead investors to defer costly investments
into environmentally friendly technologies. Chao and Wilson (1993), for example,
study the market for emission allowances (i.e. permits) and ﬁnd that a volatile market
leads to postponement of investment into mitigation technology (in their case the
installation of scrubbers).
We have chosen real options modeling as an approach because it is particularly
suited for the analysis of uncertainty’s eﬀects on investment decisions. Real options
modeling is especially suited for an analysis of investment under uncertainty in the
electricity sector because of the investment setting that involves huge sunk costs up
front. Noting the reluctance of investors to incur such large costs ex ante that will be
irrecoverable ex post, the approach is based on the fact that, as more information about
the uncertain variables relevant for the decision becomes available, staying ﬂexible by
postponing decisions has an option value if the degree of uncertainty faced is big
enough. Real options theory thus explicitly associates a value with this opportunity
to wait.
3
3Please go back to Chapter 2 for more technical detail and an overview of the seminal
literature. Note that a multi-stage stochastic programming model could be designed, which
would result in the same outcomes as those presented here. However, stochastic programming
tends to get computationally too intensive when there are many periods and scenarios, since
it requires decision-making at each stage – based on the prior history of events and decisions.
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Furthermore, we have decided to focus on the electricity sector because it makes
up a major part of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Moreover, we choose to ex-
amine coal-ﬁred electricity production because coal is the fuel, which will be aﬀected
most severely by the imposition of a CO2 tax or the introduction of emissions permit
trading. Finally, since the debate of introducing permit trading in the US has resur-
faced recently and price caps have been proposed as a safety valve for the investor
fearing CO2 price uncertainty (e.g. Pizer, 2005), we also use the model developed in
this chapter to analyze these issues in more detail.
In the remaining chapter, we will ﬁrst give a very brief overview of the related
literature and deﬁne our contributions to the existing work in this ﬁeld. In Section
3.3, a description of the real options framework applied to the investment problem
of the electricity producer is given. This is followed by a presentation of the model
and continues with an explanation of the solution methods employed. Afterwards,
the results are presented, including an overview of the data used and experiments
conducted to analyze the impact of the diﬀerent types of uncertainty mentioned above,
followed by a conclusion.
3.2 Related Literature and Contribution
A disquisition of real options theory and its application to the electricity sector can
be found in Chapter 2, which also provides an in-depth, general literature review and
an outline of the contribution to the existing work in this ﬁeld. In order to give a
short overview of how this particular chapter ﬁts into the literature, Table 3.1 brieﬂy
summarizes the studies most closely related to ours.
What can be concluded from Table 3.1 is that all but one of the studies focus on
market uncertainty, by which we mean the ﬂuctuations in a price path with known
trend. Only Reedman et al (2006) investigate policy uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty
whether there will be a price (on CO2) at all. They model this in a very simplistic way,
however. Our framework is much more elaborate and allows us to clearly distinguish
between the two types of uncertainty (market versus policy uncertainty) that all other
studies only treat separately. While Reedman et al (2006) analyze uncertainty about
the timing of policy, we will not cover this again, but focus on policy uncertainty
where the date of the new policy is known (e.g. the end of an existing climate change
agreement and the date of deciding about a new policy stance – such as it will be the
case in 2012), but the policy itself is unknown (e.g. “Will the government commit to
further increases in the CO2 price or will it have an own, national CO2 tax, which is
much lower than the permit price was expected to be?”).
such as real options models when there are many possible states. Since in the case at hand
there are many periods and a modest state space, multi-stage dynamic programming is not
the optimal solution method for our problem (see Cheng et al (2004) for a detailed comparison























































Author(s) Model Uncertainty Investment Response
De Jong, Oosterom
and Walet (2004)
Adjust NPV for options to defer and abandon
an investment into a plant emitting less CO2.
Market
uncertainty
More volatility in CO2 price





Stochastic electricity and CO2 prices. Add op-
tion value (to switch between fuels, to switch
outputs (power vs heat), to alter operation
scale) to NPV instead of using asset pricing.
Focus on trading schemes.
Market
uncertainty
Permit price ﬂuctuations might
make lower emission plants less
attractive. Results depend cru-
cially on permit price level.
Kiriyama and
Suzuki (2004)
Stochastic permit prices. Value function in-
cludes stock of CO2 emissions as negative ex-
ternality. Compare value of diﬀerent types of
power plants separately, i.e. no switching.
Market
uncertainty





No stochastic process, but a 10% chance that
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Stochastic electricity and carbon prices, where





Potential jumps in the carbon
price create uncertainty, which
raises the option value of invest-
ment and leads to postponement




Stochastic gas prices; regulatory uncertainty
modeled through diﬀerent probabilities that
CO2 prices of diﬀerent magnitudes will be im-




Social cost of carbon abatement
increases with regulatory uncer-
tainty; eﬀect is enhanced when
gas prices are low or plants that
can be retroﬁtted with CCS not
competitive.
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A more elaborate framework in that direction is by Reinelt and Keith (2007), who
– similar to Reedman et al (2006) – consider both uncertainty about the date and the
magnitude of the CO2 tax. They investigate the ﬂexibility that CCS technology oﬀers
to the investor and ﬁnd that the social cost of abatement is increased by regulatory
uncertainty and that this eﬀect is even enhanced when gas prices are low or IGCC
plants that can be retroﬁtted with CCS are not suﬃciently competitive.
The contribution of our paper is to illustrate explicitly how market uncertainty
(about time-dependent electricity and CO2 price paths) and policy uncertainty inﬂu-
ence the investment decisions in the electricity sector. To our knowledge, none of the
existing energy planning literature has addressed the impacts arising from diﬀerent
qualities of uncertainty surrounding CO2 price policy in the speciﬁc way that we do
this. Blyth and Yang (2007) also model carbon and energy prices as stochastic pro-
cesses and point to the usefulness of analyzing the impact of carbon price jumps to
model the uncertainties pervading the policy-making process.
Apart from analyzing the diﬀerence between market and policy uncertainty in one
coherent framework, we add to the existing literature in a number of other respects.
First, many studies focus on the type of trading scheme when they include stochastic
permit prices. Laurikka and Koljonen (2006), for example, analyze the case where the
number of permit is an uncertain number and where the cash ﬂows from the allocation
of free allowances matters therefore as well.
Even though this will be of importance when a country has to decide how to
implement a trading scheme, we are not interested in the design of such schemes,
but want to focus on the eﬀect of a CO2 penalty as such – no matter whether it
is interpreted as the price of a permit or an adaptable tax. We think that it is
more important to ﬁrst determine the direction of eﬀects before analyzing the type of
instrument.
With respect to the methodology, some studies use the so-called “dynamic cash
ﬂow” method to value the investment under consideration. In other words, they add
the option value to the “standard” net present value (NPV), whereas we think that it
is more appropriate (even though admittedly computationally more intensive) to use
asset pricing theory, following the approach in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
Another methodological innovation that is inherent in our approach is that we are
able to investigate the investment response under diﬀerent perceptions of the price
paths ex ante and ex post, which relates back to the diﬀerence between market and
policy uncertainty mentioned above. To be more precise, we make a distinction be-
tween the volatility perceived when deriving the optimal investment strategy for each
possible price realization and the volatility that the investor actually faces when pick-
ing the decision. This is a method that none of the studies listed in Table 3.1 considers.
What this basically means in real options terms is that the price thresholds, beyond
which it becomes proﬁtable to invest, are derived under a ﬁxed “expected” volatility
parameter. However, once the decision is picked according to a realized price path, we
assume this volatility parameter to be zero, i.e. the actual investment decision is picked
under certainty, according to the “actual” volatility parameter of zero. However, the70 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
set of available decisions was computed under uncertainty, i.e. under incomplete in-
formation. Therefore, the thresholds found in the optimization are not the same as
when the investor optimizes under perfect information. In that case investment would
occur later. However, additional experiments show that this decision-making under
incomplete information does not hurt the investor considerably. An additional eﬀect,
which should be valued positively, is that a large amount of emissions can be saved in
the meantime.
Furthermore, only Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) incorporate the possibility into
their model that the ﬂuctuations in the price can be smoothed out by passing some
of the additional cost on to consumers. In our model we also take this into account
by letting the correlation between the noises of the electricity and CO2 price process
be correlated. Note that this is no contradiction to using mean-reverting prices, while
CO2 prices are rising, since only the errors are correlated, i.e. only spikes can be
passed on to the consumer to a speciﬁed degree.
To summarize, notwithstanding the importance of the design of permit trading
schemes, taxes or the timing of policy measures, the focus and also the main novelty
of our work is to add new insights to the diﬀerent types of CO2 price uncertainty and
to derive important implications for the behavior of both investors in the electricity
sector and policy makers, who strive for a transition towards environmentally more
friendly generation technologies. We ﬁnd that the investment response to market
uncertainty indeed diﬀers quite substantially from that to policy uncertainty. More
precisely, market uncertainty induces earlier investment into lower emission technology
(because the lack of information under which the set of optimal actions is derived leads
to lower CO2 price thresholds, i.e. investment into carbon capture becomes attractive
sooner), while policy uncertainty increases the option value drastically and thus leads
the investor to postpone investment until the new policy stance is realized, even if the
investor is incurring losses in the meantime.
3.3 A Real Options Framework for the Electric-
ity Sector
This model intends to determine the optimal investment plan for a single electricity
producer facing stochastic electricity and CO2 prices. Furthermore, the possibility
of learning about climate change policy and the potentially drastic changes to CO2
prices enables us to determine the eﬀect of government pre-commitment to an environ-
mentally sound policy agenda. A real options framework is especially suited for this
purpose because it explicitly associates a value to acquiring information by waiting.
The planning horizon is 50 years. The options available to the investor are: (1)
to determine whether to invest into the basic coal-ﬁred power plant or into the plant
including a CCS module, (2) to retroﬁt the existing plant with a CCS, (3) to switch
the installed module on and oﬀ in the face of large CO2 price swings. If a CCS module
is switched on, the amount of electricity generated is lower and the operational costsA Real Options Framework for the Electricity Sector 71
higher, but the cost arising from carbon payments is lower.
4 Note that only for high
initial CO2 prices investors would prefer to build the plant including the CCS module
immediately. But what happens when producers cannot be sure of the future level of
CO2 prices? International, post-2012 carbon agreements are still under debate and
may or may not result in commitments to stricter levels of emissions reductions and
higher CO2 prices.
3.3.1 The Model
The uncertainties that arise in the context of the electricity generator’s investment
problem are two-fold. On the one hand, there is uncertainty with respect to electricity
prices. On the other hand, the production cost is inﬂuenced by ﬂuctuations in the price
of CO2 emissions. On top of this, two types of uncertainty are analyzed, as mentioned
before. The ﬁrst one is market uncertainty, which is represented by the risks involved
in the volatility of a price path, while the second type is policy uncertainty, which
concerns not the ﬂuctuations, but the direction of a price path depending on the
actions of the government. Also, there are diﬀerent types of cost that inﬂuence the
optimal investment plan, which are not treated as uncertain. The cost of capital
is taken to be constant and deterministic, which ignores the possibility of technical
improvements. However, we omit this on purpose in order to get as clear a picture as
possible of the eﬀect of uncertain policy and prices - i.e. free of interaction eﬀects.
5
Moreover, capital is not divisible in this model implying that the investor has the
choice to invest either into the complete plant (with or without CCS module), or to
leave the investment opportunity open. Other prices that are neither growing nor
stochastic are coal prices,
6 operations and maintenance cost (O&M) and the cost of
switching between technologies. Furthermore, the assumption is made that installing
a power plant also implies that is immediately used, i.e. there is no delay in the
realization of the payoﬀs.
7
When analyzing the impact of market uncertainty, the assumption is that elec-
tricity prices follow a mean-reverting process, which has generally been found to be a
4Since it is assumed that a ﬁxed amount of output has to be supplied, this output deﬁcit
needs to be balanced by the import of electricity from external sources at the current electricity
spot market price.
5Uncertainty of technical change in a real options framework is analyzed in Chapter 4.
6This can be justiﬁed considering the possibility of engaging in long-term supplier con-
tracts, especially in the case of coal, which is often traded forward. In addition, the planning
period is only 50 years and coal prices have been projected to remain rather stable in the near
future.
7Construction times could be included easily, but we leave them aside for the moment,
since this is not our focus and would not change the results qualitatively (if we expand the
planning horizon), unless lead times would be dramatically diﬀerent between diﬀerent types
of plants. Chladn´ a et al (2004), who use a similar setup to investigate the pulp and paper
sector, also claim that disregarding this aspect has no impact on the interpretation of the
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is the increment of a standard Wiener process and σ
e is the corresponding volatility
parameter. For CO2 prices, a geometric Brownian motion has been chosen, even
though it is diﬃcult to predict future CO2 price behavior, which is the very topic of
this paper. However, a rise in CO2 prices is in accordance with projections by most
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c is the drift parameter, σ
c is the volatility parameter and dW
c
t is the increment
of a Wiener process again. Furthermore, the increments of the two Wiener processes
are correlated, where the correlation parameter is denoted by ρ. A positive value for ρ
implies that swings in CO2 prices are positively reﬂected in those of electricity prices,
which makes intuitive sense thinking of producers, who will try to pass these extra costs
– at least partially – on to consumers. Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) also acknowledge
this possibility and allow for a correlation parameter of 50%. Reinard (2007) reviews
several studies that ﬁnd empirical evidence for the fact that CO2 costs are passed on
to power prices by suppliers. Estimates lie in between 40% and 72%. Even though
it is emphasized that the results depend crucially on marginal price setting, country
characteristics, loads and other factors, we have decided to take the results as evidence
of positive correlation and pick a value of 70% for our analysis.
9
Market uncertainty (which could also be called risk in a Knightian sense) can
be analyzed by varying the values for σ
e in Equation (3.3.1) and σ
c in the second
equation.
10 Policy uncertainty, on the other hand, concerns the form of Equation
(3.3.2). In the experiments that we will conduct in Section 3.4, we investigate what
happens to investment, when the CO2 price ﬁrst rises and investors are not sure if it
will continue to do so. We implement this by starting out with a positive value for the
drift parameter  
c, which turns negative or remains positive with equal probabilities
at a speciﬁed date later on. This will enable an analysis of investors’ reactions to
policy uncertainty.
The investor thus faces an optimization problem of timing his/her decision to
8Bodily and Del Buono (2002) actually show that, to be even more realistic, the mean-
reverting process should be combined with a geometric Brownian motion, so that price-
proportional volatility can be taken into account as well. They call this the mean-reverting
proportional volatility (MRPV) model, but we refrain from such complex processes for now,
since our focus is primarily on the uncertainty connected to the CO2 price process.
9This is of course arbitrary, but sensitivity analysis has shown that the results are not
decisively determined by the value of ρ. It should be noted that there is no contradiction when
assuming rising CO2 prices, mean-reverting electricity prices and a positive value for ρ, since
ρ only denotes the correlation between errors and thus only CO2 price spikes are partially
passed on to consumers and not the trend per se.
10We will restrict ourselves to analyze the market uncertainty arising from stochastic CO2
prices in this paper. This enables us to make a clear comparison with the eﬀects of policy
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invest into the CCS module so that the sum of discounted expected future proﬁts is
maximized. The yearly proﬁt π consists of income from electricity generation and
heat less the cost of fuel and the payments for CO2 emissions, operational costs and
costs associated with the action, c(at). The production function is of the Leontieﬀ
type, which means that coeﬃcients are ﬁxed. Since we can assume that all electricity
(and heat), which is generated can be sold to the grid inelastically,
11 the installed
plant will be run continuously thereby producing a ﬁxed amount of output for a ﬁxed
amount of inputs per year. Therefore, as quantities are not inﬂuenced, any deviations
in investment behavior must be due to price uncertainty.
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(3.3.3)
where P
f is the price of coal, P
h is the price of heat, OC is the operational cost
per year, the q refer to annual quantities of electricity, heat, carbon dioxide and fuel
respectively, and mt denotes the type of power plant that is operational at time t
determined by state and action, (xt,at). If mt=1, the coal-ﬁred power plant without
CCS is active. For mt=2, the CCS module is switched on as well. It is important
to take note of the tradeoﬀs involved in this proﬁt equation: while the amount of
electricity generated will be lower and the operational cost higher if a CCS module is
added, the cost arising from carbon payments will be lower, since q
c(2) < q
c(1). In
order to give the reader a feeling of how signiﬁcant this diﬀerence in carbon emissions
is, please consider that in our case the coal-ﬁred power plant without CCS emits about
740 g(CO2)/kWh, whereas the one with CCS produces only 133 g(CO2)/kWh for the
same amount of combusted coal,
12 which is more than seven times less than the plant
without CCS emits.
Moreover, as described by Equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2), the investor assumes that
prices for electricity and CO2 both follow stochastic processes with known starting
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where At(xt) is the set of feasible actions for a given state xt.
13 r is the discount rate
11This assumption can be justiﬁed by acknowledging that distributors will engage into
output contracts with generators, specifying amounts of electricity and heat that will be
bought oﬀ for a prolonged period of time.
12These data have been derived from the yearly emissions and electricity generated, see
Table 3.2.
13Switching the CCS module on when it has not been installed is an example of an infeasible
action.74 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
and therefore e
−r t is the discount factor, i.e. the factor by which future proﬁts to be
received at time t must be multiplied in order to obtain the present value. The actions
can be summarized as follows: the investor has to install a power plant in the ﬁrst
period by constraint. This could be the coal-ﬁred type without CCS or immediately
the one with CCS. In the ﬁrst case the CCS module can be added later on. In any
case, the module can be switched oﬀ at any subsequent point in time. Of course, doing
nothing is an option as well.
14
3.3.2 Solution Methods
Based on the outline of the model, the investor’s problem is to determine the optimal
investment strategies {a(t)}
T
t=1. The planning horizon is T and in our application T
will be equal to 50. The optimum decision in each year can be obtained recursively




























t ), which the producer receives upon investment, and the
expected, discounted continuation value: e








t ). It is
important to note that this term is evaluated for the state the producer is in, which
changes contingent on the actions undertaken.
The optimal action to be taken at time t shall be called at. In other words, at









t ) forward Monte Carlo simulation has been
chosen.
15 The advantage of the Monte Carlo approach is that it is relatively easy to
extend. Also, it has proven to remain eﬃcient in this framework for a rather high
degree of complexity and delivers the same results as the partial diﬀerential equations
approach. Although the method of using partial diﬀerential equations along with ap-
propriate boundary conditions is mathematically the most elegant way, this approach
has proven – once numerically implemented – to be inﬂexible to variations and exten-
sions and also computationally intensive when using a ﬁner grid. The third method
to ﬁnd the optimum decisions involves binomial lattice frameworks or binomial deci-
sion trees. Even though these are very intuitive and rather ﬂexible when introducing
multiple uncertainties and concurrent options, they also tend to get computationally
very intensive and therefore not very suitable for our purposes. Of the work reviewed
in the introduction, there are various studies that also use Monte Carlo simulation for
real options modeling in the electricity sector, e.g. Tseng and Barz (2002), who focus
14This implies that the set of feasible actions at t + 1 is essentially a fraction of all actions
taken previously. You can switch oﬀ a module only if has previously been installed, for
instance.
15Note that this numerical method - as well as the partial diﬀerential equations approach -
requires the discretization of prices, so a relatively ﬁne price grid is needed in order to obtain
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on short term generation, and Laurrika and Koljonen (2006), who adopt long term
planning horizons.
16
The output of the recursive part is a multidimensional matrix containing the opti-




t . These optimum actions are further referred
to as “strategies.” In order to analyze the ﬁnal outcome, possible price paths are sim-
ulated and the corresponding decisions are extracted from the output (this is called
“picking decisions”). By plotting the distribution of the optimal investment timing for
all the diﬀerent price paths, the ﬁnal results are generated. These results are therefore
obtained in two independent steps: the ﬁrst is the recursive optimization part that
computes the strategies representing the optimal decision of the producer for each
possible state. The second step is the simulation of future price paths and “picking”
the decisions out of the previously obtained strategies. It will therefore be possible
to conduct experiments, in which the expected volatility is positive, while the actual
volatility turns out to be zero. That implies that the optimal strategies are computed
under uncertainty, but when the actual decisions are picked, there is only one true
price path. By comparing this outcome to the result when both steps are conducted
without volatility, a measure of the uncertainty eﬀect (or lack of information), that
has kept the investor from ﬁnding the same optimal strategies as in the deterministic
case, can be obtained.
Figure 3.2: Diagram of the Solution Method
This is all summarized in Figure 3.2, where the price processes (Equations (3.3.1)
and (3.3.2)) and the options
17 are inputs to the optimization part, solving Equation
16More on these methods can be found in Kaminski et al (2004), who elaborate on the
pricing of energy options and the methodologies involved.
17The options shown are building the coal-ﬁred power plant in the ﬁrst period, building it76 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
(3.3.4). The results are extracted from the output of this optimization by simulating
many diﬀerent price paths and picking the optimal decisions previously calculated.
One example of the resulting investment frequencies is displayed in Figure 3.2.
3.4 Experiments and Results
It has been suggested that increased uncertainty about the future price of CO2 emis-
sions might reduce the ﬁrm’s investment incentives with respect to abatement capital
and less carbon-intensive technologies (see e.g. Chao and Wilson, 1993). However, we
think that one has to make a distinction here between two types of uncertainty. On
the one hand, there is uncertainty due to stochastically moving prices, where trend
and volatility are known to investors. This kind of uncertainty can result from trad-
ing emissions permits, minor amendments to national policies aimed at reducing CO2
emissions, and changes in the cost structure of particular technologies. Therefore, we
call this type of uncertainty “market uncertainty” – it is uncertainty generated by
market processes. The question then is if a higher degree of market uncertainty will
lead to less or later investment into carbon-saving equipment or not. On the other
hand, there is also uncertainty emanating from the fact that investors cannot be sure
how e.g. a post-2012 carbon agreement will be designed. More precisely, investors
do not know in advance how international climate change negotiations will turn out
and whether their own government will commit to further raising CO2 prices (i.e. a
continuation of the trend) or whether it will deem climate change mitigation a goal
inferior to economic aspirations and decrease the CO2 price subsequently. Such a
change in trend has signiﬁcant implications for the investment pattern with respect to
mitigation technology, as we will see in the analysis of this section.
In terms of our experimental setting, if climate change policy negotiations fail,
investors will most probably not want to be “stuck” with a CCS module, which is
an irreversible investment, as it cannot be resold without considerable losses once
installed. At the same time, if they postpone investments into CCS, they will face
losses if prices continue to be positive during the negotiation period. It has to be
determined, which of the two eﬀects dominates to ﬁnd out if investments are really
postponed in response to this type of uncertainty, which we call “policy uncertainty.”
In the following, we will ﬁrst describe the data for the two power plants and then
conduct a series of experiments to shed some light on the investment responses to
market and policy uncertainty.
3.4.1 Data Description
As already explained above, this analysis is about a coal-ﬁred power plant, which can
be retroﬁtted with a CCS module. Switching the CCS module on and oﬀ is relatively
inexpensive compared to installing the full module (it comprises only 1% of total
immediately with CCS and ﬁrst building the coal-ﬁred power plant and later adding the CCS
(from top to bottom). The three dots indicate that there are more options not displayed here,
such as switching the CCS module oﬀ and on.Experiments and Results 77
capital costs). Apart from the electricity, a certain amount of heat is generated as a
byproduct of the power generation process. Heat is a byproduct of power generation.
Although the heat rate is the same for the coal-ﬁred power plant with and without
CCS and thus does not change the results in favor of any of the two, heat proﬁts are
included for two reasons: (1) The data are from a survey of real-world power plants
and the goal is to remain as close to reality as possible. (2) Heat is an additional proﬁt
source for the coal-ﬁred power plant owner, which provides more time for retroﬁtting,
i.e. there will be a longer time span during which a higher amount of CO2 is emitted
into the atmosphere. Excluding heat proﬁts from the analysis would create a distorted
picture, where the investor would choose the CCS module much earlier than in reality.
We therefore assume that the producers are able to sell the full amount of this heat
at the current spot market price. Table 3.2 below gives an overview of the data that
are used for this analysis.
Parameters Coal Coal with CCS
Electricity Output [TJ/yr] 36,188 29,107
CO2 Emissions [tCO2/yr] 7,442,050 1,079,097
Fuel Consumption [TJ/yr] 78,669 78,669
Fuel Cost [$/TJ] 1,876 1,876
O&M Fixed Cost [$/yr] 57,375,000 70,581,522
Switching Cost [$] 1% of capital cost 1% of capital cost
Installed Capacity [MW] 1,530 1,231
Eﬃciency (Power) [%] 46 37
Eﬃciency (Heat) [%] 34 34
Heat Price [$/TJ] 11,347.48 11,347.48
Capital Cost
Common Parts [$] 1,664,240,721 1,664,240,721
Cost CCS Module [$] 849,822,693
Total Capital Cost [$] 1,664,240,721 2,514,063,414
Source: World Energy Model of the IEA (2005) and IEA MINUIT Model (2006). Remark:
Building the coal-ﬁred power plant without CCS costs 1,664,240,721$. Adding the CCS
module later on costs 849,822,693$. Building the full version right away costs 1,664,240,721$
+ 849,822,693$ = 2,514,063,414$.
Table 3.2: Power Plant Data
Furthermore, the parameters of the price processes have to be calibrated. The
CO2 prices are modeled based on the projections for GHG shadow prices taken from
the GGI Scenario Database (IIASA, 2007). Referring back to Equation (4.1),  
c is
estimated to be 0.0568 and σ
c as 0.0287 (CO2 prices are measured in $/ton of CO2).
As for electricity, the estimates for the parameters are based on spot market data
(source: EEX time series until 2006). The average price is 37$/MWh, α is estimated
to be 0.45564 and σ
e is 0.092376. The correlation between electricity and CO2 prices, ρ
, is assumed to be 0.7, which means that electricity producers are able to pass on spikes
in the price of CO2 to end consumers to an extent of 70%, as previously explained.
More detailed information on the data used to estimate the parameters can be found
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3.4.2 Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Types of Uncertainty
As already explained, a clear distinction is made between uncertainty coming from
ﬂuctuations (σ
c) around a known trend ( 
c) of CO2 prices and the uncertainty arising
in situations where investors cannot even be sure of the direction that price process
will take (i.e. whether  
c remains positive or becomes zero or even negative), mostly
connected with unclear government commitment plans. Keeping the electricity price
process unchanged, experiments with both types of uncertainty have been conducted,
which lead to quite diﬀerent results. The experiments are listed in Table 3.3 for
reference.
Type of uncertainty expected σc actual σc
(deterministic) Experiment 1 0.00 0.00
(stochastic) Experiment 2 0.0287 0.0287
market uncertainty Experiment 3 0.0287 0.00
µc until period 37 µc after period 37
policy uncertainty Experiment 4 0.0568 0.0568 or 0
Table 3.3: CO2 Price Experiments
In experiment 1 investors optimize (i.e. ﬁnd their optimum strategies) under cer-
tainty, and pick decisions under zero price volatility as well. Experiment 2 analyzes
what happens when investors ﬁnd optimum strategies under stochastic prices and
also face stochastic prices when picking decisions. In experiment 3 investors optimize
strategies under stochastic prices, but pick decisions under deterministic prices. Exper-
iment 3 thus serves the analysis of market uncertainty as described before. Experiment
4 looks for the investment response when there is a 50% chance that the government
remains committed to rising CO2 prices ( 
c=0.0568) and a 50% chance that it does
not ( 
c=0) after an arbitrary period. This is for the analysis of policy uncertainty
and the experiment is repeated for diﬀerent levels of probabilities and commitment
periods.
Market Uncertainty
Figure 3.3 shows that, in all cases to be considered, the ﬁrst investment will be into
the coal-ﬁred power plant without CCS, since it is cheaper to install and operate, and
initial CO2 prices are too low to trigger investment into the CCS module immediately.
If CO2 prices were known with complete certainty, i.e. there would be only one upward-
sloping line in the lower left panel, investors would add the CCS module in period 29.
In Figure 3.3 however, prices are stochastic and therefore there is a spread in CCS
investment time (i.e. when the investment option of adding CCS is exercised). Once
the CCS module is installed, it is used throughout the whole planning period, as CO2
prices continue to rise. Volatility would have to be large compared to the values used
here in order to give the producer an incentive to switch the module oﬀ and on later
in the planning period. Obviously, if CO2 prices temporarily dropped due to e.g.Experiments and Results 79
excess supplies of permits or changes in expectations, the CCS module would indeed
be switched oﬀ.
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Panel 1: proﬁt distribution peaks around 4.8x109$. Panel 2: the frequency with which CCS
is added peaks in year 29. Panels 3 and 4: the CCS module is not switched oﬀ and on. Panel
5: sample of simulated CO2 prices. Panel 6: sample of simulated electricity prices
Figure 3.3: Proﬁt and Investment Frequency Distribution for Stochastic Prices
To analyze to what extent uncertainty aﬀects investment behavior, ﬁrst note again
that if they optimize under complete certainty, they will add the CCS module in
period 29. If they optimize under uncertainty with known  
c and σ
c, Figure 3.3 shows
that they will mostly invest somewhere between period 25 and 35. However, if they
optimize under uncertainty, but later on (when they actually pick a decision) there
is only one (deterministic) price path, they will invest in period 27.
18 This implies
that the uncertainty is an obstacle for them in ﬁnding the same optimum strategies
as in experiment 1. This outcome is due to the lack of information under which the
optimum strategies have been found: in the “perfect information” case in experiment
1, investment occurs later because the true price outcome has been known ahead of
time. In the “imperfect information” case, on the other hand, the stochasticity of the
price paths that are simulated will also generate CO2 prices that are high enough to
trigger investment into the CCS earlier. In this way, optimum strategies are found
that lead to earlier investment than in the deterministic case. Moreover, the fact that
18In terms of our methodology depicted in Figure 3.2, this means that the backward-
optimization conducted with stochastic prices, but instead of the forward-moving Monte Carlo
simulation, only the deterministic price path is used.80 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
they invest earlier rather than later depends crucially on the type of price process used
in the analysis: the upward trend in CO2 prices means that producers will always face
positive costs in terms of expenses for carbon emissions, even if the deviations from
the trend are negative; therefore, upward deviations hurt them even more than in the
case of constant or decreasing prices. Table 3 summarizes these results.
Experiment expected σc actual σc investment year
1 0.00 0.00 29
2 0.0287 0.0287 25-35
3 0.0287 0.00 27
Table 3.4: Market Uncertainty Experiments for CO2 Prices
Linking this back to the analysis outlined in Chapter 2 about the value of the
plant, note that there are two important diﬀerences between the example provided
there and the one presented in this chapter. The ﬁrst diﬀerence is that we are not
dealing with the volatility of proﬁts or revenues here. The CO2 price represents a cost
to the producer and the value of the ﬁrst plant is therefore decreasing in P
c
t , which
rises over time. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4 by the downward-sloping line V 1(P
c
t ),
which is already adjusted for the investment cost. Furthermore, we do not optimize the
installation timing of a speciﬁc plant, but we actually consider the adoption of a CCS
module when ﬁrst installing a coal-ﬁred power plant without CCS is proﬁtable. The
CCS module becomes more and more attractive only with rising CO2 prices because
the value of the coal-ﬁred plant with CCS falls more slowly with increasing P
c
t , since
it emits relatively less CO2.
Figure 3.4: Values of the Coal-ﬁred Plant Only and of the Coal-ﬁred Plant with
CCS)
In Figure 3.4 the two lines for the values of the plant with and without CCS cross
at the threshold P
∗. When prices are simulated with a positive σ
c, P
∗ is reached
sooner than if we had followed a deterministic path. This situation is depicted in
Figure 3.5. Therefore, the optimum strategy that is found for the investor to pickExperiments and Results 81
from is not the same optimal decision as what it had been with complete information:
it has been derived under imperfect information and does not correspond to the true
price that the investor is now facing.
19
Figure 3.5: The Impact of Stochasticity on the Determination of the Optimum
Timing Strategy
Some authors ﬁnd that investment should be postponed in the face of uncertain
input prices because they have shutdown conditions. This means that they only reap
the beneﬁts of the downward deviations of the ﬂuctuating price process, but every time
the price hits an upward spike, they shut down operations if the input price exceeds the
output price. We think that this is no realistic assumption for electricity companies,
who have to fulﬁll their supply contracts and who face considerable switching costs in
terms of starting up a plant and maintaining it during the shutdown.
These ﬁndings imply that the concern that ﬂuctuations in permit prices might
reduce a ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in abatement capital or “cleaner” technologies is
not warranted in this framework. On the contrary, the uncertainty about the future
development of CO2 prices – knowing that they will not be decreasing – drives the
investors to act sooner rather than later.
Policy Uncertainty
Concerns have recently been uttered that politicians being vague about future climate
change policy and their commitment to that can have unfavorable eﬀects such as the
19In addition, it can be observed in Table 3.4 that the investment option is exercised one
year later on average when σc is positive. While this is not a signiﬁcant delay when we look
at the considerable spread, this can be explained by the fact that increases in the volatility
raise the option value of waiting and even though this does not make a considerable diﬀerence
with our parametrization, note that this would be represented by a slight upward rotation
of the V 1-line in Figure 3.4, which does not change the dominant eﬀect of optimizing under
incomplete information, obviously.82 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
extension of the life of existing plants rather than investing into new and less carbon-
intensive equipment. As already mentioned, Blyth and Yang (2007) also acknowledge
that policy uncertainty should be modeled more drastically, e.g. by the inclusion
of jumps in the price of carbon. Other authors have looked at diﬀerent areas of
policy-making, such as agriculture, and have modeled uncertainty as a tax credit
parameter that can be zero or non-zero according to a probability derived from a
Poisson process (e.g. Boyarchenko and Levendorsky, 1998). Finally, there are studies,
which model policy uncertainty about obligatory payments by considering that there
will be a reform and representing the post-reform amount of payment and the date of
the policy implementation as random variables (Lagerkvist, 2005). Our representation
of policy uncertainty is a bifurcation in price paths and thus much simpler for the sake
of making our results more transparent.
In the experiment conducted here, investors in the electricity sector are uncertain
with respect to the actions of their government. Suppose that the government has
enacted some sort of CO2-reducing policy on a national scale. This could be a national
trading scheme or an escalating emissions tax. Initially, producers therefore face a
rising CO2 price, but they are not sure that this path will be continued. Then the
government engages in international climate change negotiations such as will be the
case for post-2012 climate policy, for example. If the negotiations are successful, the
government will commit to further increases in the CO2 price. However, it might
also turn out that the government decides to drop out of the carbon-reducing scheme
completely.
20 So the investor faces two scenarios: in the ﬁrst one, the price will
continue to rise, in the second one the price will drop (either to zero or to a relatively
low level, where it stabilizes). If oﬃcials are not clear about their direction, investors
will face a 50% chance of ending up in either of the two scenarios. The main ﬁnding
of our analysis is that – under this type of uncertainty – investors will postpone their
decision until the year, in which they learn about the government’s (non)commitment.
In case the government commits to a stricter emissions reduction target, they will
add the CCS module, as soon as they learn about their government’s commitment.
Otherwise, they will keep producing with the coal-ﬁred power plant that has no CCS
module. The ﬁrst case is shown in Figure 3.6, where the new policy is announced and
implemented in period 37. Action 1 refers to “Do Nothing”, action 2 stands for “Build
the power plant without CCS” and action 5 is about adding the CCS module to an
existing coal-ﬁred power plant.
This result clearly demonstrates that there is a large option value involved when
the investor is ﬂexible. Remember that with perfect information ex ante, investors
would have installed the CCS module in period 29, i.e. if they would have been sure
that their government would remain committed. So, while they are waiting for the
government decision to be revealed (at the publicly known end of the climate change
negotiations round, for example), they are incurring losses, as soon as they pass period
29. In Figure 3.6 they postpone their investment for eight consecutive years, during
20This is a somewhat extreme supposition, but the results also hold for commitments to
lower CO2 prices.Experiments and Results 83


















































Panel 1: with commitment, CO2 prices continue to rise (dotted line), otherwise they fall (solid
line). Panel 2: electricity price is stable (stochasticity is left aside here to avoid cross eﬀects,
but further tests have shown that the result remains the same also with stochastic prices).
Panel 3: government commits to climate change policy in period 37, so investment in CCS
also occurs in period 37. Panel 4: the coal-ﬁred power plant runs until period 36, then CCS
is added.
Figure 3.6: Learning about Government Commitment in Period 37
which they suﬀer increasing losses because they have constant revenues, but increasing
expenses for emissions. These losses must therefore be lower than the option value
attached to waiting.
In real options terminology, this means that the threshold of investing when there
is no uncertainty is passed in year 29, when both plants have the same value. This
situation is depicted in Figure 3.4 at P
∗. We have seen that small ﬂuctuations in the
price path can then lead to earlier adoption of the CCS module when optimization
occurs under uncertainty (see Figure 3.5 and accompanying text). When there is
uncertainty about the direction of the price path, however, the deviation in costs in
case the policy will be less strict is huge. So there are considerable beneﬁts to reap
from waiting with the switch. While waiting, these beneﬁts diminish, as the prices
continue to grow. At the same time, it would have been optimal to install the CCS
module in year 29 in order to save on CO2 costs. So the investor is incurring losses in
these terms as well. In year 37, the beneﬁts from waiting do no longer exceed these
losses. If people know that the new policy will become oﬃcial later than year 37, they
will invest into the CCS module in year 29. If they know that it will be announced in
between year 29 and 37, they will wait. This can also be seen in Figure 3.7, which is84 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
an extension of Figure 3.4 in that it shows the option value of the investment.
Figure 3.7: Option Value of the Plant with CCS exceeds the Diﬀerence between
V1 and V2 after Year 29 until Year 37
The principal drivers of this result are (a) the perceived probability that the gov-
ernment will commit to a policy of further raising CO2 prices (further called commit-
ment probability) and (b) the year that this commitment will be made. Figure 3.8
shows how the diﬀerent combinations of these two parameters inﬂuence the investment
decision of adding the CCS module.
Figure 3.8: Timing of CCS Investment under Policy Uncertainty (sensitivity
analysis with respect to commitment probability and commitment year)
It is important to note that there are only two outcomes in this experiment: either
the investor invests in year 29 (which he would do if he was 100% sure that the
price would keep rising) or he postpones the investment until the year the government
commits or does not commit and acts accordingly. Figure 3.8 shows that a higherCap & Trade System with Price Ceilings? 85
perceived probability of government commitment is needed for CCS investment to
take place when the commitment year is relatively early. However, the farther into
the future this commitment is, the lower is the perceived probability needed to induce
the investor to add the CCS module. This is because CO2 prices continue to rise
during the time the investor waits for the true CO2 price path to be revealed. In
other words, the investor will wait, as long as the option value exceeds the losses
incurred through rising CO2 expenses. The later the commitment year, the smaller
this diﬀerence becomes – until the point in time when it is optimal again to act as if
commitment was 100% probable, i.e. to invest in year 29. In the fourth experiment,
the investor had no signal from policy makers with respect to the future trend of the
CO2 price, so he attached a 50% probability to both scenarios and waited up to eight
years for this information to become revealed. Only for a commitment year farther
away than year 37, CCS investment would have taken place in year 29.
Regarding policy-making, it is thus evident that increased uncertainty about the
direction of future policies is relatively more harmful for the environment and the
investor than market uncertainty because environmentally friendlier (and more ex-
pensive) technologies will be installed at a later point in time only.
3.5 Cap & Trade System with Price Ceilings?
We have found above that ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price can lead to earlier investment
than optimal under perfect information. Even though this might seem desirable from
an environmental point of view, it is clear that investors will not be in favor of rising
carbon costs in the ﬁrst place and the associated volatility of these costs in particular.
They will thus be against a so-called cap and trade system, where emissions are capped
and the corresponding number of permits traded like in the European Trading Scheme.
It has therefore been proposed to introduce CO2 price caps, which are thought
to reduce the cost uncertainty emanating from market-based mechanisms (e.g. Pizer,
2005). As early as the late 1990s, so-called “hybrid” systems of emissions trading sup-
plemented with a price ceiling have been proposed (Pizer, 1997). Pizer (2002) focusses
on uncertainties in abatement costs and aggregate economic costs of such a hybrid
approach and ﬁnds that it can lead to economic beneﬁts close to those reached by a
comparable tax. Another argument that has been advanced in favor of price caps is
the facilitation of compromises both in international negotiations and between govern-
ments and national industries. The US administration, for example, has had severe
doubts about the stringency of the Kyoto (quantity) targets and a price cap could have
acted as a “safety valve” that allows for more ﬂexibility concerning those targets. The
aims of proposing a safety valve are therefore two-fold: “avoiding excessive cost by
relaxing the emissions target and moving from a quantity to a price penalty” (Jacoby
and Ellerman, 2004, page 484).
Discussion about CO2 price ceilings became muted when the US with-drew from
the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, but has resurfaced lately: at least 26 utilities have recently
signed a letter to Congress, in which they demand a safety valve as part of any CO286 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
permit trading scheme to be implemented (The Wall Street Journal, 17 Oct. 2007).
Being responsible for more than 40% of US emissions, a trading scheme will have a
large impact on the electricity sector, which fears that market volatility will intervene
with the very aims of policy makers by providing disincentives to commit resources
to expensive yet less carbon-intensive technologies such as wind power and nuclear
energy. According to utilities, a safety valve would facilitate a “more predictable
price signal” and thus lead to better investment planning. In this section we show,
however, that the initial level and trend of the CO2 price is price signal enough to
ensure eﬃcient planning and that price ﬂuctuations do not harm proﬁts excessively
and do furthermore not alter the timing of investments signiﬁcantly. A price cap
on the other hand will severely reduce the eﬀectiveness of the CO2 price and thus
delay investment in carbon-reducing or less carbon-intensive technology by protecting
the interests of “old” CO2-intensive utilities. Investors that might have been ready
to commit to environmentally friendlier technology will feel discouraged to do so in
the face of price caps. In fact, the opinion has recently been put forward that total
economic costs and beneﬁts (such as in Pizer’s analyses) do not represent investment
incentives or disincentives for the individual company. What matters for the investors
is the carbon price and the uncertainty that surrounds it. Capping this price will
most likely only reduce the risks for high-carbon investments and might even reduce
investment incentives for “green” technologies, especially when it is not clear for how
long the price cap will be active (Blyth and Hamilton, 2006, page 9).
To summarize, the debate about CO2 price caps in a permit trading scheme is far
from resolved in the US and also in other countries. In addition, with the end of the ﬁrst
commitment period approaching, any post-2012 carbon agreement will likely be prone
to similar dispute, involving also stakeholders from less developed countries. Even
though some 40% of the electricity generates nowadays comes from coal-ﬁred power
plants and 97% thereof is based on pulverized coal, less carbon-intensive technologies
are available and have further scope for technological improvement. Moreover, the
existing power plant stock in OECD countries is ageing and will need replacement
over the next 10 to 20 years (IEA, 2006). While this replacement demand diﬀers
between countries and some of the existing plants might also be refurbished to extend
plant life, growing energy demand will add to the amount of capacity needed in the
near future. Therefore, investment into new capacity will be decisive for the carbon-
intensity of the future electricity mix.
We follow this line of thought here and take on the view of an individual electricity
producer again. After all, investors in the electricity sector are the actors, who will
decide what types of plants will be installed in the near future. The US Department
of Energy’s National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), for example, reports
that the American electricity industry plans to replace their aging capacity by 154
gigawatts (GW) of new coal-ﬁred power plants over the coming two decades (Morgan,
2006); and less advanced countries such as China build up coal-ﬁred capacity even more
rapidly. The speciﬁc choice for coal is also motivated by the volatility that gas prices
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energy security) are important for most advanced nations at the moment or in the near
future. With considerable expenses that have to be made upfront, the investment into
new power generation equipment is largely irreversible and what is installed these days
will be around for decades and continue to add to cumulative GHG emissions in the
meantime. It is therefore important to provide the right incentives to power plant
investors, so that they at least build up capacity, which can be retroﬁtted with carbon
capture and storage (CCS) modules or other mitigation technologies, or even phase a
larger proportion of renewable energy into the electricity mix.
To investigate these issues we will employ the same real options model as before.
The only diﬀerence is that we consider an electricity producer, who needs to replace
existing coal-ﬁred capacity with either coal-ﬁred capacity that can be extended to
include a CCS module or a biomass-ﬁred power plant with the same extension pos-
sibility. Nowadays, the biomass power plant is still much more expensive than the
coal-ﬁred power plant. However, with increasing CO2 prices, biomass becomes more
attractive, since the biomass plant produces zero (without CCS) and negative (with
CCS) emissions. This can be explained by the fact that biomass-based electricity
production requires that additional biomass is grown, which will extract more CO2
from the atmosphere, and we assume this to be subsidized or rewarded by extra CO2
allowances. We further assume that the amount of CO2 emissions for a biomass plant
without CCS technology is equal to these subsidies/allowances.
21. Also, it can be
expected that the high O&M costs will be somewhat reduced over the next decades.
22
Even though real options modeling has previously been applied to investment in
the electricity sector, none of the existing real options studies has actively addressed
the policy debate about price caps outlined above. The purpose of this exercise is
therefore to do exactly that: to ﬁnd out whether and when an individual electricity
producer will replace old coal-ﬁred capacity with another coal-ﬁred power plant or if
he will switch to either a extendable coal plant where CCS can possibly be added or
a biomass-ﬁred plant of the type described above under diﬀerent policy regimes. Our
analysis shows that a price cap does indeed not provide the right incentive scheme to
phase in renewables. A particularly low price cap would even forestall the introduction
of a coal-ﬁred plant that could be retroﬁtted with CCS.
Moreover, the ﬂuctuations in the price of carbon indeed turn out to depress the
producer’s proﬁts, as feared by the proponents of price caps. However, these losses are
not excessive, and as a positive side eﬀect, the ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price can even
lead to earlier adoption of “green” technologies even with a moderately increasing CO2
price when the volatility is large enough. Interestingly, the timing of adding the CCS
module when a coal-ﬁred plant is built to replace the old capacity does not depend on
21Uddin and Barreto (2007), amongst others, show that the negative emissions of a biomass-
ﬁred power plant with CCS are large, even if the decrease in eﬃciency, the extra emissions
from the transport of biomass and CO2 and many other factors are considered. According to
their estimates, the emissions sequestered during the fuel growth phase are almost equal to
the emissions produced by combusting it.
22We assume a 20% decrease in total O&M costs over the planning horizon of 50 years,
which is not exaggerated given recent forecasts concerning future cost improvements of renew-
able energy technologies, see e.g. the estimates of overnight investment costs by the European
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the level of the price cap, if the price cap is not prohibitively low.
We will ﬁrst present the data that we use to ﬁnd the optimal investment decisions
of the electricity producer under diﬀerent policy regimes. Then we analyze the results.
This presentation will be divided into two parts, where we ﬁrst focus on the eﬀects
of applying price caps and then on the impact of more slowly growing CO2 prices.
Finally, some policy recommendations will be given.
3.5.1 Replacing Coal-Fired Capacity
As already described above, we are looking at a situation, where the electricity pro-
ducer owns a coal-ﬁred power plant that has to be replaced after it expires (here in
year 21). The possibilities for replacement are another coal-ﬁred power plant with a
possibility to add a CCS module later, and a biomass-ﬁred power plant, which is also
extendable with CCS. Bear in mind that the special feature of the biomass plant is
that the growing of biomass as a fuel sequesters carbon from the atmosphere and if
emissions are in addition captured and stored during the electricity generation process,
this type of plant ultimately ends up with “negative emissions”. In terms of cost, we
can think of this as a subsidy that is granted to the users of biomass on the grounds
of their positive externality of sequestering carbon in the fuel-generation process. The
data for the two power plants can be found in Table 3.5, where the speciﬁc fuel cost
of the coal-ﬁred plants are to be taken as the initial prices, which will be rising sub-
sequently.
23 Moreover, the high O&M costs for the biomass-ﬁred plant are due to its
relative technological immaturity. As time passes, technical change will improve the
operational processes, so we expect the O&M costs to fall.
Parameters Unit Coal Coal+CCS Bio Bio + CCS
Electricity Output TWh/yr 3,285 2,642.3 3,285 2,628
CO2 Emissions kt CO2/yr 2,155 292.3 0 -2,691
Fuel Consumption TJ/yr 23,188 23,188 29,565 29,565
Speciﬁc Fuel Cost 1,000 e/TJ 1.515 1.515 2.292 2.292
O&M Fixed Cost 1,000 e/yr 40,250 48,450 77,000 91,568
Eﬃciency (Heat) % 34 34 16 16
Heat Price e/MWh 52.424 52.424 52.424 52.424
Capital Cost
Common Parts 1,000 e 686,500 686,500 402,029 402,029
Cost CCS Module 1,000 e 137,946 320,333
Total Capital Cost 1,000 e 686,500 824,446 402,029 722,362
Source: “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 2005 Update” IEA/OECD (2005)
and M¨ ollersten et al (2006).
Table 3.5: Power Plant Data for Coal- and Biomass-Fired Plants and CCS
It is important to note that we are in fact analyzing two diﬀerent cases, where
the control variable is the optimal timing of investing into the CCS module after
they have replaced the expired old coal plant: we investigate this separately for the
23In accordance with the predictions by German power plant owners from the same survey
that has been used to generate the data in Table 3.5 by the IEA, we assume that fuel prices
are increasing at a relatively moderate rate (compared to e.g. gas or oil), whereas biomass
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coal-ﬁred power plant and for the biomass-ﬁred power plant because we are interested
in the investor’s behavior in both cases. By comparing the proﬁts ex post we can
still determine the “winner” in terms of the ultimate investment choice. However,
by ﬁrst investigating the CCS decisions for coal and biomass separately we can make
statements about the impact of uncertainty not only on the timing of investment, but
also on the level of proﬁts in diﬀerent scenarios.
3.5.2 Policy Experiments
Price Caps
In this section we will conduct a number of diﬀerent policy experiments to assess the
eﬀects that stochastic CO2 prices coupled with price caps have on the investment
pattern of a coal-ﬁred power plant owner in contrast to his behavior under a gradually
rising, but deterministic CO2 price. The experimental setup is such that we ﬁrst
conduct four experiments are for deterministic CO2 prices, i.e. with  
c=0.0568 and
σ
c=0. The other four experiments are for stochastic prices, i.e. with  
c=0.0568 and
σ
c=0.0287. Moreover, the ﬁrst experiment in each category will be without a price cap;
the others have price caps of 40, 50 and 60e/t respectively.
24 In other words, when
we investigate a price cap, we basically look at a minimum function of the actual CO2
price and the pre-speciﬁed price ceiling. Finally, we have chosen 5e/t as a starting
price because a CO2 price of 7$/t had been discussed for the potential setup of a
permit trading system in the US.
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the outcomes of the diﬀerent policy experiments that
we have conducted. The ﬁrst Figure corresponds to simulations with deterministic
CO2 prices. Without a price cap, this can be interpreted as a gradually escalating tax,
i.e. a continuously rising CO2 price, but without the volatility resulting from permit
trade. We see that this would eﬀectively lead to higher proﬁts for the biomass plant,
which would then be chosen over the coal-ﬁred plant on the basis of its proﬁts. With a
cap on the CO2 price, the biomass proﬁts would be considerably reduced, while those
of coal would be increased. In fact, the reduction in the biomass proﬁts is 33% (34%
in the stochastic case), while coal gains 5% in terms of proﬁts. A cap of 40e/t would
already be enough for coal to beat biomass. However, that cap is still high enough to
trigger investment into the CCS module.
25
Turning to the experiment series conducted under stochastic prices, the investment
timing stays on average the same, which is why we refrain from reporting it here, but
proﬁts are somewhat reduced, as feared by opponents to permit trading. However,
these proﬁt reductions are smaller for the coal-ﬁred power plant owner. In the scenario
with the highest price cap, for example, the biomass plant looses 1.5% of its proﬁts
24The results for deterministic prices combined with price caps are computed for reasons
of comparison, even though in reality price caps usually supplement stochastic CO2 prices
(this is the result of a so-called “cap-and-trade” system, where prices ﬂuctuate due to permit
trade, but the safety valve can never be exceeded by regulation).
25With a cap of 20e/ton of CO2 there will neither be an incentive to build a biomass plant
nor will a CCS module be added, so emissions will continue to be as high as before replacement
and the policy has not provided the right incentive scheme for emissions reduction, i.e. welfare
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compared to the deterministic case, while the coal plant looses “only” half a percent
of its deterministic proﬁts. Given the diﬃculty of enacting taxes in some countries
as opposed to market-based mechanisms, however, these losses are not too large to
represent a valid excuse for inaction. Moreover, the results show that the owners of
fossil-fuel-ﬁred plants will not be comparatively worse oﬀ than their renewable energy
competitors, here the biomass-ﬁred power plant owner. On the contrary, the biomass
plant has proved to be much more prone to loose from ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price
than the coal plant.
As can also be seen from the results, when considering the application of a price
cap policy, deciding on the level of that price cap is crucial. In our analysis, in case of
a lower price cap than 40e/t, the impact of the climate policy is signiﬁcantly weaker.
However, as the whole problem is very data-speciﬁc, it is very diﬃcult to compute
a general level of the price cap that would not cause the renewable technology (here
biomass) to become uncompetitive.
Figure 3.9: Average Proﬁts in efrom Optimal Timing of Investments: The
Deterministic Case
From the point-of-view of the policy maker, who strives to reduce emissions, it is
also interesting to compute total emissions in tons of CO2. In the deterministic scenario
without a price cap, these amount to 22,641,000 tons for coal and -81,718,000 tons for
biomass. Introducing a price cap of 60e/t increases those emissions to 22,697,000 tons
and -81,545,000 tons respectively. Interestingly, because the investment timing does
not change with lower price caps, the total amount of emissions is not progressively
higher for lower caps. This implies that the investor’s optimal decision with respect
to adding CCS is not inﬂuenced by a price cap (50e/t or higher). The only eﬀect
of the policy is that the power plant owner has lower proﬁts. However, this ﬁnding
should not be interpreted to mean that the level of the price cap is unimportant, since
the CCS module is added at the same time anyway. On the contrary, the analysisCap & Trade System with Price Ceilings? 91
Figure 3.10: Average Proﬁts in efrom Optimal Timing of Investments: The
Stochastic Case
above shows that the price cap forestalls the phasing in of renewable technologies
(here biomass-ﬁred generation) by making it less proﬁtable than coal, even though it
would lower emissions considerably more compared to the CCS module on coal-ﬁred
capacity.
26
Lower Increase in CO2 Prices
As regards the formulation of compromises and agreements in national, regional and
international climate policy debates, another conceivable scenario is an agreement to
limit the growth in CO2 prices. In the case of a gradually escalating tax, this is easily
implemented. In a permit trading system, this could be achieved by increasing the
supply of permits, whenever there is upward pressure on the CO2 price as suggested
in some Congressional Bills in the US.
Figure 3.11 shows the results for an experiment, where we have reduced the rate
of growth of CO2 prices to half of its original value. In the deterministic case, we
observe that coal has much higher proﬁts than biomass. Furthermore, for none of
the two technologies a CCS module is added. The result is therefore that a second
coal-ﬁred power plant is built to replace the expiring one and that emissions continue
to be generated at the same high level as before replacement.
When we analyze the results for the same experiment with stochastic CO2 prices,
we see that biomass still produces much lower proﬁts than coal, which is why the
investor will install a new coal-ﬁred power plant again. However, due to the stochas-
ticity of the price path, the critical CO2 price level, which triggers investment into
the CCS module, is reached relatively often now, as can be seen in the investment
frequency distribution in Figure 3.12. This implies that the uncertainty emanating
26Another disadvantage is that low price caps could also be used to grant beneﬁts to the
coal-ﬁred power plant owners, while renewable energy does not have such protection against
down-ward ﬂuctuations in terms of e.g. a price ﬂoor.92 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
Figure 3.11: Average Proﬁts in efrom Optimal Timing of Investments when the
CO2 Price Grows More Slowly






































































































































































































































Coal-ﬁred powerplant Biomass-ﬁred powerplant
Panel 1 shows that in year 21 (when the old coal-ﬁred power plant expires) the new one
is always built. The second panel shows that the CCS module is added relatively often
(compared to the deterministic case, where it is never added). Panels 3 and 4 show that the
frequency of switching the module on and oﬀ is negligible for coal-ﬁred capacity and not high
for biomass-ﬁred capacity either.
Figure 3.12: Simulation Results for Experiment with Lower CO2 Price Growth
for the Coal-ﬁred (left) and the Biomass-ﬁred (right) Power PlantConclusion 93
from the ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price, which could arise from permit trading, does
not only have negative eﬀects. On the contrary, from the point of view of the goal to
reduce carbon emissions, the addition of a CCS module in a relatively large number of
cases is desirable. Moreover, proﬁts are 2% higher in the stochastic setting than in the
deterministic one, so ﬁrms also gain. Since for biomass the critical CO2 price, beyond
which investment occurs, is higher than in the case of coal, there are only relatively
few instances, where that threshold is surpassed, as can be seen in Figure 3.12.
3.6 Conclusion
The uncertainties in the science, economics and politics of climate change translate to
even deeper uncertainties for actors in the energy sector regarding the extent, timing
and cost of emission controls. The market for emission permits carries the potential
to become the ﬁrst global environmental market, with permits being traded interna-
tionally in considerable quantities. The capital-intensive energy sector is particularly
vulnerable to policy uncertainties aﬀecting the income stream from (irreversible) in-
vestment. Future control on emissions is a key risk for the economic viability of sector
investments, which policy aims to regulate. At the same time, governments should
have a strong interest in an eﬀective and eﬃcient investment response to its policy
signals.
While people have often expressed the concern that the volatility in CO2 prices
that e.g. a permit market would convey could potentially provide an incentive to
actors in the energy sector to postpone investments into less carbon-intensive, but
also more costly technologies, the results presented here actually indicate that this
market-driven uncertainty is more “harmless” from an environmental (and also from
the investor’s) point-of-view than the uncertainty emanating from unclear government
commitments.
In this paper a real options framework has been developed for analyzing invest-
ment decision-making under these diﬀerent types of uncertainty in the electricity sec-
tor, where investments are largely associated with high sunk cost, but the timing of
investment is ﬂexible. A distinction has been made between uncertainty coming from
ﬂuctuations around a known trend, which could arise from permit trading, and un-
certainty emanating from the absence of clear policy signals. It has been shown that
market uncertainty – up to a reasonable degree – should actually not be as much of
concern as it has been so far. In fact, some market uncertainty will induce the in-
vestor to invest earlier into CCS equipment than in the case of perfect information.
On the other hand, policy uncertainty leads to investment decisions resulting in a
prolonged accumulation of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere, since investors hold on
to their waiting option in order to learn about the ﬁnal decision of government and
do not invest in environmentally friendly technologies. Emissions abatement activities
would have started earlier if government had developed a clearer, long-term commit-
ment plan. In addition, investors’ proﬁts are reduced during the waiting time when
government continues to raise CO2 prices subsequently.94 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
Notice that the message from the analysis presented in this paper is therefore two-
fold: energy producers have to adapt their decisions about investment in generation
equipment not only to market-driven uncertainties, but also to uncertainty involved in
the process of policy making. At the same time, uncertainty is pervasive in the analysis
of climate change and will persist to be an essential feature of the international climate
policy debate. Regulators will have to learn over time how their policy signals translate
into changes in the pattern of investment behavior, which in turn will determine the
viability of their very policies. Robust climate policies should provide investors with
opportunities aiming at learning from positive carbon price shocks. Finally, regulated
entities will have to acquire experience as to the way of learning more eﬀectively about
the irreducible uncertainties emerging from the climate policy process with the aim
to exploit uncertainties to their own advantage. 21
st century energy and mitigation
technologies are one opportunity to give energy sector managers more ﬂexibility to
adapt to more predictable – but still uncertain – climate policy, while policy makers
will have to adapt their ways of regulation as much as possible, too.
Furthermore, the idea of a price cap or “safety valve” on the CO2 price that arises
from permit trading has often been forwarded (e.g. Pizer, 1997). One proposal for the
US was, for instance, to start out with a price ceiling of 7$ per ton of CO2. Experts
judge that this is “a level virtually certain to be exceeded and that would result in
rising emissions at least through 2020.” (Doniger, et al (2006), page 764). The merits
of such an approach would be that parties that are otherwise strictly opposed to taxes
and also permit trading would feel protected against sudden price spikes. In this way,
agreements might still be achieved. At the same time, the uncertainty emanating from
permit trading could be kept under control.
In order to shed some light on this debate we have investigated the replacement
decision of a coal-ﬁred power plant owner, who can either replace the expiring capacity
with a new coal-ﬁred power plant that can be retroﬁtted with a CCS module or with a
biomass-ﬁred power plant, which has the extra bonus of sequestering CO2 during the
fuel-generation process and can be adjusted to capture carbon as well. This analysis
is performed for diﬀerent policy regimes (ﬂuctuating and deterministic CO2 prices,
diﬀerent levels of price caps and slower growth rates of CO2 prices) in order to assess
the eﬀectiveness of the policies considered.
There are four main conclusions that we can draw from our analysis: (1) Under
a gradually escalating tax (i.e. without ﬂuctuations), biomass-ﬁred power plants are
more proﬁtable than coal-ﬁred power plants. However, the introduction of a price
cap reduces the proﬁts of biomass enormously (33% loss of proﬁts), while beneﬁtting
the coal plant(5% gain in proﬁts). (2) Fossil-fuel-ﬁred power plant owners are not
necessarily worse oﬀ than their renewable energy competitors in the face of CO2 price
volatility. In our setting, the biomass plant has been shown to be much more sensitive
to ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price than the coal plant. (3) The timing of investment
into CCS is not inﬂuenced by the level of the price cap, as long as this cap is not so
low that it depresses investment into CCS completely. (4) Volatility in CO2 prices can
often trigger investment into CCS, when this would not have occurred in the case ofConclusion 95
deterministic CO2 prices. This reduces average emissions considerably.
These four conclusions convey important messages for policy makers, and especially
policy makers who are concerned about climate change. From (1) we can see that
increasing CO2 prices provide an incentive to investors to phase in renewable energy,
as old capacity ages and needs to be replaced. However, compromises entailing caps
on the price of CO2 jeopardize this incentive scheme and make coal-ﬁred capacity
more attractive in terms of proﬁts. Still, this capacity will be retroﬁtted with a CCS
module, if the price cap is not too low, which will contribute to emissions savings by
capturing and storing part of the emitted CO2.
With respect to the fossil-fuel-using industry’s concern that they will suﬀer consid-
erably more from CO2 price ﬂuctuations, conclusion (2) shows that the biomass-ﬁred
plant is even more disadvantaged by such volatility. The sensitivity of the biomass
proﬁts to the volatility in CO2 prices can also be demonstrated by looking at Figure
3.10. At the same time, while coal-ﬁred power plant owners will be protected by the
safety valve against upwards ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price, biomass-ﬁred power plant
owners cannot rely on a symmetric “insurance mechanism” for downward ﬂuctuations
through e.g. a price ﬂoor.
Conclusion (3) shows that emissions will still be somewhat reduced, independent of
the level of the price cap, since the timing of adding the CCS module does not change
across diﬀerent price caps. However, the price caps still make the biomass alternative
less competitive and thus less attractive for adoption. Moreover, since our analysis
rests on data-speciﬁc experiments, it would in reality be too diﬃcult to compute a
price cap that would be just high enough to induce investment into the biomass plant.
Evidently, the replacement decision is sensitive to the level of the price cap: if the price
cap is too low, the threshold price triggering investment into a biomass-ﬁred power
plant will never be reached thus resulting in investment into another coal-ﬁred power
plant.
The argument against permit trading based on the ineﬃciencies due to the volatil-
ity of the CO2 price is not always warranted from an “emissions-reduction” point-
of-view. In fact, the larger the ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price, the more often the
investor will be enticed to add CCS to an existing coal-ﬁred power plant, which re-
duces emissions considerably compared to the deterministic case. While this should
not be understood as policy advice to foster uncertainty about CO2 price develop-
ment, it clearly demonstrates that the volatility produced by permit trading can have
positive side eﬀects, which need to be weighed against its costs.96 Energy Investments under Market & Climate Policy Uncertainty
Appendix: Explanations on Data and Data Sources
The data used to calibrate the parameters for the mean-reverting electricity price
process are taken from the European Energy Exchange Corporation (EEX) in Leipzig,
Germany. Since the data available are short-term (monthly here), the data had to be
aggregated to obtain yearly prices. The price development is shown in Figure A.1.
Furthermore, the series has been tested for the presence of unit roots, as that would
imply that mean-reversion would not be an appropriate model for the electricity price.
However, the null hypothesis on the unit root can be rejected, so mean-reversion can
be assumed.
Figure A.1: Electricity Price Data (Source: EEX spot market prices)
CO2 price are more diﬃcult to model: the market for CO2 allowances has only
been established recently and there are no long-term data available. Also, since the
market is still in its infancy, policy failures and changing expectations have led to
disruptions in the price development, as shown in this chapter in Figure 3.1.
Evidently, both the short-term nature of the time series and the swings due to
starting diﬃculties make these data very inappropriate to estimate the parameters of
a price process for the long run. Therefore, we have chosen to use long-term projections
rather than historical time series. In particular, we use scenarios with diﬀerent rates of
population growth, urbanization, technical change etc aiming at a relatively ambitious
stabilization target. The source is the GGI Scenario Database (IIASA, 2007). More
on the assumptions and resulting projections of this database can be found in Riahi et
al (2007). The parameters were estimated for a geometric Brownian motion, since for
the (shadow) price series taken from the GGI Scenario Database (IIASA, 2007) the
null hypothesis on the unit root could not be rejected.Chapter 4
Fuel Price & Technological




As indicated in the last chapter already, investors in the electricity sector will decide
what types of plants will be installed in the near future. Those plants will then be used
for the coming decades and contribute to cumulative emissions while combusting fossil
fuels. This problem is relevant to both industrialized countries with rising replacement
demand and developing and transition countries, where quickly rising energy demand
propels the need for more generating capacity. The last chapter has mentioned the
US and China as examples, but in Europe a lot of existing capacity will have to be
retired and replaced by new plants soon as well. The question that arises for the
environmentally concerned policy-maker then relates to the type of power plants by
which the old (mostly coal-ﬁred) capacity will be replaced. Will coal-ﬁred power plant
owners opt for coal-ﬁred power plants again? Or will renewable energy be phased
in, as old capacity is phased out? In addition to answering these questions, we are
interested in the role of technical change. Can technological progress in less carbon-
intensive generation technologies be a savior of last resort? Or is it possible that
the prospect of technological improvements could delay investment in immature plant
types?
1 Or will the volatility of fossil fuel prices maybe make producers reluctant to
switch to another generation of fossil-fuel-ﬁred power plants?
1This is actually the case in our vintage-portfolio model in Chapter 6.
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Electricity Planning
Source: European Electricity Exchange (EEX)
Figure 4.1: Daily spot prices for coal in EUR/t
These considerations illustrate that electricity planning is surrounded by a number
of uncertainties. The previous chapter has explored the eﬀects of uncertainty about
regulation and ﬂuctuating CO2 prices on investment decisions. Another source of
uncertainty – most imminent in the case of power plants ﬁred by fossil fuels – is the
risk associated with the volatility of (growing) fuel prices. As an example, Figure
4.1 shows the evolution of the spot price of coal (source: EEX, 2006) for the time
period 1999-2006. Oil and gas prices ﬂuctuate even more sharply.
2 This can lead to
considerable losses for the individual power producer, but also to a signiﬁcant loss in
terms of a country’s GDP. Awerbuch and Sauter (2006) present results that point to
elasticities of GDP with respect to oil prices of about 10%, for example. It is therefore
important to understand how the volatility of fuel prices inﬂuences the decisions of
installing new generating capacity.
The uncertainties involved in fuel price processes (usually accompanied by an up-
ward trend) might lead to the conclusion that renewable, “zero-fuel-price” technologies
might also outperform the conventional power plants on these grounds, in addition to
their advantage of emitting zero CO2. This would imply that the external problems
associated with the generation of emissions by fossil fuel plants would vanish simulta-
neously, as a transition to renewable energy would take place with ongoing technical
change and uncertainty about rising fuel prices. However, the main disadvantage of
such “green” technologies is their high ﬁxed cost (capital cost and ﬁxed O&M costs),
2Even though there might be contracts allowing the producer to procure a certain amount
of gas or coal for a longer period of time than a day, these contracts will typically cover
only relatively short periods of time: gas producers are reluctant to engage in longer-term
contracts, since a standard well is usually depleted in about a year and engaging into longer-
term contracts would mean that gas producers would have to be sure about future wells’
productivity. Coal miners, who were facing increasing costs at the beginning of the 2000s and
could not take advantage of high spot prices because they were tied up in relatively long-term
contracts (like in the previous chapter), might also be reluctant to engage in such long-term
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which has so far inhibited the large-scale diﬀusion of renewable technologies in the
electricity sector amongst other factors. Proponents of renewable energy have pointed
to the fact that these costs will still be subject to major reductions as technologi-
cal change progresses.
3 To illustrate the vast scope for improvement, consider Figure
4.2, which shows several renewable power technologies’ projected change in overnight
investment cost over the next decades based on the TECHPOL database (European
Commission, 2006).
Source: TECHPOL Database, European Commission, 2006
Figure 4.2: Evolution of Overnight Investment Cost of Renewable Power Tech-
nologies
It can be observed that technologies, which have to date been uneconomical such
as decentralized photovoltaics (PV) and hydrogen fuel cells, are expected to experience
considerable reductions in their investment cost according to the Commission’s study.
Even (oﬀshore) wind will be only half as expensive 40 years from now. Furthermore,
biomass technologies are expected to undergo reductions in investment costs of about
28%, solar PV of 33% and (onshore) wind of 25%. This draws a very optimistic
picture for future power investments. However, technological improvement itself is
an inherently uncertain process, which needs to be taken into account when making
investment decisions. Whether research really results in the projected cost reduction
and at which point in time it would do so exactly, can never be determined with
absolute certainty. Therefore, the arrival of cost-reducing innovations must be treated
3The fact that today’s installations will be used for the next decades shows that a sustain-
able energy mix needs to be found already now in order to avoid lock-in or path-dependencies.
The expectation of technological improvements, however, might provide a disincentive for the
investors to irrevocably commit resources now and wait for improved versions instead. Our
model shows that this is a plausible outcome.100
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as a stochastic process.
With respect to the technological prospects of established technologies relying on
fossil fuels, it can be said that most of them are already in a later stage of maturity than
renewable technologies, which still have large scope for improvements that might also
occur at a relatively fast pace initially. As explained in Chapter 1, there are studies that
indeed ﬁnd evidence for this hypothesis. They look at so-called progress ratios (PR),
which is the percentage of initial costs (per unit of output) that current costs will reach
as a result of doubling their output (of installed capacity). It is found that gas turbines
had a lower PR during their R&D phase than during their commercialization phase,
i.e. costs were reduced by a lower percentage for each doubling of cumulative output
than before. This suggests that technological progress decelerates, as technologies
mature. For comparison, the European Wind Energy Association (2004) projects a
relatively low PR for the capital costs of onshore wind generation.
4 However, they do
not report a precise number, but a range of PR projections. This indicates a large
potential of wind energy in the future, but the wide range in the projections also points
to the uncertainty associated with these promising rates of progress. It is important
to emphasize at this point that – while the computation of these PR ratios often also
accounts for the eﬀects of learning by doing (i.e. improvements after instalment) – the
nature of technical change in our framework is purely embodied. This implies that new
equipment has to be bought and installed in order to enjoy the latest technological
improvements. Once the new power plant is installed, there is no scope for reductions
in the cost of investment. This is important because it creates further value to waiting,
as technical change is exogenous. In the case of learning by doing, investment could
occur earlier and costs could be further reduced by e.g. advances in know-how ex post.
In the latter case, the waiting value would be much less pronounced.
We have decided to analyze the eﬀect of the above-mentioned uncertainties on
investment in a real options framework, as this allows us to take into account that
the capital invested into a speciﬁc power plant is sunk and the investment decision
irreversible. Furthermore, real options modeling considers the ﬂexibility of the investor
to invest earlier or gain more information by postponing investment. The real options
literature of primary interest for this study deals with uncertainty about technological
change and input cost or revenue uncertainty (see Chapter 2). Table 4.1 summarizes
this strand of literature with particular focus on the ﬁndings with respect to the
relationship between uncertainty and investment.
Among these studies, only two deal with technological and revenue/input cost
uncertainty simultaneously, which is of major interest in this chapter. Both Pindyck
(1993) and Murto (2007) can only derive analytical solutions for very special cases.
5
In the model presented in this chapter, an analytical solution can generally not be
obtained either, and we want to abstract from special cases, which do not seem to
4Please refer to Chapter 1 for the exact projections.
5In Pindyck (1993), the interest rate needs to be zero and fuel price uncertainty absent
in order to ﬁnd an analytical solution; Murto (2007) also solves analytically for extreme cases
only, such as the complete collapse of investment cost.Introduction 101
have realistic applications in the ﬁrst place.
6
This model adds to the existing work in this ﬁeld by formulating a more general
framework than Pindyck (1993) and Murto (2007) and applying it to the case of invest-
ment in the electricity sector. To our knowledge, applications of real options theory
to technological change in the electricity sector with derived climate change policy
implications are rare, apart from attempts to capture learning eﬀects by including
learning curves into real options models.
7 However, such an approach to technolog-
ical change does not take into account the embodiment of technological change that
we want to incorporate in our framework by focusing on improvements in investment
cost. While Pindyck’s (1993) model is simple and therefore straightforward, it is not
suited for our purpose because it relies on sequential investments, where the project
can be abandoned midstream. It is true that this might explain the canceling of many
nuclear power plants in the US in the early 1980s because there was large uncertainty
about construction cost at that time. However, the construction costs of nuclear power
plants is enormous compared to the power plant types that we consider. Therefore,
we do not think that midstream abandonment is a relevant strategy for the standard
plants we focus on. Since we exclude this possibility, technological uncertainty has a
much more profound eﬀect in our model.
Murto (2007) models technical change with a Poisson process, in which we follow
him closely, but he makes some assumptions that we do not regard appropriate for the
electricity sector. For example, he assumes that upon investment, the producer will
receive a perpetual revenue stream (which is practical when looking for an analytical
solution), while in the case of power plants, the stream of proﬁts ensuing investment
is evidently limited by the lifetime of the plant. Furthermore, as mentioned before, we
do not want to restrict ourselves to examine the timing of investment in a particular
facility, but we want to focus more on the switch or transition from an established
(fossil fuel) power plant to an environmentally more friendly plant (based on renewable
energy carriers) under the described uncertainty.
8 If technological advance and the
risks associated with stochastic fossil fuel prices do not result in earlier investment into
low- or zero-emission plants, policy makers have to provide another investment trigger
for earlier adoption. This could take the form of CO2 taxes or subsidies for producing
renewable energy.
6The appendix shows that, even though it is possible to set up the problem analytically
with the help of the Kummer function, it is not possible to ﬁnd an analytical solution for the
fuel price when the option to invest is not perpetual.
7Kumbaro˘ glu et al (2004) include learning curves for renewable energy into their real
options model. They ﬁnd that for Turkey the diﬀusion of renewable energy technologies will
only occur if policies are directed to that cause because they suﬀer from high capital cost. On
the other hand, active promotion of green technologies will accelerate learning and result in
faster adoption of these technologies because costs will decrease more quickly.
8However, we will ﬁrst also adopt a simpler experimental setting with only one plant,
which improves due to uncertain technical change, in order to distill the eﬀects of technological
progress itself (i.e. the rate) and the uncertainty surrounding it (i.e. the ﬂuctuations in the
path of improvement), before considering the more elaborate framework with existing capacity














































































Author(s) Model Investment Response
Balcer and Lippman
(1984)
Technical change modeled as cost reduction. Proﬁts linear
in technology level. Innovation potential evolves according
to discrete time semi-Markov process.
More uncertainty leads to postpone-
ment of investment.
Pindyck (1993) Stochastic (ﬁxed) input costs. Technological change de-
creases cost. Project can be abandoned during construction
stage.
Input cost uncertainty depresses invest-
ment signiﬁcantly. Technological un-




The state of technological progress is a random variable
following a geometric Brownian motion. Once it surpasses
a speciﬁed threshold, an innovation arrives. Sequential in-
vestments possible. Learning in the sense that investors
become better at beneﬁtting from innovations. Diﬀerent
innovation adoption strategies.
Larger volatility leads to postponement
of investment.
Farzin et al (1998) Technical change improves production eﬃciency and is
modeled as a jump process, where there can be uncertainty
about the speed of technical change, but also about the
magnitude of improvement. Multiple switching possible.
Larger degree of uncertainty leads to
delay in technology adoption. This ef-
fect diminishes if technical change is
slow/the improvements are small be-
cause the beneﬁts from waiting for the
next arrival will be smaller.10
Murto (2007) Revenue stream follows geometric Brownian motion. Tech-
nical change follows Poisson process and decreases invest-
ment costs.
Technological uncertainty has only an
eﬀect in the presence of revenue uncer-
tainty: investment is postponed.
Table 4.1: Real Options Literature on Technological and Input Cost UncertaintyIntroduction 103
The IEA/OECD data we use indeed suggest that a typical coal-ﬁred power plant
will only be scrapped in favor of a wind farm when an additional investment incentive
(here CO2 prices) is introduced by policy makers. With increasing fuel prices and
positive rates of technological change for the wind technology, a constant CO2 price
of 70e/ton will trigger investment into a wind farm in the second half of the planning
period. At current CO2 permit prices of around 23e/EUA
11 at EEX, this implies that
today’s CO2 prices would need to triple to achieve a transition to renewables within
the next 35 years.
12 At 23e/EUA the wind farm is only phased in when the coal-ﬁred
power plant’s lifetime is over, namely in period 40. Raising the price to 75e/ton of
CO2 leads to much earlier discarding of the coal-ﬁred plant. The wind farm would
then already be adopted within the next ﬁve years. An escalating tax or a CO2 permit
trading system with upward trending CO2 prices will achieve such a transition within
24 years for a rate of CO2 price growth equal to 5%. An interesting study by Viebahn
et al (2007) shows that depending on the development of carbon capture technologies
for coal-ﬁred power plants, rates of technical change of renewables, coal prices and
market development, renewable energy (they use a mix of technologies) could become
competitive within the next 15 to 45 years. They assume a CO2 price level of 35e/
ton.
It is therefore up to the potential negotiators of a post-2012 carbon agreement to
keep in mind that the market itself will not provide suﬃcient incentives for private
investors to make a shift towards renewable energy in the absence of technological
breakthroughs. Many European countries have proclaimed the aim to achieve that a
pre-speciﬁed portion of the electricity supply shall be generated from renewable sources
(e.g. more than 10% in the UK). In order to speed up the diﬀusion of technologies based
on renewables, CO2 prices would need to be tripled instantly or raised successively,
where the latter policy leads to earlier diﬀusion than the former and has the advantage
of easier implementation.
The rest of the chapter is organized in three sections: the ﬁrst one outlines the
model and describes the techniques that we use to solve it. Afterwards, we provide
an overview of the data used and an analysis of the results obtained. Finally, we
draw conclusions, provide possible policy implications and point out areas for future
research.
9With technical uncertainty, there is always the chance that the cost to completion is
suﬃciently low to make an investment proﬁtable. The true cost will only be revealed upon
investment, but there is always the option to abandon the project when the cost evolves
unfavorably. Thus, the critical cost threshold, at which investment is proﬁtable, is higher, i.e.
investment is brought forward in time. For a more detailed description of this model, please
return to Chapter 2.
10This might be due to the fact that with smaller improvements also the maximum attain-
able technology level is lower. So this result could really be the eﬀect of a change in the rate
of technical change and not in the extent of uncertainty. To avoid this in our model, we follow
Murto (2007) in keeping the rate of technical change constant and focus on the variance to
analyze the eﬀects of uncertainty.
11An EUA is an allowance for emitting one ton of CO2.
12This does not seem to be far oﬀ the estimates of the IPCC, who suggest that a CO2 price
of $100/ton will be necessary to stabilize cumulative CO2 emissions at levels associated with
relatively moderate global warming.104
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4.2 The Real Options Model
The model that we develop here focusses on two power plants: a coal-ﬁred power plant
(representative of the fossil fuel technologies) and an oﬀshore wind farm (representative
of renewable energy technologies), see Section 4.2.2. With respect to uncertainty, the
coal-ﬁred power plant suﬀers from ﬂuctuations in the price of coal. At the same
time, it is a relatively mature technology in the sense that we do not expect further
decreases in cost. The wind farm, on the other hand, has promising expected rates of
technical change and is obviously not subject to fuel price volatility. However, even
though the scope for technical change might be high, the realization of such progress
is uncertain.
13
We model technical change as a reduction in the investment cost of a wind farm
that could provide the same amount of electricity as the coal-ﬁred power plant. There
are two ways to look at this. First, with the arrival of an innovation, investment costs
are reduced by a speciﬁed percentage. The uncertainty here concerns the arrival rate:
the higher the arrival rate, the more certain investors can be that an innovation will
arrive within a relatively short period of time. On the other hand, with a certain
arrival rate, the magnitude of the improvement is a source of uncertainty. If technical
change is to be realized by multiple arrivals of innovations that improve costs only
marginally, this might be preferable to a situation where very few innovations lead to
huge drops in cost. This is visualized in Figure 4.3, where the plant value of the wind
farm (i.e. the immediate and discounted future revenues less the investment cost at
each point in time of the planning horizon) is shown for a low arrival rate combined
with a high reduction in costs (i.e. the step size is large) by the bold dotted line.
The solid line shows a large number of arrivals, but then each arrival reduces the
cost only by a low proportion, i.e. the plant value does not increase substantially, but
more “continuously”. Both lines end up at the same level at the end of the planning
period. That is, the cumulative “amount” of technical change remains the same.
However, the thin line that grants more continuous improvements might be preferred
over the big jumps at arbitrary points in time that the bold, dotted line exhibits.
Fixing the level of cumulative technical change and varying only the arrival rate or
step size leading to this level therefore provides a way to analyze uncertainty about
technical change without confusing the eﬀect with the result of changing the rate of
technical change; see Section 4.2.1 for the mathematical framework.
14
Fuel price uncertainty is represented by letting the coal price follow a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM), which takes into account that prices are rising slightly over
time and that this price path is volatile rather than smooth, as can be veriﬁed in
13Moreover, wind suﬀers from a low capacity factor and is therefore not a reliable candidate
for providing large-scale base loads. Even though we account for the capacity factor, we
abstract from the distinction between peak and base load provision in this chapter. Wind is
taken as a representative technology for all renewable energy carriers. Our focus is on the
phasing in of renewable energy as a replacement for fossil fuel technologies when investors face
uncertainties. Therefore, the technologies under consideration have been chosen for illustrative
purposes and not to claim that the electricity sector should exclusively rely on wind.
14We will typically be changing the arrival parameter, λ, to analyze uncertainty. However,
when ﬁxing λ and changing the step size, the investment pattern shows the same response.The Real Options Model 105
Figure 4.3: The Plant Value of the Wind Farm
Figure 4.1. This volatility would be much larger for gas. However, a gas-ﬁred power
plant has very low investment costs, even compared to coal, which would require us to
examine a much longer time horizon in order to observe a transition to (oﬀshore) wind.
The choice for wind as our renewable technology is due to the fact that it is (a) still
very expensive in terms of the capacity that needs to be installed, (b) ongoing research
eﬀorts lead us to expect a decrease in costs in the near future, and (c) even though it
might be space-wise restricted eventually, there is still a lot more scope for expansion
(especially oﬀshore) than for other technologies such as large-scale hydro-dams.
15
4.2.1 Framework
As has already been mentioned above, fuel price uncertainty will be examined by
letting the fuel price (here the price of coal) follow a GBM. Equation (4.1) represents
the change in the fuel price, p
f, where α is the drift parameter, σ
f is the volatility
parameter and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process.
dp
f
t = α   p
f




The eﬀect of uncertainty can then be investigated through the volatility parameter,
σ
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Technical change in the alternative technology, wind, is occurring in response to
the arrival of innovations. This arrival follows a Poisson process in the way that also
15Other representative technologies that we could have used are biomass-based technologies
or solar PV, for example. Biomass (and also biofuels) have non-zero and therefore potentially
uncertain fuel prices, however. Solar PV’s capital costs still exceed those of traditional tech-
nologies by far (see Chapter 1) and are thus not appropriate for an illustration with a relatively
short planning horizon.106
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Murto (2007) models it. Let us denote the investment cost by Ct evolving according
to:
Ct = C0   ξ
Wt (4.2)
In Equation (4.2), Wt is a Poisson random variable, with an average arrival rate (of
innovations) of λ. 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 determines the size of the step or – in other words
– the magnitude of the technological improvement achieved through the innovation.
The expected value of Ct is therefore C0   e
−λ t (1−ξ). This is easy to see when noting
that λt counts the number of innovations (arrival rate times periods). If ξ=0.05, for
example, -0.95 would be multiplied by the number of innovations in order to ﬁnd the
corresponding fraction of C0 that is Ct. For λ=0.1, this would be 91% at t=1.
It is important to note that only if λ(1 − ξ) remains constant, the expected path
of technological progress is unchanged. Equation (4.3) shows the variance of the
investment cost (see also Murto (2007), page 1480):
V ar(Ct) = C
2





The implication from Equation (4.3) is that a decrease in λ and ξ (so that λ(1 − ξ)
remains constant) increases the variance of costs, while an increase in the parame-
ters decreases the variance until the point where the cost is reduced to zero by the
very ﬁrst innovation.
16 Murto (2007) considers this polar case along with some other
simpliﬁcations because it allows him to derive an analytical solution. However, we
do not regard this to be a realistic scenario for our application and want to focus
on cases, where the cost is reduced in accordance with general expectations for the
corresponding technologies.
Immediate proﬁts are composed of the revenues from selling electricity, p
e q
e, and
the revenues from providing heat, p
h q
h, both of which are constant over the planning
period.
17 Furthermore, we have to subtract the costs for the amount of fuel used in
the generation process in the case of coal, q
f   p
f. Other costs involve the outlays
for operations and maintenance, OMC, which are ﬁxed for the amount of electricity
that is generated per year, and the CO2 taxes and/or expenses for the purchase of
emissions permits. Finally, the costs of the action taken by the investor at time t need
to be considered as well: these are zero in case no investment is made and equal to
the cost of installing new capacity if the decision is taken to invest. Note that these
costs depend on the advance of technical change and the uncertainty associated with
16This requires that ξ=0: to keep λ(1 − ξ) equal to a constant, the innovation probability
has to be low, but once the innovation arrives, the investment cost drops to zero.
17We have chosen to include the proﬁts from selling heat because many existing coal-ﬁred
power plants are actually able to sell the heat that they generate during the generation of
electricity and therefore these revenues represent a further advantage over renewable energy
technologies that do not have this extra source of revenue. Renewables therefore need to
overcome an even higher barrier than “only” their high overnight investment and O&M cost.
(Biomass-based technologies are the exception, but even they have lower heat proﬁts due to
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this. Equation (4.4) summarizes this as the immediate proﬁt.
π(mt,at,p
f
t ,CCt) = q
e(mt)   p
e
t + q
h(mt)   p
h − q
c(mt)   p
c
− q
f(mt)   p
f
t − OMC(mt) − CCt(at,λ,ξ),
(4.4)
where mt is the state the investor is currently in. In Section 4.3.1 this is either a
situation where there is no plant or where the wind farm has already been deployed.
In Section 4.3.2 this is a setting where a coal-ﬁred power plant already exists at ﬁrst.
At a later stage it can be a state where a new coal-ﬁred power plant has replaced the
old one or where a wind farm has been built instead. Table 4.2 gives a brief overview
of this setting. CCt is equal to Ct in Equation 4.2 when an investment is made (at=1)























Table 4.2: Experimental Settings in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2
Very much like in Chapter 3, the investor’s problem can be formulated as an
optimal control problem and restated in a recursive functional form, so that we can use
dynamic programming to determine the optimal action for the above model. In other
words, this means that we will be screening all possible values of the value function
depending on all the possible states that the decision-maker can be in depending upon
all realizations of prices and thereby determine the optimal action in each stage for
each realization of prices and technical change. Mathematically, we formulate a value
function in Equation (4.5), which has to be maximized by determining the optimal
investment strategy {at}
T
t=1, where T is the planning horizon.
V (p
f












where γ is the discount rate and at ∈ A(mt) is an action in the set of feasible ac-
tions.
18 The value function has a straightforward interpretation. The ﬁrst part
is the immediate proﬁt, π(mt,at,p
f
t ,CCt), which the producer receives upon in-
vestment. The second part represents the discounted expected continuation value
e




t ,CCt,mt). This term is evaluated for the spe-
18In this chapter’s model all actions are feasible actions by deﬁnition, since instalment of
a plant also implies its use, and so if a wind farm is added later in the planning period, the
coal-ﬁred power plant will be switched oﬀ.108
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ciﬁc state the producer is in, which changes as actions are undertaken. For example,
at the end of the lifetime of the coal-ﬁred power plant the wind farm could replace
the coal-ﬁred power plant. Then fuel costs would drop to zero. However, it could
also be that the coal-ﬁred technology is still cheaper than the wind farm. In this case
the investor would build another coal-ﬁred power plant to replace the expired one and
thus make no transition towards renewable energy.
E(V ( )) can be numerically computed in three diﬀerent ways as explained in Chap-
ter 3. The ﬁrst one would be through partial diﬀerential equations, the second one
involves multinomial lattice frameworks and the third one (which we choose here again)
is Monte Carlo simulation. Please refer to Figure 3.2 in the previous chapter for the
exact methodology used. Before presenting the experiments, we will ﬁrst describe
the technologies we are focussing on in more detail and provide the data used in the
simulations.
4.2.2 Coal and Wind Plant Data
The ﬁrst technology selected for our study as a representative of the fossil-fuel-based
plants is a coal-ﬁred plant with an integrated module capturing and storing a por-
tion of its CO2 emissions (therefore the capital costs appear to be higher than for
a standard coal-ﬁred power plant). More speciﬁcally, the data are for an Integrated
Gasiﬁcation Combined Cycle (IGCC) plant, which are typically more expensive to
build, but have very satisfactory eﬃciency. We are using data from the International
Energy Agency/OECD (2005). The choice for coal with carbon capture is targeted
at making the plants more comparable in eﬀective emission terms. With a positive
CO2 price, coal is already at a disadvantage compared to renewable energy with zero
emissions. Since we want to focus on the eﬀects of fuel price uncertainty and tech-
nological uncertainty on the investment pattern and not on CO2 prices as the main
trigger for a transition in the ﬁrst instance, we will ﬁrst keep CO2 prices low and by
choosing in addition a coal-ﬁred power plant that emits relatively less than the stan-
dard, we grant the coal-ﬁred power plant a certain degree of competitiveness versus
the renewables-based technology on these grounds. Using an old-fashioned coal-ﬁred
power plant makes the coal-ﬁred power plant much less proﬁtable in our experiments
where we introduce CO2 prices, even though the general results still hold. A transition
to wind energy is much more rapid in this case.
The other technology is an oﬀshore wind plant (a Danish brand). It is considerably
more expensive than coal in terms of capital and O&M costs and also its capacity factor
is not very attractive (see Table 4.3). We have opted for oﬀshore instead of onshore
wind, even though it has higher costs of installation, and O&M because the space to
build the farm is less restricted than onshore, and the wind can propel the mills with
less obstacles in its way and thereby achieve a higher capacity factor than onshore
wind mills, which only run at full capacity 25-27% of the time. The data are from the
same IEA report as the coal data and are assembled in Table 4.3. Still, the capacity
factor compares very unfavorably to that of the IGCC plant.The Results 109
Parameters IGCC Coal Oﬀshore Wind
Electricity Output [TWh/yr] 3,285 3,285
CO2 Emissions [kt CO2/yr] 2,155 0
Fuel Consumption [TJ/yr] 23,188 0
Fuel Cost [e/TJ] 1,970 0




Capacity factor [%] 75 45
Heat Eﬃciency [%] 34 0
Heat Price [e/TJ] 11,347 -
Investment Cost [1,000 e] 686,500 1,049,358
Lifetime [years] 40 25
Source: “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 2005 Update”,
IEA/OECD, 2005
Table 4.3: Power Plant Data for Coal and Wind
4.3 The Results
The analysis of investment sensitivity to uncertainty about fuel prices and technological
improvements is divided in two experiments. First, we want to focus exclusively on
technological uncertainty. The experiment that we have designed for this purpose
therefore presents only one investment option, namely to invest into the wind farm.
We ﬁrst start out by investigating the eﬀects of diﬀerent rates of technological progress
on the timing of investment. Varying the degree of uncertainty by adjusting λ and ξ
correspondingly (see Equation (4.3)), we can then also analyze how the investor reacts
to these changes.
The setting of the second experiment is such that we consider an established coal
plant,
19 which has no prospect of cost reductions due to technological improvements.
Furthermore, the price of coal is stochastic and (slightly) rising (see Equation (4.1)).
The analysis will then determine how the optimal date of replacing existing capacity
with the wind farm responds to changes in fuel price and technological uncertainty. If
the wind farm is not competitive, the coal-ﬁred plant will be kept until it expires and
will then be replaced by another IGCC plant. Refer back to Table 4.2 for an overview
of the experimental setting.
4.3.1 Technological Change and Uncertainty
Let us ﬁrst analyze the impact of diﬀerent rates of technical change on the timing of
investment and interpret it in terms of plant and option value. In Figure 4.4 the plant
and investment option values for a modest rate of technical change (λ(1 − ξ)=0.2%)
and for a relatively higher rate (λ(1 − ξ)=0.5%) are plotted. Uncertainty is kept low
by setting λ=1 in order to avoid cross-eﬀects.
From Chapter 2 we know that the investor will exercise the option to install the
plant, as soon as the plant value (i.e. the value of the immediate proﬁts that accrue
19Coal-ﬁred plants are always preferred over renewables in the beginning because of their
current cost advantage as explained above, see Section 4.2.2.110
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In the low-progress scenario investment occurs around year 11. In the high-progress
scenario, the investment option is exercised much later.
Figure 4.4: Option Values (circles) and Plant Values (triangles) for Low (Solid)
Rate of Technical Change (TC) and High (transparent) Rate of Technical
Change in (e)
upon investment) exceeds the option value of waiting. This is the case around year
11 for the low rate of technical change, i.e. where the solid circles and triangles meet
in Figure 4.4. For higher technological progress, the plant and also the option to
invest into the plant reach a much higher level, as shown by the transparent circles
(option value) and triangles (plant value). In addition, the option value rises more
sharply relative to the plant value. This can be explained by the fact that technological
improvements are embodied in the latest capacity; once investment has taken place,
no further cost reductions can occur. Therefore, if a larger decrease in costs can be
expected at the same level of certainty, it pays oﬀ to wait longer and reap the beneﬁts
of ongoing technological change. Higher rates of technical change therefore lead to a
postponement of investment.
We now turn to the analysis of uncertainty and use the results obtained above for
λ(1 − ξ)=0.5% and λ=1 as a reference scenario. As already pointed out, a relatively
high λ lowers uncertainty about the future technological advances with respect to
investment cost. The high number of innovations that arrive over the planning horizon
is compensated by a relatively smaller step size. More speciﬁcally, ξ will be 99.5%,
which means that costs fall by only 0.5% each time a new innovation is found. If we
have a planning horizon of 50 years, there will in total be 50 innovations, i.e. there
will be a fall of 25% in investment costs over 50 years, which is not unrealistic looking
back at the projections displayed in Figure 4.2.
In Section 4.2.1 we have explained how increasing the arrival rate of innovations,
along with a decrease in the size of the steps that this implies for the actual costThe Results 111
reduction, decreases the variance of technical change and thereby the uncertainty
associated with the cost of investment. We ﬁx λ(1 − ξ) at 0.005, and choose λ = 0.1
for the beginning. This gives us a step size of ξ = 95%, which leaves ultimately the
same “amount” of technical change, but makes costs much more volatile in terms of
the variance given in Equation (4.3).
With such a low value for λ, this is a situation of great uncertainty, since the
investor cannot be sure when the innovations will exactly arrive. Since the cost reduc-
tions are quite substantial, waiting for them gets more valuable. The outcome of this
simulation
20 is that, on average, the wind farm is built after year 26 (more precisely
the mean building time is at t = 26.5134). Please note that this result is obtained
without any fuel price uncertainty, since we are focussing on only one type of plant
(the wind farm) and there is no existing capacity ex ante investment in this setting.
As we can see in Figure 4.5, the option value is higher with more technological
uncertainty, while the plant value is largely unaﬀected. This is the reason why in-
vestment occurs later than in the lower uncertainty case. The analysis implies that
we ﬁnd a negative relationship between investment and uncertainty, as is typical in
the real options literature: the higher the variance, the later the investment option is
exercised.
In the low-uncertainty scenario investment occurs earlier than in the high-uncertainty case.
Figure 4.5: Option Values (circles) and Plant Values (steps) for High Uncer-
tainty (transparent circles) and Low Uncertainty (solid circles) in (e)
This is quite logical from an intuitive point of view. If the expected decrease in
costs over a speciﬁc time horizon is quite substantial, but the investor cannot be sure
how late it will be realized, it will pay oﬀ to wait for that improvement to materialize
because the proﬁts that accrue thereafter are higher and more than compensate for the
20The number of simulated technology paths is 10,000.112
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costs of waiting.
21 On the other hand, if the investor knows that a lot of innovations
will arrive during the planning horizon, he can be sure that at least some of them will
arrive in the beginning of the planning period and that he does not forgo much by
investing relatively early. Moreover waiting for smaller increments in plant value to
arrive over the planning horizon is not as lucrative as waiting for a huge cost drop,
which becomes ever more probable to occur, the longer investors have been waiting
already.
It is important to note that this result hinges crucially on our deﬁnition of techni-
cal change, which we model as a decrease in investment cost. This takes into account
that you have to irreversibly commit resources in order to take advantage of the latest
technology. This principle is generally known as embodied technological progress (see
Chapters 1 and 2) in the literature. If we had modeled technical change as learning-by-
doing, i.e. if current operations decreased the costs through improvements in knowl-
edge of how to handle existing processes, the outcome would be diﬀerent. Even with
irreversible investment, cost reductions would then be possible after instalment, which
would reduce the incentive to wait for (exogenous) technological improvements.
With very high uncertainty (λ=0.01) the option value increases at a diminishing rate.
Figure 4.6: Option Value (circles) and Plant Value (triangles) for Very High
Uncertainty in (e)
Another interesting ﬁnding is that an even higher arrival rate leads the rate of
increase in the option value to diminish, see Figure 4.6. This illustrates nicely how the
framework works: for an unchanged rate of technical change, the value of the plant is
unchanged as well. With a ﬁxed end beneﬁt, the option value of waiting in the ﬁnal
21Remember Figure 2.3 from Chapter 2 where the cost of waiting (i.e. foregoing the
immediate proﬁts) were also smaller than the extra gains (i.e. the avoided losses) that could
be realized later on.The Results 113
period cannot be diﬀerent either. Therefore, a larger option value induced by higher
uncertainty earlier in the planning period needs to be compensated by a diminishing
rate of increase later on.
The existence of technological progress, when it occurs at a relatively certain rate,
thus leads to a postponement of investment. This is an embodiment eﬀect because the
beneﬁts of technological progress can only be reaped once – namely when the wind
farm is installed. Uncertainty, modeled through a reduction of the arrival rate and an
increase in the size of the cost drops, further delays adoption because the option value
rises, i.e. it more valuable to wait for technical improvements to materialize. As we
will see in the second set of experiments (when we look at the problem of replacing
an existing IGCC capacity with wind capacity), this result still holds when fuel price
uncertainty is introduced as well.
4.3.2 Technological Change & Fuel Price Uncertainty
In this section the experimental setting is such that we consider an established coal-
ﬁred power plant with ongoing O&M and fuel costs, which needs to be replaced. The
possible replacement candidates are either another coal-ﬁred power plant or an oﬀshore
wind farm of the same capacity.
What real options models typically ﬁnd for input cost uncertainty is that higher
uncertainty (usually modeled by increasing the volatility parameter) leads to a post-
ponement of investment (see Chapter 2 and Table 4.1 in Section 4.1) because higher
volatility leads to a higher option value of waiting. In our setting, this is much more
complicated, since the option value is composed not only of waiting and keeping the
proﬁt ﬂows from having the coal plant operational. At the same time, the wind
farm’s overnight investment costs are reduced due to ongoing (exogenous) technologi-
cal progress, which creates additional value to waiting.
To illustrate this, we have left the fuel prices at a constant level in the ﬁrst ex-
periment. In Figure 4.7 the option value is therefore clearly upward-sloping, since the
only reason why there actually is an option value (given that fuel prices are constant)
is that there is ongoing technical change beneﬁtting the wind farm. And since the
beneﬁts of technical change are embodied in the latest version of the plant only, the
gain from waiting is positive and increasing. Another important remark that has to
be made about Figure 4.7 is that without a price on CO2, the option value line would
be enormously far removed from the plant value line, and investment would never
occur. Only a CO2 tax (or permit price) leads to eventual adoption of the wind farm.
The upper option value line corresponds to a CO2 price of 70e/ton, while increasing
this price by 5edepresses the option value and leads to earlier adoption of the wind
farm. From the policy-maker’s perspective, this implies that the cost disadvantages
of renewable energy (here wind power) will not be overcome by technological advance
in the short run according to current projections. So if emissions reductions need to
be achieved quickly, the investment trigger for renewable energy needs to be lowered
by either introducing a penalty for CO2 emissions (as in this example), by subsidizing
“green” technologies or introducing other regulations.114
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With low CO2 prices, investment occurs at the end of the planning period. With lower CO2
prices, the investment threshold can be moved forward signiﬁcantly.
Figure 4.7: Plant Value (circles) and Option Values (lines) for Low (dashed
line) and High (solid line) CO2 Prices in (e)
The next step in our analysis is to add rising fuel prices, which rise deterministically
in the next experiment. Figure 4.8 demonstrates what has been mentioned before: the
option value is inﬂuenced by two forces – the rising fuel price, which decreases the op-
tion value of keeping the coal-ﬁred plant operational and brings the option value closer
to the wind farm’s plant value, and the option value of waiting for more technological
improvement to materialize, so that less has to be spent to set the wind farm up. In
the beginning of the planning horizon, the ﬁrst eﬀect more than outweighs the second
inﬂuence and the option value line slopes downward. Only later, the increase in the
value of waiting for further cost reductions starts to exceed the decrease in the value of
keeping the coal-ﬁred power plant, which suﬀers from higher fuel costs. Again, we can
observe that the rate of increase in the option value line diminishes, as we approach
the end of the planning period.
22
Furthermore, the diﬀerence between the dashed line and the solid line in Figure 4.8
demonstrates that the option value is shifted downwards when coal prices rise more
quickly. Investment is therefore brought forward in time, consistent with expectations.
Now we can ﬁnally turn to the full experimental setting with rising and stochastic
coal prices, as described in Equation (4.1). In Figure 4.9 the plant value of the wind
farm and the option value with deterministic fuel prices are plotted again. The crosses
22If we would only depict the option value of keeping the coal-ﬁred power plant on the
basis of rising fuel prices, the option value line would slope downward completely and the
investment threshold would be much lower.The Results 115
With slowly rising coal prices, investment occurs around year 32. With coal prices rising at
twice their forecast rate, the moment at which the investment threshold is surpassed, is
moved forward to approximately year 19. The CO2 price is ﬁxed at 70e/ton of CO2.
Figure 4.8: Plant Value (circles) and Option Values (lines) for Slowly (dashed
line) and Rapidly (solid line) Rising Fuel Prices in (e)
refer to the option value with stochastic coal prices.
23
We can observe that with stochastically rising prices, the option value is shifted
slightly upwards. However, the option value converges back to the level of the “de-
terministic” option value after the “waiting for more technical change”-value starts to
exceed the falling option value of keeping the coal plant. This is because the ﬂuctu-
ations in the coal price have no eﬀect on that part of the option value. The average
investment threshold therefore remains unchanged in this experiment. However, if pol-
icy makers trust in fuel price uncertainty to provide suﬃcient incentives for investors
in the electricity sector to retire fossil-fuel-based capacity in favor of renewable energy,
these results provide no support for such hypotheses. Even if we would exclude the
possibility of technological improvements in wind, which leads to the convergence of
the two option value lines in Figure 4.9, the net eﬀect would not deviate much from
the average. If anything at all, it would lead to a postponement of investment. In our
setting, where the wind farm is only phased in towards the end of the planning period,
this could imply that there is no transition to renewable energy at all.
Finally, we want to examine the diﬀerence that technological uncertainty with
respect to the investment cost of the wind farm makes in the full setting. Figure 4.10
below shows the plant values and option values for a λ of 0.1 and 0.8 respectively.
23We have inﬂated σf by a factor of 10 in this experiment, since the low volatility of coal
made no visible diﬀerence in the graph. For gas, the gap between the deterministic and the
stochastic option value line would be much larger, since the volatility of gas is greater and the
fuel costs represent a much higher proportion of total costs of gas-ﬁred power plants.116
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With slowly rising coal prices, investment occurs around year 32. With coal prices rising at
twice its forecasted rate, the investment threshold is moved forward to approximately year
19. The CO2 price is ﬁxed at 70e /ton of CO2.
Figure 4.9: Plant Value (circles) and Option Values (lines) for Slowly (dashed
line) and Rapidly (solid line) Rising Fuel Prices in (e)
The former case corresponds to a situation where arrivals occur only sporadically but
reduce costs a lot, while a λ of 0.8 stands for more continuous, but also less dramatic
improvements.
24 Note that both values for λ ultimately lead to the same plant value,
only the line for the plant value with λ=0.1 evolves more erratically than the one
with λ=0.8. The option value is inﬂuenced much more heavily by the change in
technological uncertainty, however. As could be expected from our analysis in Section
4.3.1, the option value with higher uncertainty (dashed line) is above the one with
lower uncertainty (solid line) in Figure 4.10. This leads to a postponement in the
adoption of the wind farm by approximately ﬁve years in this case.
In Figure 4.11 we display the investment and proﬁt distributions for this last exper-
iment. We see that with higher technological uncertainty, the investment distribution
does not only have a wider spread, but is also more skewed to the left. This is in line
with the conclusions about the option value drawn from Figure 4.10.
In order to test the robustness of the results, a sensitivity analysis has been con-
ducted. We have found that the shape of the option value depends on the choice of
the CO2 price level. For a higher CO2 price (e.g. 75e/ton of CO2) the impact of
rising fuel prices on the option value is diminished and the option value line slopes
24We have chosen a price of 70e /t CO2 again, with λ(1 − ξ) at 0.005.The Results 117
More technological uncertainty leads to a postponement of investment.
Figure 4.10: Technological Uncertainty: Plant Values with Less Uncertainty
(ﬁlled circles) and Higher Uncertainty (transparent circles) and Option Values
(lines) for Lower (solid line) and Higher (dashed line) Uncertainty in (e)
upward from the beginning.
25 This is because the high CO2 price makes the coal-ﬁred
power plant relatively more unproﬁtable even at initially low fuel price levels. There
is therefore no positive value to keeping the coal plant, apart from making use of it
during the waiting period where technological progress reduces the costs of installing
the wind farm. While this does not change the quality of the results, it is important to
keep in mind the extent of the impact the policy-maker can have on the option value
of waiting to install the wind farm.
To summarize the results of the experiments conducted in this section, we ﬁnd
that the option value is now composed of (a) the value of keeping the coal-ﬁred power
plant in the face of increasing (and potentially volatile) coal prices and (b) the value
of waiting for technological progress to increase the plant value of the wind farm by
decreasing the cost of investment. In the beginning, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates the latter
and the option value graph therefore slopes downwards. Later on, this relationship is
reversed and the option value slopes upwards. With constant (and also with rising)
coal prices, there is no point of intersection between the option line and the plant
value, as the option value exceeds the plant value of the wind farm by far. This means
that even when the coal-ﬁred plant expires, the choice will not be for wind, but for
another coal-ﬁred power plant of the same type that had been installed before. Only
by tripling the CO2 price, at which a ton of CO2 is currently traded, the investor can
be induced to make the transition to wind. Marginal increases beyond this price will
bring investment into wind considerably forward in time. In an experiment where the
25Remember that these cost items are separate, additive entities.118
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Figure 4.11: Investment and Proﬁt Distributions for 1,000 Simulations. Proﬁts
are in (e).
coal price rises more quickly than forecasted, the option value line shifts downward
and the investment threshold is reduced. This means that more quickly rising fuel
prices will induce earlier investment into renewable technologies. However, given that
coal reserves have rather been increasing than decreasing lately
26 it is diﬃcult to
imagine that there will be severe price surges over the long term that might trigger
such investment behavior. The volatility of fuel prices does not add to the eﬀect of
rising fuel prices either, as it contributes relatively little to the total generation cost
and given the modest forecasted increase in fuel prices themselves. Furthermore, such
volatility would rather raise the option value of keeping the coal plant and waiting
for more technological change to occur and therefore lead to a later adoption of the
wind farm. Finally, adding technological uncertainty leads to postponement again,
where the total impact appears to be smaller than in the experiments with the wind
farm only. This is because the coal-ﬁred power plant owner is now confronted with a
larger cost of waiting in terms of the higher fuel cost that he increasingly faces as time
progresses.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a real options model with stochastic fuel prices and stochas-
tic technical change in the electricity sector to explore the eﬀects of uncertainty on the
26This is due to technical improvements, which make the exhaustion of previously uneco-
nomical deposits possible.Conclusion 119
behavior of investors. As some authors have mentioned (e.g. Awerbuch and Sauter,
2006) volatile fuel prices might cost economies more than generally expected. It ap-
pears that renewable energy carriers, which come at a zero “fuel” cost, such as wind in
this chapter, have a large advantage over fossil fuel technologies in this respect. Fur-
thermore, even though they might still be expensive in terms of their capital and O&M
costs, renewables have bright prospects in terms of their technological improvement
over the next decades (see Section 4.1 for forecasts). At the same time, renewables do
not generate CO2 emissions, which implies that a transition to their use is desirable
from an environmental point-of-view (and in the very long run also from an economic
point-of-view, as fossil fuel prices continue to rise). More precisely, an early adop-
tion of renewable energy will assist most governments’ striving for sustainable energy
development.
However, it stands to question whether the combination of rising, uncertain fuel
prices and technological advance in the area of renewables will really provide suﬃcient
incentives for investors to switch from an established fossil fuel plant (here coal) to a
renewable technology (here wind). The application of our model to recent data from
the IEA (2005) suggests that this may not be the case. Without an additional trigger
(here CO2 prices), the transition is not proﬁtable for the investor in the short run,
even if the rate of technical change had been higher.
Furthermore, the analysis of the eﬀect that uncertainty has on the investment
pattern suggests that uncertainty about fuel prices does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
the timing of renewable energy phase-in. If anything at all, the price ﬂuctuations will
lead to a slightly higher option value, as long as this option value is dominated by the
value of keeping the coal-ﬁred plant operational. As soon as the value of waiting for
more technical change to materialize dominates the option value, fuel price volatility
will no longer play a role for the optimal investment date.
27 Betting on fuel price
uncertainty to provide suﬃcient disincentives for investors in the electricity sector to
replace old coal-ﬁred capacity with new coal-ﬁred power plants does therefore not seem
to be a promising policy to eﬀectively reduce CO2 emissions.
Including technological uncertainty complicates matters further: if we abstract
from the eﬀect that rising (and possibly stochastic) fuel prices have on the option
value of waiting to install the wind farm, larger uncertainty will raise the option value
of waiting as illustrated in Figure 4.5 and therefore lead the investor to postpone the
adoption of the wind farm. This is because technological progress is modeled to be
embodied in the latest version of capacity. Therefore, if the investor can expect a
relatively large fall (and the fall will be large, if the arrival rate is low, as we keep
the rate of progress constant) in the cost of installing the wind farm, it will pay oﬀ to
postpone the decision for a while and wait for that big cost drop to occur.
Changing the setting, so that we either keep an existing coal-ﬁred plant or replace
it with a wind farm (before or after expiration) or another coal plant (after expiration),
adds another inﬂuence on the option value of waiting. More precisely, the rising fuel
27In Chapter 3, this was diﬀerent, as both technologies were aﬀected by the stochastic CO2
prices, even though to a diﬀerent extent.120
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prices reduce the value of keeping the coal-ﬁred power plant. If we would not include
the value of waiting for more technological progress to improve the costs of the wind
farm, the option value line in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 would cross the plant value line
much earlier and trigger investment already in year 7. However, the value of waiting
for the beneﬁts of technical change raises the option value and even starts to dominate
the development of the option value later during the planning period, so that the
option value slopes upward and adoption occurs later than if we had not taken the
waiting beneﬁts into account. This implies that – contrary to the hopes that policy
makers might have for the role of technical change – the mere existence of cumulative,
embodied technological progress leads to a later transition to renewable energy.
Such an analysis is interesting in the light of US energy policy, for example. In 1973,
when the US were hit by an oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) after Israel’s victory in the Yom Kippur War, employ-
ment and economic growth were dearly aﬀected by surging fuel prices. Nixon then
proclaimed that science and industry were supposed to provide for a technological
revolution that would free the country from the dependence on fossil fuels from other
countries. However, that technological leap was never made and existing infrastructure
was not transformed in favor of non-oil technology. The current US Administration
has also demonstrated that it sees a solution in the gradual improvement of existing
technologies. Even though the initiatives that have been taken in the area of energy
have been motivated by considerations of energy security, the measures are not exclu-
sively targeted at a transition to renewable energy: examples of such policies include
the extension of oil exploration activities in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, subsi-
dies for the testing of modern oil drilling techniques, ﬁnance for new gas pipelines and
research funds for fusion energy. For the future, tougher GHG reduction initiatives
are expected and utilities have started to actively include carbon regulatory risk in
their portfolio analysis (Barbose et al, 2008).
With respect to technological uncertainty in the presence of coal-ﬁred capacity,
which looses attractiveness as fuel prices rise, we also ﬁnd a “typical” real options
result. In particular, we ﬁnd a negative uncertainty-investment relationship again:
when the investor can be sure that innovations will arrive within the next few years to
reduce the investment cost, the investment option is exercised earlier than if there is
uncertainty, which increases the option value of waiting. This result hinges crucially on
the way how technical change is modeled, since a reduction in investment cost can only
be gained once, namely at the time the investment is made. This is an embodiment
eﬀect, without which the value to waiting would be much less important (if we abstract
from another eﬀect, namely the intrinsic technological diﬀerences between coal and
wind, which could be termed “heterogeneity eﬀect”).
To summarize, technological uncertainty leads to the postponement of investment
into the wind plant in the presence of coal-ﬁred capacity that is inﬂuenced by (stochas-
tic) fuel price growth. Furthermore, reasonable rates of technological change alone are
not capable of making the wind farm competitive versus the established coal-ﬁred
power plant. The message for policy makers is that an additional trigger in the formConclusion 121
of CO2 taxes or permit trading must be maintained in order to induce an earlier
transition to renewable energy.
Finally, a few words need to be said about the limits of the analysis presented:
the exogeneity of technical change is a simpliﬁcation, of course, because progress is
endogenous insofar that the R&D needed to drive the progress must be ﬁnanced as
well. In fact, Davis and Owens (2003) use real option pricing techniques to estimate the
current value of expected future supply from renewable electric technologies, net of
federal R&D expenditures, when fossil fuel prices are uncertain. They ﬁnd a large
positive value of $30.6 billion, of which a large part is attributed to past federal
R&D eﬀorts, and continued federal R&D funding is assumed. The value would even
be higher, if future federal R&D levels were projected to be higher as well. In the
ideal framework, however, the private investor would value an R&D option to further
develop immature technologies in the presence of the option to make a transition to
that same technology – thus taking into account that also technical change needs to
be paid for. However, the endogeneity of technical change is beyond the scope of this
chapter, where we the focus is on the eﬀects of technological uncertainty as such in the
presence of uncertainty about fossil fuel prices. Therefore, we have assumed that the
individual investor does not carry out the R&D necessary for progress, even though
endogenizing technical change in real options models is deﬁnitely an interesting and
important topic for further research. One interesting question to be addressed, for
example, concerns how uncertainty in the productivity of the R&D process will aﬀect
both the rate of technical change and the uncertainty surrounding it, thus creating
not only endogenous technical change, but also endogenous risk.122
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Appendix: Analytical Approach to Option Valu-
ation Under Fuel Price Uncertainty
The fuel price p
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σ is the volatility parameter and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process as
in Section 4.2.1. Abstracting from heat proﬁts and CO2 penalties, we focus exclusively
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where p
e is the electricity price, t is the installation date, T is the lifetime of the
plant and p
f is normalized such that it measures the fuel cost of producing one unit
of electricity. Using the technique of replicating a portfolio (see Dixit and Pindyck,
1994), we can set up a diﬀerential equation of the following form
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where F is the option value of the investment and m = s and q are constants, composed
of the volatility parameter σ, the dividend parameter, the interest rate r and p
e. More
speciﬁcally, m = s = 2   r/σ
2 and q = 2   p
e   (δ − r)/σ
2.
This diﬀerential equation has to be transformed in order to ﬁnd a solution. There-
fore, we set p
f = z
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z  w, where k is the relevant root of k
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z+(a0 z+b0) w (see Polyanin and Zaitsev, 2003). To achieve
this transformation, we have to have a2 = 1, b2 = 0, a1 = 2+
2pe(r−δ)
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σ2 ). The general solution to such a
diﬀerential equation is w = e
g z   x(y), where y =
z− 
λ . The form of the function x(y)
must be determined using the solution to the degenerate hypergeometric equation, of
which the Kummer function is a particular solution. Polyanin and Zaitsev (2003),
for example, provide a detailed overview of exact solutions for ordinary diﬀerential
equations (ODE). If the ODE has the form θv
′′+(b−θ)v
′−av = 0, then for b > a > 0












̺−1. If b is not an integer, the solution can be formulated as
v = C1 φ(a,b,θ)+C2 x
1−b φ(a−b+1,2−b,θ). This is what we use in this appendix
28The notation in the appendix does not necessarily coincide with the notation of the main
text because this is a simpliﬁcation of the problem.Appendix 123












Substituting back for w and z, we can derive all constants by using the smooth
pasting and value matching conditions and F(p
f → ∞) = 0, but it is analytically not






While the ﬁrst part of the thesis has been occupied with real options modeling, this
part’s models are based on portfolio selection. In this chapter we ﬁrst present a
“standard” Markowitz portfolio application to electricity investments and then develop
a simple portfolio framework in a vintage setting for the same application. In this way,
it will become clear what the beneﬁts of the new approach are.
As already explained in Chapter 2, standard (ﬁnancial) portfolio theory has been
applied to (real) investments in the electricity sector before. Awerbuch and Berger
(2003), Awerbuch (2006) and Roques et al (2006) have contributed signiﬁcantly to this
literature, which is summarized brieﬂy in Table 5.1 (and has already been reviewed
in more detail in Chapter 2). While real options theory focusses on the optimal
timing of investing into particular power plants and is thus an appropriate framework
to analyze individual investment decisions, portfolio selection is a useful tool for large
investors, who want to diversify a portfolio with respect to the risks imminent to certain
technologies. Another application is the optimization of the energy generating mix at
the country level. As Awerbuch and Sauter (2006) emphasize, ﬂuctuations in fuel
prices can be costly in terms of GDP losses, so energy security becomes an important
issue for countries depending on fossil fuels for energy generation. A portfolio approach



































































Mean-Variance (M-V) Portfolio Model; utilities can
cover fossil fuel needs partially by long-term con-
tracts, the rest is bought on the spot market; min-
imize expected increase in fossil fuel cost for given
fuel cost risk.
Utilities are eﬃciently diversiﬁed, but they accept very high risk
for high returns, which might be due to regulation forcing them





Minimize risk to domestic economy from fuel price
shocks; use (co)variances that vary with time (esti-
mated through a GARCH model).
Electricity sector has operated close to minimum-variance position
during the 90s. Overall, US electricity consumption is ineﬃcient.




M-V portfolio framework, which is used to evaluate
current and planned EU generating mixes with un-
certain fuel, O&M and construction costs.
Existing EU portfolio is suboptimal/ineﬃcient. Fuel price risk
dominates the other risk types (uncertainty about variable and




Extended version of Awerbuch and Berger (2003)
with applications to EU, US and developing coun-
tries’ portfolios. Focus on fossil fuel price risk, which
claimed to be an important issue in energy security.
Countries should be adding renewables to make generating port-
folios more eﬃcient. Compared to US and EU portfolios, Mexico





Use seemingly unrelated regression estimation to
compute time-invariant covariance matrices for their
M-V model. Application to Switzerland and the US.
Maximum expected return portfolio for Switzerland should con-
tain more nuclear and solar energy and less hydropower, while
the minimum variance portfolio would have more hydropower, but
also more nuclear. The US maximum expected return mix would
have more coal and wind. The minimum variance mix would con-
tain coal, wind, nuclear and oil.
Roques et al
(2006)
M-V portfolio model where return distributions for
the diﬀerent technologies are generated by Monte
Carlo simulation to serve as input for the calcula-
tion of the covariance matrix. Application to UK
data. Uncertainty about fuel, electricity and carbon
prices.
Questionable whether the market provides suﬃcient incentives to
install a socially-optimal fuel mix. Correlations between the price
processes inﬂuence the results signiﬁcantly: diversiﬁcation bene-
ﬁts of a nuclear plant for a power company operating gas- and
coal-ﬁred plants are low for price correlations observed in the UK.
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All of the studies listed in Table 5.1 have the strength of valuing diversiﬁcation
gains and draw a clear tradeoﬀ between risk and return (or cost). However, as ex-
plained in Chapter 2, they rely exclusively on M-V portfolio selcetion and thus suﬀer
from several shortcomings – most notably their static nature, which makes it diﬃcult
to analyze the eﬀects of inherently dynamic processes such as technical change and
the consequences of irreversibility. This is the main motivation for developing a new
approach here, which will be extended and applied in the following two chapters.
1
While e.g. Awerbuch (2006) ﬁnds that the portfolio share of renewables should
be increased in most countries according to portfolio considerations and one might
wonder why this is not the case in reality, we ﬁnd that renewables should be phased in
at a later point in time when taking into account the dynamics and the irreversibility
underlying investment in the electricity sector.
The basic idea is that the possibilities by which fuels can be converted into elec-
tricity correspond to one “family” of technologies, deﬁned by the type of fuel they use.
Hence we have the “gas-ﬁred-turbine-family”, the “coal-ﬁred-turbine-family”, renew-
ables using fuels such as wind or solar energy and so forth. Each family in turn consists
of diﬀerent generations of similar technologies, as in a vintage model of production.
2
Within a family, each generation embodies the level of knowledge that was cutting
edge at the time the generation came into existence. Each of these – in turn – will
become outdated as new vintages arrive.
The reason why we are emphasizing this structure within a technology family is
that technical change does not fall as “manna from heaven” (Robinson, 1962). Instead,
it needs to be bought and paid for in the form of new machines and equipment. In
electricity production, the most important type of technical change is embodied and
comes about in the form of quality improvements of machinery and equipment. As
eﬃciency usually does not change substantially ex post, we will disregard disembodied
technological improvements that could be achieved through learning-by doing, and
focus on embodied technical change through improved capital productivity in a clay-
clay vintage setting. As laid out in Chapter 2 in Section 2.5, the clay-clay structure
of vintage models implies that factor proportions are ﬁxed ex ante and ex post. The
improvements made through technological progress can therefore only be realized by
buying the new equipment. Ex post, no additional eﬃciency enhancement is possible,
i.e. there are no substitution possibilities. The novelty of the approach presented here
1Another contribution to the problem of electricity planning is by Madlener et al (2005).
In their model uncertainty pertains to ﬂuctuations in demand, peak load capacity, generation
costs and the price of electricity. They use a dynamic programming approach and actively
value waiting in the face of uncertainty. Their work thus falls more into the category of real
options frameworks as in the ﬁrst half of the thesis. However, their approach to maximize the
net present value of optimal vintages is – at least to some extent – similar to ours, which is
why we did not want to ignore it at this point. Their results are based on data for the Turkish
electricity sector, where a large amount of gas-ﬁred capacity has been installed lately, which
is found to be a suboptimal choice because coal prices are a lot less volatile than gas prices in
Turkey.
2See Gregory and James (1973) for further arguments why vintage modeling is appropriate
for the electricity sector, such as the substantial initial investment outlays required to start
production (Gregory and James, 1973, p. 1134). A more extensive literature review about
vintage modeling is provided in Chapter 2.128 An Integrated Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment
is the way in which uncertainty surrounding the rate of technical change will have an
impact on investment behavior, while fuel price uncertainty leads to the outcomes one
would expect from “standard”, static mean-variance portfolio theory.
Furthermore, we emphasize the fact that there are diﬀerent technology families
used in electricity production by one and the same ﬁrm at the same point in time.
Since most providers do not rely on a single production technique, the various tech-
nologies must thus be imperfect substitutes for each other because the most eﬃcient
family would otherwise drive out the other families. The question then arises why pro-
ducers prefer to employ a mix of technology families. There are several reasons for this.
First, some families perform the best under constant production circumstances. Their
output levels can only be changed at a relatively high cost, which causes signiﬁcant
problems if forecasts fall short of actual demand.
3 Other families can be used to meet
peaks in demand because their output levels can be easily adjusted. Gas turbines, for
example, have high generation costs, but require only low instalment expenses, while
coal-based technologies have much higher capital costs, but lower generation costs.
More speciﬁcally, gas turbines have capital costs of only half the amount than that of
coal-ﬁred turbines and a quarter of that of nuclear capacity. At the same time, fuel
costs of gas-ﬁred plants constitute up to 80% of total costs, while the corresponding
percentages for coal and nuclear are around 30% and 10% respectively. Other rea-
sons for using technology mixes are that prices of fuels can be quite volatile, which
is especially evident in the case of oil. This might lead to considerable gains from
diversiﬁcation and thus warrants a portfolio approach.
Evidently, the return to electricity production depends on price movements and
the corresponding composition of the electricity capital stock in terms of technology
families. However, the proﬁtability of electricity production also depends on the size-
distribution of generations within families, since that determines the eﬃciency of the
family in meeting its production goals. The above-mentioned diversiﬁcation gains do
thus not only apply across diﬀerent technology families, but also across vintages of
the same family that diﬀer with respect to their productivity characteristics, where
we focus on fuel price and technological uncertainty as the causes of return volatility.
4
In our framework, we combine elements from portfolio theory (so we can introduce
the gains from diversiﬁcation described above and in Chapter 2) and vintage mod-
eling (so we can overcome the static nature of mean-variance portfolio selection also
explained in Chapter 2).
The beginnings of vintage modeling and later applications have been documented
3For the sake of transparency and to illustrate the new approach with as little potential
cross eﬀects as possible, this chapter does not investigate stochastic ﬂuctuations in demand,
even though this could be implemented as in Chapter 7. Chaton and Doucet (2003) take both
fuel price uncertainty and demand uncertainty into account, but their approach ignores the
eﬀect that prices might have on demand, which could be important if we think of recent eﬀorts
to further liberalize electricity markets. Uncertainties emanating from market liberalization
have been analyzed by e.g. Dyner and Larsen (2001).
4Other factors such as the anticipation of new regulations, supply security and environ-
mental considerations all add to overall uncertainty in capacity planning as well, as described
by Ku (1995). For the same reasons that we do not explicitly consider demand ﬂuctuations,
however, we will also disregard these sources of uncertainty for the moment.Introduction 129
at length in Chapter 2. Let us recall here that the basic idea of a vintage model is that
the potential of technical change as an idea can only be realized in practice by ﬁrst
incorporating that idea in a piece of machinery and subsequently using that machinery
to produce output. Because technical change is therefore embodied in individual pieces
of machinery and equipment, vintage models emphasize the fact that complementary
investment has to take place in order to realize the productivity potential of new ideas.
The main focus of a vintage model, therefore, is on the diﬀusion of technical change.
The embodiment of technical change results in a capital stock that is heterogeneous
in terms of the unit operating cost associated with individual vintages.
While Chapter 2 has also reviewed putty-putty (Solow, 1960) and putty-clay (Jo-
hansen, 1959; Salter, 1960) models, a clay-clay (Kaldor and Mirrlees, 1962) model
applied to individual technology families is best suited for our purposes, as it implies
the absence of alternative choices of production techniques within a family, and the
absence of possibilities to change factor proportions (among which the fuel output ra-
tio) ex post. A clay-clay model therefore also reﬂects the irreversibility of investment
decisions that is typical of investment in the electricity sector.
From a policy point of view, the irreversibility of investment is important, as it
implies that the hope that technical change will solve problems such as global warming
may involve high and irrecoverable investment costs that many investors might be
reluctant to incur – especially in the face of uncertainties. Moreover, adjustments may
take a long time to complete, as the eﬀective pace of technical change (in as far as
the latter is indeed embodied in machinery and equipment) crucially depends on the
rate of investment. Thus, investors would either be forced to bear large adjustment
costs, or, from a risk diversiﬁcation point of view, government would have to promote
investment in new energy-saving technologies sooner rather than later.
With respect to the economic scrapping of old equipment, there are basically two
“rules”, where one is a special case of the other. Remember from Chapter 2 that the
most general rule is the one formulated by Malcomson (1975), which states that an
existing vintage should be used up to the point in time where its variable unit cost rises
above the unit total cost of the newest vintage. By replacing old capacity with new
capacity, one “saves” the diﬀerence between the unit total cost on the newest vintage
and the unit variable cost on the old ones. A “derivative” of the Malcomson scrapping
rule is the “negative quasi-rent” rule, which states that a vintage should be scrapped
as soon as its quasi-rents become negative, that is to say, as soon as its unit variable
cost are not completely covered by the selling price of the product. Under perfect
competition and marginal cost pricing, where the marginal cost of production are
represented by the unit total cost on the newest vintage, the Malcomson scrapping rule
implies the “negative quasi-rent” rule. In the model developed here, we (implicitly) use
the Malcomson scrapping rule as the more general one of the two, also because it allows
us to state the portfolio objective function in terms of costs and variance of that cost.
More precisely, as we are using variance-adjusted costs, we are implicitly comparing
the variance-adjusted contributions of new and old vintages to total variance-adjusted
costs in order to decide whether to keep on using old vintages or replacing them by130 An Integrated Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment
the newest ones for each individual technology family.
As vintages explicitly and simultaneously deal with the cumulative character of
technical change and the irreversibility of investment, we ﬁnd this approach to be a
valuable alternative to real options theory, providing new insights into the dynamics
of investment under uncertainty. The outcomes are in between the “standard” pre-
dictions of portfolio theory and real options theory: producers postpone investment
into technologies that exhibit lower degrees of (technical) uncertainty in our model,
whereas M-V portfolio theory generally predicts that assets with a lower associated
risk will make up for a larger part of the portfolio immediately. A typical result we
have seen in real options frameworks was that it is beneﬁcial to wait and invest later
in the face of uncertainty, and to invest more when volatility is reduced. Our ﬁndings
are in contrast with this because by linking portfolio selection to vintage modeling
we explicitly incorporate the embodiment character and cumulative nature of techni-
cal change into the investment decision. Whereas in real options theory the option
value of waiting and keeping the investment opportunity open falls with a decrease in
the variance, our approach recognizes potential beneﬁts to be reaped from cumulative
processes that are now occurring with more certainty. In other words, our “option
value” is adjusted for the beneﬁts that can be realized through the cumulativeness
of technical change and, as we will show later on, this can more than outweigh the
immediate gains from lower variance.
The purpose of this chapter is to present a simple version of the new vintage-
portfolio framework. We also want to analyze the diﬀerences and compare it to the
“standard” mean-variance portfolio approach. To this end we will focus on three
hypothetical technologies that have the characteristics of (a) fossil-fuel ﬁred power
plants such as coal, (b) nuclear generators, and (c) technologies based on renewable
energy such as (onshore) wind farms. Furthermore, both models – the M-V portfolio
framework as well as the vintage-portfolio model – will feature the same variables
and parameters. In order to make the comparison clearer, we have chosen to focus
on one type of price uncertainty and one type of technological uncertainty: fuel price
uncertainty and uncertainty about the rate of capital-saving technical change. A more
complete version of the vintage-portfolio model will be presented in the next chapter;
this one is restricted because we want to avoid cross-eﬀects in order to be able to
clearly disentangle the cause-and-eﬀect relationships leading to the diﬀerences in the
results between the two approaches.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First the technology families will be described
and analyzed in a “standard” M-V portfolio model. We then develop a simple vintage-
portfolio model and test it with a set of technologies with the same characteristics as
before. The comparison of both models’ results illustrates the advantages of the new
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5.2 A Mean-Variance Portfolio Approach to In-
vestment in the Electricity Sector
Let us ﬁrst start out by analyzing an investment problem with three typical power
plant types in a “standard” Markowitz portfolio setting. This exercise is very similar to
the studies listed in Table 5.1. More precisely, it is closest to the paper by Roques et al
(2006) because we also use Monte Carlo simulations to ﬁnd the covariance matrix and
the unit expected cost per technology. This works by generating 10,000 realizations
of fuel prices and capital-saving technical change and computing the present value of
investing into the plant and subsequently operating it throughout the planning period.
In this way, a frequency distribution for each power plant’s cost is created, which can
be used to calculate the expected cost and the variance for each technology’s cost and
the covariance between them.
The cost structure of the three typical power plants is given in Table ??, which
will be the same used for the analysis in Section 5.2. Rather than providing numerical
estimates of applications to a speciﬁc electricity sector, we are here more interested
in an illustration of the principles of the new approach and – in particular – in a
comparison with the results of a “standard” Markowitz M-V portfolio framework.
Therefore, we restrict our technology dimension to three technology “families”, which
have diﬀerent characteristics. The ﬁrst one is the fossil-fuel-based technology family.
With fuel costs representing a relatively low fraction of total costs, which are in our
framework merely composed of fuel and capital costs for the sake of transparency,
this category is representative of coal-ﬁred capacity. Furthermore, this technology has
volatile fuel prices and only a very modest prospect for technical change to improve
its capital coeﬃcient over time. At the same time however, this low rate of technical
change is relatively certain to materialize. In other words, its volatility parameter is
low.
The latter is also true for the second technology family, which features lower fuel
costs, but requires very high investment outlays. This cost structure is typical of
nuclear power plants. A note of caution needs to be spelled out here about our
simpliﬁcation, since it ignores the risks emanating from nuclear waste disposal and
potential reactor accidents. Taking this characteristic into account would probably
lower the attractiveness of nuclear power. However, we think that for the sake of
illustration such a representation is passable because we do not want to recommend
the installation of nuclear power plants as such, but of technologies that have similar
features with respect to the composition of total costs, i.e. that are very capital-
intensive.
The third and last technology family can best be described to represent technolo-
gies based on renewable energy carriers because fuel costs are set equal to zero. Hence
there is no volatility associated with the variable cost of such a plant. Furthermore,
even though capital costs are high, the technological outlook is very promising, i.e. the
expected rate of capital-saving technical change is high, so that initial capital costs
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ment is relatively uncertain, which might decrease the attractiveness of this technology
somewhat. These characteristics resemble many renewable energy technologies such as
solar or wind power. Due to their low capacity factors, large amounts of capacity are
needed to generate suﬃcient amounts of electricity and this puts them at a clear cost
disadvantage with traditional technologies such as coal and nuclear. Since the cost
structure is most similar to that of an onshore wind farm, we will call this category
“wind” in the following.
5.2.1 The Framework
The framework is the simple M-V model developed by Markowitz (1952, 1959) and
applied to electricity investments by the studies listed in Table 5.1. As we will also
do so in the vintage-portfolio model, we focus on minimal costs instead of maximal




 i   xi (5.2.1)
where xi is the share of technology i in the portfolio and  i is the same technology’s








where σij is the covariance between technologies i and j and the variance of a particular
technology if i=j. UTC stands for (unit) total cost.
We minimize Equation (5.2.2) subject to Equation (5.2.1) and thereby trace out
the eﬃcient frontier for this problem. In other words, we determine xi. However, in
order to ﬁnd the covariance matrix corresponding to σij and the expected cost per
unit  i of each technology we will ﬁrst run a Monte Carlo simulation generating cost
distributions for technologies with the characteristics displayed in Table ??.
In the Monte Carlo framework both capital-saving technical change and fuel prices
will follow geometric Brownian motions, where the drift for fuel prices is positive and
the drift for the change in the capital coeﬃcient is negative. The volatility parameter
for technical change is higher in the case of wind than for nuclear and coal. Total
expected costs for generating one unit of electricity are composed of the investment
costs incurred upon installation and the discounted stream of costs arising from op-
erating the installed capacity throughout the planning period. 10,000 simulations for
the fuel price and the rate of technical change will then result in a cost distribution for
the corresponding technology. Please note that there is no optimization involved in
this process: while it could have been optimal to exercise investment at a later point
in time, we are merely interested in the net present value of investing on the spot
and operating the equipment subsequently. Additional experiments will show how the
results that we obtain change in response to postponing investment by an arbitraryA Mean-Variance Portfolio Approach to Investment in the Electricity Sector 133
period.
5
The discount rate is 5%, which is the same rate used in the vintage-portfolio
analysis later on. The capacity of wind has been adjusted for its low capacity factor,
i.e. more wind capacity has to be installed to achieve the same levels of output as coal
and nuclear.
6 Figure 5.1 presents all three cost distributions for the base run, which
computes the present value of expected costs upon investment for each technology:




t=0 FCt, where CC is the cost of investment, FC
is the fuel cost, T the length of the planning period and r the discount rate.































(The x-axis represents total expected costs for a ﬁxed amount of generated electricity; the
y-axis is the frequency. Distributions are ordered from left to right and from top to bottom.
Please note that the costs are not representative of particular technologies: only the cost
structure corresponds to reality, the absolute amounts do not necessarily coincide with speciﬁc
power plants).
Figure 5.1: Cost Distributions for Coal, Nuclear and Wind
While it is diﬃcult to see from the Figure, the calculations show clearly that coal
has a slightly higher variance than nuclear. The volatility of wind is zero, of course,
since investment occurs in the beginning, i.e. technical change has not had an impact
5The planning period is 25 years, although nuclear and coal-ﬁred power plants have longer
lifetimes. Wind farms and other types of renewables, however, have lower expected lifetimes.
If we had chosen a longer planning horizon, it would have been necessary to account for this
diﬀerence by requiring additional capacity to be installed towards the end of the horizon. This
would have been an unnecessary complication, which does not add further insights here.
6More precisely, the capacity has been normalized to produce 3,285,000 MWh per year;
costs are in millions of dollars. However, since our endeavors are of an purely illustrative
character here, the magnitudes should not be of primary interest and are just mentioned for
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on the costs of the wind technology yet and fuel costs are zero in the ﬁrst place. In
the next section we will also present results using Monte Carlo distributions where
the investment has been made later (5 and 10 years later respectively). It turns
out that in this case the cost distribution exhibits a very large variance leading to a
smaller proportion of wind in the overall generating portfolio because there will be
10,000 realizations of capital costs. The covariance matrix derived from the above











where the column/row corresponds to coal, the second to nuclear and the third to
wind.
5.2.2 Results
The results from feeding the covariance matrix and expected cost values derived from
the Monte Carlo cost distributions into the M-V portfolio model have been summarized
in Figure 5.2. In particular, we have computed the cost distributions for investment
on the spot, i.e. in year 1 (see Figure 5.1), in year 5 and in year 10 respectively.
7
In the ﬁrst panel of Figure 5.2 the investor faces the distributions displayed in
Figure 5.1. Therefore, the portfolio in the upper left corner, which combines the
highest expected total cost, but also the lowest variance, is composed of wind only.
As we move downwards and to the right on the eﬃcient frontier, more variance is
accepted at a lower expected cost, so the proportion of wind shrinks, while the shares
of coal and nuclear, which are both cheaper and have more volatile costs, increase.
When the share of wind has been reduced to zero at a variance level of 0.00212484,
the fraction of coal also begins to diminish. At the same time nuclear continues to
gain until it completely dominates the generating portfolio for a minimum expected
cost of 412.919558 million dollars.
The second panel shows how the eﬃcient frontier looks when investment occurs in
the ﬁfth year. It is clear that wind has uncertain costs then as well, because technical
change reducing the capital coeﬃcient – and thereby capital costs – is stochastic. In
fact, wind has the largest cost variance of the three technologies in this case. Coal
is the least risky option. The covariance matrix has only non-zero entries. In terms
of the expected cost,  i, wind is still the most expensive technology, followed by coal
and then nuclear. The reason is that technical change has reduced the cost of wind
too little, while coal and nuclear prices have not risen substantially. In particular,
 nuclear <  coal <  wind, while σcoal < σnuclear < σwind.
8 It is clear that this leads to
an outward shift of the eﬃcient frontier: the minimum possible variance is no longer
equal to 0, but positive. The minimum variance portfolio with the highest expected
7The planning period has been adjusted accordingly, so that production takes place for
an equally long period of time to ensure that the outcomes remain comparable.
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The cost-risk trade-oﬀ shifts outwards, as time progresses.
Figure 5.2: Eﬃcient Frontiers for Investment at t=0, t=5 and t=10 (top to
bottom)
cost is dominated by coal, but has also nuclear and a small share of wind. However,
coal and wind are phased out, as the share of nuclear grows towards a share of 100%
for the minimum cost portfolio.
The third panel is based on cost distributions arising when the plants are installed
in the tenth year. This further increases the variance of wind, but brings its expected
costs almost down to the level of coal-ﬁred capacity, while nuclear is still least costly
compared to wind and coal but also more expensive in absolute terms than before
(when investment occurred immediately). The expected costs can thus be ranked as
 nuclear <  coal ≤  wind. The variance is generally higher, but the ranking remains
the same: σcoal < σnuclear < σwind.
9 With this characterization in mind it is no
surprise that, from left to right, the portfolio starts out with 67.67% coal, 31.25%
nuclear and 1.08% wind for the minimum variance portfolio. As more variance is
accepted, coal and wind are phased out in favor of nuclear. Again, the eﬃcient frontier
9σcoal,nuclear=0.000499, σcoal,wind=-0.009957 and σnuclear,wind=0.021038.136 An Integrated Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment
is shifted outwards.
Interestingly, the highest possible cost (i.e. the most upper left point on the eﬃcient
frontier) in this setting is higher than that of the second setting, while the ﬁrst setting
has the highest possible cost of all three “scenarios”. This can be explained by the fact
that technological change reduces the cost of wind at a slower pace than fuel prices
make coal and nuclear more expensive between year 5 and 10, whereas the opposite is
true for the period between year 1 and year 5.
In summary, larger variance – regardless whether generated through ﬂuctuating
fuel prices or stochastic rates of technical change – has a negative eﬀect on invest-
ment. More precisely, technologies with higher variance dominate the portfolio only
for minimum levels of expected cost. For positive rates of risk aversion, technologies
exhibiting lower variance are favored over more risky technologies.
5.3 The Vintage-Portfolio Approach
This version of the model is very simple and abstracts from uncertainty on investment
prices and fuel-saving technical change, since our main motivation here is to illustrate
the basics of the new approach and to compare it to the “standard” approach used in
the previous section.
5.3.1 The Setting
The investment framework uses a two-dimensional clay-clay vintage model. The ﬁrst
dimension is the technology-family dimension mentioned before, while the second di-
mension is the quality dimension, proxied by the installation time of a vintage. The
technology families are characterized by the type of fuel they use. Diﬀerent vintages
belonging to a family embody the diﬀerent states of the technology at the moment
they were installed.
An important feature that we are able to incorporate in our framework is the
dynamic nature of technological change: some technologies may have limited scope for
productivity growth, but that growth itself may be relatively certain to occur, while
other technologies seem to be highly promising in terms of productivity growth, but
also fairly risky in terms of the actual achievement of these promises. This suggests
that, from a longer-term perspective, in which uncertainties regarding technological
development become highly relevant, portfolio theory provides a suitable modeling
framework for investment in the electricity sector. Since we are dealing with physical
rather than ﬁnancial capital, we need to take into account that a physical capital
portfolio can change only gradually through investment at the margin, i.e. investment
in new vintages embodying the latest versions of a technology. Due to the ex post
sunk cost character of physical investment, it is necessary to adopt an intertemporal
perspective rather than the myopic perspective that is used in the type of model
outlined in the previous section. We do this by developing a simultaneous investment
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using the (expected) user cost of capital.
There are three types of costs to consider per family. The ﬁrst includes ﬁxed costs,
which depend on the amount of installed capacity. The second type is variable fuel
cost, based on the capacity actually used. The third type is quasi-rents forgone due
to capacity shortages that occur due to unexpected demand peaks, but we disregard
the latter item here for reasons of transparency.
10
5.3.2 The Vintage Model
We use several indexed variable names. The index f denotes a technology family
(characterized by its fuel type), the index v the moment in time at which the vin-





f are the (vintage) level of investment, capacity output,
actual output and fuel consumption per technology, respectively. We allow for embod-
ied capital-saving technical change at a proportional rate with a given expected value
and a given (expected) variance of that rate. For the development of the amount of









v,t measures the amount of capital still left of a vintage after (t − v) periods
of time have passed since its installation. In Equation (5.3.3), δ
f is the (constant)
exponential rate of physical decay. Hence Equation (5.3.3) states that the amount of
capital associated with a vintage installed at time (t−v) will fall at a rate of δ
f% per












In Equation (5.3.4) κ
f
v is the capital-output ratio associated with a vintage installed at
time v. Assuming zero ex post disembodied technical change, κ
f
v does only depend on
v. However, embodied capital-saving technical change takes place at a given expected
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where ˆ κf is the expected proportional rate of change of the capital-output ratio. The
fuel-output ratio ϕ
f will be ﬁxed at its initial level.
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10In Chapter 7, where we introduce diﬀerent demand scenarios, quasi-rents are lost, or
at least cost increases associated with excess capacity or an alternative technology family
composition of capacity installed and used become part of the investment decision.
11Fuel-saving technical change is a feature that we implement in the next chapter.138 An Integrated Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment
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Given the factor requirements above, there are now two problems to solve. The ﬁrst
concerns the question of how much to invest per technology family, given its speciﬁc
characteristics. The second problem is the timing of investment. Since investment
is irreversible ex post (i.e. capital costs are sunk), the investment planning process
should involve both forward-looking expectations as well as a measure of risk aversion
in order to accommodate this irreversibility. Therefore, we assume that producers
maximize the weighted sum of the expected present value (PV) of total cost and the
variance of that cost by composing their vintage portfolio in both the technology family
dimension and the quality dimension: as rational, risk averse investors they are able
to diversify risks by spreading investments both over technologies and time.
In order to calculate the portfolio variance of the PV of buying and using the
vintage portfolio, we ﬁrst describe how fuel costs are expected to develop and what
the corresponding variance of these expectations will be.
5.3.3 Expected Variance in Fixed & Variable Cost Com-
ponents
The two sources of uncertainty in this model thus emanate from fuel price growth,
which is distinctive of the corresponding technology families, and capital-saving tech-
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In Equation (5.3.8) ρ is the rate of discount and rv is the interest rate at the time
the vintage is installed. P
f is the cost of a unit of investment, which is constant. t
′
is an absolute moment in time within the planning period, i.e. 1 ≤ t
′ ≤ θ. Equation
(5.3.8) shows that depreciation charges are valued at historic cost-prices rather than
at replacement value.
12 Since there is no disembodied technical change ex post by
assumption, the capital-output ratio does not change once a vintage has been installed.
Q
f
t is the user price of a unit of fuel f used at time t. The price of fuels does not depend
on the vintage v, for which it is used. Hence, for all vintages v, Q
f only depends on
t. ϕ
f is the corresponding fuel-output ratio. Y
f
v is the total capacity of vintage v at




v,t′ is the amount of capacity of vintage v that is actually used at
time t
′.
12Note that a change in investment prices then aﬀects only the marginal vintage in a
technology family, as opposed to changing fuel prices that would aﬀect all vintages in a
technology family at the same time. So valuation at historic cost-prices introduces a qualitative
diﬀerence between capital and fuel costs that would partially vanish if capital would be valued
at replacement costs. Of course, there would still be the qualitative diﬀerence arising from
capital costs being associated with capacity installed and fuel costs with capacity used.The Vintage-Portfolio Approach 139
In order to calculate the variance of the PV of total cost as given by (5.3.8), it
should be noted that for constant expected values (and forecasting errors) of the growth
rates of fuel prices and capital coeﬃcient, a ﬁrst order approximation of Equation
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where the “S-terms” are the sums of the forecasting errors for the corresponding vari-
ables associated with a technology family over time. Note that ˆ κ
f is the rate of



















j , and where
ε
x,f
j is the forecasting error for variable x associated with technology family f for time
j. In Equation (5.3.9), ˆ Q
f is the expected growth rate of fuel prices for technology
family f. All forecasting errors ε
x,f





3,t′ – the only error sum not depending on v. After simplifying
Equation (5.3.9) it can be used to calculate the (approximated) expected forecasting
error in the PV of total capital and fuel costs. The expectation of its squared value
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where min(v1,v2) represents the minimum of v1 and v2, and where k1,k2 = 1...3 refer
to the variables ˆ κ
f, r, and ˆ Q
f respectively, corresponding to technology families f1
and f2. The “C-terms” in (6.6) are deﬁned in terms of the “S-terms” associated with
(5.3.9). For further details, see the appendix.
5.3.4 The Objective Function
As stated before, we assume that producers minimize a weighted sum of the expected
PV of their total production cost and its corresponding variance.
Φ = PV + λ   var(PV ) (5.3.11)
where λ is the relative contribution of the variance of the PV of total costs to the
objective function. We will further assume that λ is a nonnegative constant and refer
to it as the risk aversion parameter.
Producers minimize (5.3.11) by choosing the optimum values of both initial vintage
capacity, Y
f
v , per family f for all vintages to be installed during the planning period
and a corresponding production plan X
f
v,t for each planned vintage to be installed.
13 ˆ ϕf and ˆ Pf will be constant at zero.
14It should be noted that the forecasting errors in the interest rate are really independent
of the technology family. However, for uniformity of notation we act as if they do depend on





v,t are chosen conditional on the expected values and (co)variances of the
stochastic variables in this setting, i.e. fuel price growth and the proportional rate of
change of the capital coeﬃcient due to embodied technical change.
The full model now consists of the objective function (5.3.11) that needs to be
minimized subject to Equations (5.3.9) and (6.6), where (5.3.9) is evaluated for all
“S-terms” equal to zero in order to obtain the expected value of the PV of total cost.
For each vintage in each technology family, we also have to consider that actual output
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v,t′ ≥ Dt′ (5.3.13)
where t
′ again refers to an absolute moment in time within the planning period, i.e.
1 ≤ t
′ ≤ θ. We assume that demand will be rising at a moderate, but continuously
positive rate, which is realistic for the majority of OECD countries over the next
coming decades.
5.3.5 Results and Interpretation
The results that we obtain from the vintage-portfolio model demonstrate very clearly
that this framework does not only allow for diversiﬁcation over technologies, but also
for the fact that there are diversiﬁcation eﬀects over time and vintages. In Figure 5.3
the initial composition of the capacity stock is imposed. In particular, it is assumed
that most of the existing power plants are coal-ﬁred, while only a small portion is
nuclear. Renewable energy is not used at all. We see that coal is then phased out over
time. However, coal becomes unattractive rather quickly and the performance of wind
improves at a relatively slow pace. Moreover, it has been noted in the previous section
that the rate of technical change that applies to wind is volatile. Therefore, we can
observe that nuclear energy temporarily dominates the portfolio. In fact, the share of
nuclear rises well into the second half of the planning period and is only reduced after
period 30. It is thus only in the last ﬁve years of the planning horizon that wind picks
up and starts to be the primary technology in the generating portfolio.
The more than exponentially rising trend that can be observed in the last years,
might be misleading at ﬁrst glance. It arises because of the low capacity factor of wind
capacity. To meet increasing demand, relatively more wind capacity than previously
coal or nuclear capacity needs to be installed.
15
Figure 5.4 displays the development of net investment. In particular, the existing
stock of coal-ﬁred capacity is scrapped slowly, which is presented as small amounts
of negative net investment. Net investment in nuclear is positive, but not excessive.
15In other words, eﬀective capacity would not show this increase in the last ﬁve years.The Vintage-Portfolio Approach 141
Scrapping of nuclear and abandonment of the remaining coal-ﬁred capacity occurs
only when wind is phased in on a larger scale.
The dark area is coal, the light one is nuclear and the medium one is wind.
Figure 5.3: Evolution of Capacities in the Base Run
The dark area is coal, the light one is nuclear and the medium one is wind.
Figure 5.4: Net Investment in the Base Run
In the light of practical constraints such as space requirements and peak load
demands that will be diﬃcult to cover in times of calm, it is of course not realistic
that wind would take over such a large proportion in a large producer’s, region’s or
country’s energy mix. However, we have already pointed out that these results serve
illustrative purposes and should not be taken at face value. Wind stands representative
here for a number of renewables with similar characteristics as in Table ?? and could be
seen as a basket of technologies rather than a single one. The Figure thus shows clearly
that nuclear is used as a placeholder for wind, as coal is phased out. Wind outperforms
the other two technologies because of its zero fuel price growth and thus also zero fuel142 An Integrated Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment
price risk after a suﬃcient “amount” of technological change has materialized. Please
note that – here as well – as large amounts of coal that are scrapped and nuclear
capacity are replaced by wind capacity, more of the latter needs to be installed than
is scrapped of nuclear and coal due to the low capacity factor.
16
The dark area is coal, the light one is nuclear and the medium one is wind. Deviations are
absolute. The negative deviations in wind investment in periods 31 and 32 are due to the fact
hat no investment occurs in the experiment in these years, while it was positive then in the
base run.
Figure 5.5: Deviations from Base Run Net Investment for Less Coal Price Un-
certainty
Figure 5.5 displays the deviations from base run investment when coal price volatil-
ity is zero: coal is no longer scrapped, but there is indeed positive net investment into
coal – a development, which goes at the expense of nuclear capacity in the beginning.
The transition to wind still occurs during the same time as in the base run. The
diﬀerences are that (a) nuclear is no longer an important placeholder and gets phased
in much later than in the base run and (b) wind does not dominate the generating
portfolio at the end of the planning period, but comprises less than 50% of the mix,
while coal is still quite important and nuclear also occupies a share of little less than
a third. In summary, fuel price uncertainty is negatively related to investment.
17
16Another factor that contributes to the investment spike at the end of the planning period
is an echo eﬀect, which arises because coal and nuclear have expected technical lifetimes of 30
and 35 years respectively. Note that extending the planning period will change the picture,
since a longer investment and production horizon opens up new opportunities that the rational
investor will also make use of. However, in accordance with Ku (1995) 30-40 years is the typical
investment horizon in electricity capacity planning, which is why we refrain from analyzing
the very long run at this point. Furthermore, we will add another term to the total cost
function, which will remove the bias to install relatively capital-intensive technologies towards
the end of the planning period (because they will be used for a shorter period of time) in
Chapter 7 and ongoing research is occupied with implementing rolling planning horizons (see
e.g. Wagner and Berman (1995) for an application of rolling planning horizons to capacity
expansion planning) in order to further investigate this issue.
17Additional experiments have shown that a complete transition to wind requires a muchThe Vintage-Portfolio Approach 143
The dark area is coal, the light one is nuclear and the medium one is wind. Deviations are
absolute.
Figure 5.6: Deviations from Base Run Net Investment for Less Nuclear Tech-
nological Uncertainty
With respect to technological uncertainty we ﬁnd a positive relationship in the be-
ginning. In Figure 5.6 net investment into nuclear power generation equipment, which
has zero volatility in technical change in this experiment, deviates negatively from base
run investment in the beginning of the planning period with larger upward deviations
only in the second half of the planning period. The negative deviation in period 31
might seem contradictory to the conclusion that technological certainty provides an
incentive for investors to wait and reap the beneﬁts of technical improvements that
are now more certain to materialize. However, we should not forget the role of nuclear
as a placeholder for wind in this context. Wind will still be developed enough to take
over around year 30, so if more nuclear has been installed before, some needs to be
scrapped in favor of wind, which will still make up about half of the portfolio in the
ﬁnal year, while the other half will be composed of nuclear capacity.
18 In summary,
certainty about technological change depresses investment today for the sake of higher
investment at a later point in time, which can be seen as a negative tradeoﬀ between
minimum cost and variance. Overall, when taking the time dimension into account,
the uncertainty-investment relationship is thus still negative: the energy mix will be
composed of a larger share of nuclear energy in the end, even though investment will
ﬁrst be lower than in the base run.
longer planning horizon. The patterns of investment remain the same – only the role of nuclear
as a placeholder is somewhat reduced, since coal and nuclear are otherwise quite similar.
18Please note that the upward deviation of coal in year 32 should not be mistaken for
positive net investment. Coal is completely phased out already earlier in this experiment,
while in the base run a signiﬁcant amount of coal was scrapped in year 32. With a net
investment of zero in the experiment at hand, the deviation from the base run must be
positive.144 An Integrated Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment
5.4 Evaluation and Comparison of the Two Ap-
proaches
Both frameworks – the vintage-portfolio model in Section 5.3 and the M-V approach
in Section 5.2 have two advantages in common. First, they both account for the gains
from diversiﬁcation. By combining technologies or technology families with diﬀerent
expected costs, variances and other characteristics it becomes less costly and more
secure to produce a certain amount of electricity. A portfolio framework is therefore
not only well suited to explain diversiﬁcation, but also to analyze the tradeoﬀ between
risk and return (or in this case the tradeoﬀ between risk and cost). Both approaches
are thus particularly useful for large investors or for the optimization of a region’s or
country’s generating portfolio.
However, the above analysis has also revealed that the new vintage-portfolio model
has a number of advantages over the standard Markowitz approach as used in the stud-
ies presented in Table 5.1 and in Section 5.2. Most importantly, the M-V framework as
traditionally applied to energy investment is inherently static and myopic with respect
to potential future developments, whereas the combination of portfolio selection and
vintage modeling allows for a dynamic setting. This is particularly important when
we want to investigate the eﬀects of technological change and the uncertainties asso-
ciated with the same. As the discussion of Figure 5.1 shows, neither technical change
nor its volatility enter the cost distribution generated in the Monte Carlo simulation,
which we use to calculate the (co)variances and expected costs as an input for the
M-V model. The width of the distribution of coal-ﬁred and nuclear capacity depends
exclusively on the variance in fuel price growth and wind has no distribution at all
because it does not use fossil fuels.
19
In a somewhat artiﬁcial exercise we have tried to circumvent this shortcoming
by computing the present value of total (unit) costs when the investment is made
at diﬀerent points in time.
20 Wind has also volatile costs then, which is due to the
diﬀerent realizations of technical change and thereby capital coeﬃcients that have
been generated in the Monte Carlo simulation. The result in terms of the portfolio
optimization is that the share of wind in the total generating portfolio is low and
decreasing along the eﬃcient frontier because it still has relatively high costs, but
also a much higher variance now. This implies that technological uncertainty has a
negative eﬀect on investment in the M-V framework.
21
19Remember that the PV underlying the Monte Carlo simulation has the form
E{PV [UTCi]} = CC0 + 1
(1+r)t−1 ·
 T
t=0 FCt, i.e. there is only one instance of CC at
the beginning of the planning period.
20If this exercise would be repeated for each time instance of the planning period, we could
compute a net investment series from that, showing the amount of capacity that should be
installed or scrapped to give the optimal mix of technologies. However, keep in mind that this
would not account for the irreversibility of investment and most likely result in an infeasible
strategy.
21In addition, this is not desirable from a low-carbon-policy point of view. Policy makers
interested in promoting the use of renewables would want investors to take the eﬀects that
technical change will have on future costs into account in order to see some attractiveness in
technologies that might otherwise still seem expensive.Evaluation and Comparison of the Two Approaches 145
In the vintage-portfolio model the opposite is true. Here, technical change is
embodied and this leads to the result that lower uncertainty about the rate of technical
change triggers less investment into the concerned technology because it pays oﬀ to
wait and reap the beneﬁts of ongoing technological improvements that will happen
with higher certainty now. In other words, there is a positive relationship between
technological uncertainty and investment in the beginning, which is due to the value
that waiting has in the face of embodied, ongoing technical change. Even though we
have modeled technical change in the same way – namely as an increasing but volatile
reduction in the capital coeﬃcient – in the M-V framework, it can neither account for
the dynamics nor for the full embodiment eﬀect of technical change and can thus not
incorporate the beneﬁts from waiting. This can also be seen as an “implicit option
value”. Real options theory is also dynamic and explicitly values the investment option
by asking how much could be gained by postponing investment. However, as we have
seen in Chapter 4, technological uncertainty is related negatively to investment in
the real options model we use there. The reason is that uncertainty is modeled by a
small arrival rate compensated for by larger cost reductions. This makes it valuable
to wait for the next arrival because technical change is again embodied in the latest
equipment.
Another advantage of the vintage-portfolio model that arises from its dynamic
nature is that it diversiﬁes not only across technologies, but also across time or – more
speciﬁcally – vintages.
22 Sometimes it pays oﬀ to keep older equipment and machinery
if improvements are to be expected for other technologies. In this chapter it has proven
useful to invest into nuclear capacity just to bridge the time, during which wind would
become more proﬁtable, for example. Such strategies cannot be found with static
M-V portfolio selection. An investment is seen as a once-and-for-all opportunity and
is either exercised or discarded for good.
23
Furthermore, the M-V framework presented here (but also the studies summarized
in Table 5.1) use covariance matrices and expected returns or costs based on empirical
estimates (e.g. Awerbuch, 2006) or computed from Monte Carlo simulations like we do
(e.g. Roques, 2006). While this might entail interesting information for large investors,
it is important to note that this does not ensure that individual investors and power
plant owners behave optimally. Exercising an investment option at once does not take
into account the beneﬁts from waiting for technological improvements, for example.
In the Monte Carlo simulations conducted in this paper it is assumed that investors
compose their portfolio at once in the ﬁrst year. However, waiting some time would
decrease the costs of wind and thereby increase its attractiveness, so investment in
year 1 might not have been optimal. Fortin et al (2007) overcome this shortcoming by
using a real options model that ensures that the return distributions that they use to
compute the inputs for their portfolio model are the result of optimizing behavior.
22In addition, this feature allows us to form a much more realistic model of the electricity
sector taking into account diﬀerences in initially installed capacity stocks, for example. This
is much less straightforward in the static framework.
23The best one can do, is to ﬁnd optimum portfolios at diﬀerent points in time and interpret
developments with the help of these results, but this is of course not a straightforward and
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The same paper uncovers another disadvantage of standard M-V portfolios, which
rely on their ﬁrst two moments: mean and variance. This is no problem as long as
the distributions are normal. Fortin et al (2007) examine all their marginal return
distributions and the joint distribution making use of the corresponding copulas.
24
Results from estimating a restricted symmetric version of a fairly ﬂexible copula show
that the null hypothesis of symmetry can be rejected most of the time. This seems to be
clear evidence of non-normality in the total joint return distribution and thus implies
that the M-V approach is often not appropriate. In response to these ﬁndings, the
authors recommend the use of other risk measures than the variance – in particular
the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR).
25 While such considerations are beyond the
scope and interest of our comparison exercise, it is important to keep this in mind for
further research in this ﬁeld.
Finally, the new vintage-portfolio model naturally accounts for the irreversibility
of investment through its clay-clay vintage structure: it can only be updated at the
margin by either scrapping or replacement of technically decayed equipment. Because
standard M-V models only look at a portfolio at a speciﬁc point in time, they cannot
incorporate irreversibility and the eﬀects it might have on the composition of the
portfolio because they rely on low or zero adjustment costs. Also by looking at M-V
portfolios at diﬀerent points in time this shortcoming cannot be overcome.
5.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed three hypothetical technologies or technology families
that have the cost structures of coal-ﬁred capacity, nuclear generators and wind-based
equipment. To this end we have employed two diﬀerent approaches: the new vintage-
portfolio model, which will be expanded in the following chapter, and the “standard”
Markowitz approach, which has (re)gained popularity in electricity applications lately
(see Table 5.1).
The vintage-portfolio model has delivered two main insights. (1) Nuclear energy
might be used as a bridge between a capacity portfolio dominated by fossil-fuel-ﬁred
technologies and an energy mix relying on renewable energy carriers. Even though
we have abstracted from carbon penalties and emission caps in this study, it is clear
that environmental considerations will only add more substance to this insight. (2)
Technological uncertainty will lead to larger investment in the beginning and a lower
portfolio share of the concerned “asset” only later in the planning period, whereas fuel
price uncertainty has a clear, negative eﬀect on investment.
Furthermore, it has become very clear that it is the dynamic nature of the vintage-
portfolio framework that allows for such conclusions and that it therefore outperforms
24The copula is that part of the joint distribution function, which captures everything
describing dependence (after factoring out the marginal distributions). See e.g. Nelsen (2006)
for a background on the use of copulas.
25According to Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000, 2002) the β-CVaR is the conditional expec-
tation of losses above an amount α, where β is a speciﬁed probability level. This measure is
therefore particularly useful when return or cost distributions have fat tails.Summary and Conclusion 147
the static M-V model used in Section 5.2 on various accounts (see Section 5.4). We
have found that the eﬃcient frontier shifts outward as time progresses, which is in
line with expectations. Such exercises of evaluating portfolios at diﬀerent points in
time can be used to – partially – overcome the disadvantages of the static framework.
However, these points in time are chosen arbitrarily and do not correspond to optimal
timing of investment decisions as in a real options model, for example.
We conclude that static Markowitz portfolios are not appropriate if we want to
analyze the eﬀects of dynamic processes such as technical change and the uncertainty
surrounding it. The omission of (the diﬀusion aspect of) technical change and the
uncertainties surrounding it is one explanation why other M-V studies ﬁnd that more
renewable energy should have been installed, which has not happened in reality. In
our M-V analysis where investment occurs at the beginning, risk averse investors
would even go so far as to adopt a portfolio, which relies exclusively on wind. When
we impose a later investment date, this picture changes dramatically, as the cost of
installing a wind farm becomes very uncertain due to volatility in the rate of technical
change. The vintage-portfolio model, on the other hand, can capture such features,
accounts for irreversibility of investments and is thus suitable to develop more eﬃcient
investment programs and production plans. Diversiﬁcation is not only possible across
the available “assets”, but also across existing vintages and between installed capacity
and capacity that is yet to develop. The vintage-portfolio model is therefore not only
conceptually more suitable for investment analysis in the electricity sector, but it is
also – more importantly – closer to reality.148 An Integrated Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment
Appendix
Equation (5.3.9) can be simpliﬁed by noting that the sums of all the error terms
should be relatively small in absolute terms. This holds a fortiori for terms containing
products of those sums. We can now approximate (5.3.9) by assuming terms containing
products of at least two sums of error terms to be equal to zero. In that case, the
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Equation (A.3) deﬁnes the expected forecasting error in the PV of total costs over
the entire planning period in terms of the individual error terms associated with the
stochastic variables in the model. It should be noted that the “weighting parameters”,
C
f
k,v, depend explicitly on the capacity choices and (ex ante) production plans that
need to be formulated at the beginning of the planning period. The actual values that
these choice variables will indeed depend on the forecasting errors of the stochastic
variables if we would be using an objective function that depends not only on the
expected value of the PV of total costs, but also on the (expected) variance. This
variance is calculated as the expectation of the square of the error-term given by
(A.3):Appendix 149
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The ﬁnal step in calculating the variance of the PV of total costs is to deﬁne the
covariances between the diﬀerent sums of error terms, S
f
k,v. These obviously depend
on the covariances between the individual error terms regarding the forecasts of the
rates of technical change, but also the rates of growth in fuel prices, as well as changes
in the interest rate. With respect to these covariances, we assume ﬁrst that they are
constant over time, and secondly that the forecasting errors are serially uncorrelated.
Hence, deﬁning σ
f1,f2
k1,k2 as the covariance between the contemporaneous error-terms
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where min(a,b) represents the minimum of a and b, and where k1,k2 = 1...3 refers
to the variables ˆ κ
f, r, and ˆ Q
f respectively, corresponding to technology families f1
and f2. The minimum function arises here, since under our assumption of zero non-
contemporaneous correlation between error terms, two forecasts for the same variable
for two diﬀerent points in time in the future v1 and v2, can be correlated with each
other only through their common “history”. Hence, when both forecasts are formu-
lated at time zero and counting time from time zero, the time-length of their common
history would be the minimum of v1 and v2.
In order to simplify simulation (and interpretation) matters even further, we have
assumed that all individual variables are uncorrelated.
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26Typically, the growth rates of fuel prices associated with diﬀerent families would be





In the previous chapter, we have sketched a very basic version of the new vintage-
portfolio approach. Even this relatively simple framework already helps to gain new
insights about investment planning in the electricity sector and has proven to have
several important advantages over standard portfolio models approaching electricity
planning. It is therefore worthwhile to expand the model to allow for diﬀerent types of
costs and also to take into account the diﬀerent types of technical change that aﬀect
electricity-generating equipment.
More precisely, what has been disregarded in Chapter 5 is that not only fuel
prices ﬂuctuate, but that investment prices might be uncertain as well. Even more
importantly, technical change has been modeled so as to be capital-saving, which was
improving the relative attractiveness of the renewable technology greatly. However,
there is also fuel-saving technical change, which beneﬁts the traditional, fossil-fuel-
using technologies by improving their fuel-output ratio. In other words, the parameter
ϕ
f in the previous chapter is most probably also dependent on the vintage. By reducing
the amount of fuel that is used to generate the same amount of electricity, the variable
costs of fossil-fuel-ﬁred power plants can be decreased as well, which might lead to a
later transition to renewable energy, which can then be developed and reﬁned for a
longer period of time.
Incorporating fuel-saving technical change and the corresponding uncertainty and
∗This chapter is based on the submitted working paper “Investing in Energy Conversion
Technologies – An Optimum Vintage Portfolio Selection Approach” by van Zon and Fuss
(2005).
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stochastic investment prices does not only serve the purpose of making the framework
more realistic and applicable to investment problems in the electricity sector, but also
sheds further light on the underlying mechanisms at work in the new model. We
therefore refrain from adding even more features to the model for now and also rely
on theoretical exercises with stylized data rather than implementing this version of
the model with real-world data already. The next chapter will overcome this omission
and provide a broader framework, which is the tested with UK data.
We ﬁnd that the distinction between uncertainty in investment and fuel prices
and in capital-saving and fuel-saving technical change is indeed important, since they
trigger a diﬀerent investment response. In particular, less fuel price variance leads to
larger investments immediately and also later on capacity is increasingly replaced by
a larger fraction of the more technology that is more secure in terms of fuel prices.
For less variance in investment prices, we observe an immediate drop in investment
into the concerned technology, but then large upward deviations, which decrease over
time. This diﬀerence in response to uncertainty in diﬀerent types of costs has to
do with the fact that fuel prices matter for production on all vintages and therefore
also the installed ones, while investment prices are only important for equipment that
is to be installed now or in the future. A similar mechanism is at work when it
comes to the diﬀerent types of technical change, where we ﬁnd a negative response
to less uncertainty in both cases at ﬁrst, but then increasingly positive deviations
in investment in the case of fuel-saving technical change and decreasingly positive
deviations in the case of capital-saving technical change.
An experiment with asymmetric technologies illustrates again the gains from di-
versiﬁcation across technologies and vintages. This exercise also serves to investigate
the eﬀects of increasing risk aversion and lays the foundation for the more complex
analysis in Chapter 7.
The setup of the rest of the chapter is as follows: in the next section we provide
a brief outline of the model. Section 6.3 is devoted to a number of illustrative model
simulations. The ﬁnal section summarizes and evaluates the new insights from the
extended model.
6.2 The Vintage-Portfolio Model With Uncer-
tain Investment & Fuel Prices and Capital-
& Fuel-Saving Technical Change
The model has the same structure as the model developed in the previous chapter.
The only diﬀerence is that the fuel-output ratio will no longer be constant and the
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again the capital-output ratio associated with a vintage installed at time v. Assuming
zero ex post disembodied technical change, κ
f
v grows at a given expected proportionalThe Vintage-Portfolio Model With Uncertain Investment & Fuel Prices and
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where ˆ κf is the expected proportional rate of change of the capital-output ratio. By
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Given these changed factor requirements, we can now rewrite the present value
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with the same notation as before. Note that P
f
v is no longer constant, but depends on
v now as well.
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j , and where ε
x,f
j is the forecasting error for variable x associated
with technology family f for time j.
1 So there are two additional error sums due to
the inclusion of volatile, fuel-saving technical change and investment prices. Recall
that ˆ κ
f is the expected rate of capital-using technical change, which now also applies
for ˆ ϕ
f.
2. All forecasting errors ε
x,f
j are again assumed to have zero expectation.
Equation (6.5) can be used again to calculate the (approximated) expected fore-
casting error in the PV of total capital and fuel costs; the expectation of its squared
















k1,v1   C
f2
k2,v2   σ
f1,f2
k1,k2   min(v1,v2) (6.6)
where min(v1,v2) is the minimum of v1 and v2, and where k1,k2 = 1...5 refer to the
1Equation (6.5) is again evaluated for all “S-terms” equal to zero in order to obtain the
expected value of the PV of total cost.




f, r, and ˆ Q
f respectively now, corresponding to technology families
f1 and f2. The computations are the same as in the previous chapter’s appendix.
Again, producers minimize the weighted sum of the expected PV of their total





Φ = PV + λ   var(PV ) (6.7)
where 0 ≤ λ is the risk aversion parameter.













v,t′ ≥ Dt′ (6.9)
where t




In order to illustrate the portfolio principles involved in the most transparent way pos-
sible, we want to avoid any eﬀects that could arise from asymmetries in the character-
istics of the technology families at ﬁrst. Also, we choose to focus on three technology
families because – on the one hand – this already provides very interesting insights,
while on the other hand remaining simple enough to present the model outcomes in a
tractable manner.
In the symmetric, three technology families case, where the cost of investment and
fuels, capital and fuel coeﬃcients and initially installed capacity are all equal between
families, we indeed ﬁnd a portfolio that is evenly spread across families. However,
this only occurs if investors are risk averse (λ > 0). Otherwise, the distribution of
investment across families appears to be totally random, even though total investment
is the same in all cases, as it is implicitly deﬁned by the total demand constraint.
To explain the source of randomness, one should realize that in the absence of risk
aversion and under complete symmetry, all technology families are perfect substitutes
for each other, and so there are inﬁnitely many optimum investment portfolios.
The even distribution of investment over technology families for λ > 0 is caused
by the convexity of the objective function that arises due to the inclusion of the
variance term. As, roughly speaking, the variance of the total cost associated with
each technology family depends quadratically on the size of the family, we have a
lower total portfolio variance if capacity is distributed over all families rather than
being concentrated in just one of them. After all, this is how risk diversiﬁcation in a
traditional portfolio setting works. The evenness of the investment distribution simply
arises due to the imposed symmetry.
Given this basic setup, we conduct a sensitivity analysis concerning the responsive-
ness of investment behavior towards changes in the variances of the stochastic variablesModel Simulations 155
associated with just one of the families, thus breaking the symmetry between fami-
lies.
3 Before discussing these results, note that the valuation of investment at historic
cost prices causes a signiﬁcant qualitative diﬀerence between fuel price variance ex-
periments and capital cost variance experiments. Higher fuel price variance at some
moment in time aﬀects all vintages within a family that are in existence at that time,
whereas higher capital cost variance at a point in time only aﬀects the vintages bought
from that period on, just like more uncertainty about the productivity growth rate
at some point in time does not aﬀect the vintages installed before that period. In
that sense, capital cost variance and embodied technical change variance have some
features in common with respect to the timing of investment.
6.3.1 Experimental Setting
For the experiments we have used a 30-year planning period. This is in line with real
investment considerations in the electricity sector.
4 Initial prices are 1 for investment
and 0.1 for fuels,
5 whereas the rate of interest is 10%, the discount rate is 5% and the
rate of technical decay 8%.
Please note that these “data” do not correspond precisely to any real world tech-
nologies and serve the mere purpose of illustrating how the new methodology works.
Evidently, real world technologies are never completely symmetric as will be seen in
the extension and application of the new framework to electricity generation in the
UK in Chapter 7.
The expected rates of embodied factor-saving technical change are equal to 0.1%.
The variance in expected capital cost and fuel price growth is 0.01, and the variance
factor in productivity growth is equal to 0.01 as well. Variance in interest rate growth
is left aside for the ﬁrst experiments because interaction eﬀects lead to less clear-cut
results, even though they remain qualitatively the same. Finally, total demand is equal
to 10 growing by 3% per year. At the beginning of the planning period, installed ca-
pacity is equal to 10 as well, and evenly distributed over the three technology families,
while in a real world situation the amount of fossil-fuel-ﬁred generators generally out-
strips other technologies by far. Such considerations have been taken into account
already in Chapter 5 and will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 7.
6.3.2 A Reduction in Fuel Price Variance
A zero variance in fuel price growth of TF1
6 (all else equal) brings investment into
that family forward in time at the expense of investment in the other two technology
3These results are obtained for zero covariances between expected price growth and ex-
pected rates of technical change, both within and across technology families, even though this
model has been speciﬁed for the non-zero covariance case, again because this makes the results
more transparent.
4Ku (1995) claims a period of 30 to 40 years to be a typical investment horizon in electricity
capacity planning (page 73).
5This is to make the capital and fuel cost of the same order of magnitude, since we use
the user cost of capital and therefore multiply investment prices with (r +δf), which is of the
order of 0.1.
6TFi is short for “technology family i”.156 Technological & Price Uncertainty in the Vintage-Portfolio Model
Figure 6.1: Deviations of Net Investment for Zero Fuel Price Growth Variance
in TF1
families. This is illustrated in Figure 6.1, which shows the percentage deviations of
net investment relative to the base run. This ﬁnding is in line with the standard
results known from portfolio and real options theory, i.e. we also ﬁnd a negative
relationship between uncertainty and investment in this case as we did in the previous
chapter. Facing higher uncertainty associated with investment in some technology
family, investors will reduce investment in that family, since the risk-adjusted returns
fall, which is the typical portfolio result. In real options theory terms, the value of
waiting and postponing investment in that technology family is reduced if uncertainty
decreases.
When fuel-saving technological change makes it gradually more proﬁtable to install
new vintages, we see that the positive deviations increase again, making the portfolio
biased towards the more secure technology. In general, however, we can conclude that
the investment portfolio is reshuﬄed over both the family and the quality or vintage
dimension. In this particular case, the quality of the aggregate capital stock falls due
to the fact that aggregate investment in the more secure technology is brought forward
in time.
6.3.3 A Reduction in Investment Price Variance
For the experiment with zero variance in the rate of growth of investment prices we
ﬁnd the opposite eﬀect at the beginning of the planning period: less investment into
the more secure technology, but then a gradual increase above base run investment
from period 5 on.
This postponement in investment can be explained by the diﬀerence in inﬂuenceModel Simulations 157
Figure 6.2: Deviations of Net Investment for Zero Investment Price Growth
Variance in TF1
that investment prices and fuel prices have on total cost. Fuel prices aﬀect production
costs on all existing and future vintages, while investment prices are only important
for the next vintage to be installed. Therefore, it is proﬁtable to always have more
investment into a technology that has less variance in fuel price growth, whereas for
less investment price volatility, it pays oﬀ to have less investment ﬁrst and more later
on, since investors can then proﬁt from better developed technologies – as technologi-
cal change continues to take place – as long as investment prices will not exceed their
expected values dramatically. There is a tradeoﬀ involved here that is not inherent in
the fuel price experiment, however: as investors wait to install new vintages, invest-
ment prices continue to grow and this will eventually more than outweigh the beneﬁt
of falling unit capital requirements to produce the same amount of electricity because
of embodied capital-saving technical change at a certain point in time. This is the
reason why we see the positive deviations in Figure 6.2 decline over time.
6.3.4 A Reduction in the Variance of Embodied Capital-
Saving Technical Change
The same mechanism is at work when we conduct the experiment for less variance
in the rates of capital-saving technical change: it pays oﬀ to wait until some of this
technical change (that is now more certain to occur) has materialized. However, the
longer investors postpone investment, the more costly it becomes in terms of higher in-
vestment prices and more certain productivity gains foregone, which is why we observe
a decrease in positive deviations towards the end of the planning period.
This is again very diﬀerent from “standard” mean-variance portfolio selection and158 Technological & Price Uncertainty in the Vintage-Portfolio Model
Figure 6.3: Deviations of Net Investment for Zero Variance in Capital-Saving
Technical Change of TF1
contrasts with real options theory as well. The latter predicts that less uncertainty
lowers the option value of waiting, and hence that investment has to take place sooner
rather than later. We have seen in the real options model in Chapter 4 that while
embodied technological change itself leads to a preference for investment later in the
planning period, technological uncertainty only intensiﬁes these incentives for post-
ponement because producers feel it is worthwhile to wait for a major technological
breakthrough if the arrival rate of innovation is low but potential improvements large.
6.3.5 A Reduction in the Variance of Embodied Fuel-Saving
Technical Change
For more certain fuel-saving technical change in TF1, we see the opposite from what
we have observed in the fuel price growth case: a postponement in investment, even
though the technology gets more “secure” in portfolio terms. This is because fuel
prices are important for operations on all installed and future vintages, while technical
change matters only for the latest vintage to be installed. The eﬀect is still diﬀerent
from more certain capital-saving technical change, as can be seen in the increase in
positive deviations over the course of the planning period. This can be explained by
the fact that there is no such tradeoﬀ involved here as with investment prices. Fuel
prices also grow, but they have to be paid for all existing vintages, so it always pays to
have as much investment as aﬀordable towards the end of the planning period implying
that less fuel has to be bought to operate the latest vintages, whereas the old ones
consume as much fuel as before, getting gradually more expensive.Model Simulations 159
Figure 6.4: Deviations of Net Investment for Zero Variance in Fuel-Saving Tech-
nical Change of TF1
6.3.6 An Asymmetric Case
We have now collected some qualitative theoretical results – namely that fuel price
uncertainty and investment are negatively related, as could have been expected from
the analysis in the previous chapter. Furthermore, we have found that this relationship
does not hold for investment prices because investment and fuel cost aﬀect the total
cost structure in quite diﬀerent ways. The same is true for capital-saving and fuel-
saving technical change, where a reduction in the uncertainty surrounding either of
the two leads to less investment in the beginning and more later on, which might
seem to be at odds with standard portfolio and real options theory at ﬁrst glance,
but is completely rational in our model given the cumulative but marginal nature of
technical change. We can now turn to a more interesting case, where we introduce an
asymmetry between technologies.
Table 6.1 presents the parameter values we have used in the asymmetric case,
where TF1 and TF2 are relatively similar. The main diﬀerence is that TF2 uses more
expensive fuels, with a fuel price variance that is greater than that of TF1. TF3
is diﬀerent from the others in that it has low capital productivity, high unit capital
costs, but low fuel prices and relatively strong rates of capital- and fuel-saving technical
change. However, for TF3 technological expectations with respect to capital-saving
technological change are more uncertain than those of TF1 and TF2.
The technologies can thus be characterized as follows: TF1 and TF2 are established
technologies with limited scope for productivity improvements, possibly representing
fossil-fuel-based conversion methods, such as coal-ﬁred capacity (high capital costs,
low fuel costs as with TF1) and gas-ﬁred capacity (high fuel costs, low capital costs160 Technological & Price Uncertainty in the Vintage-Portfolio Model
Parameter TF1 TF2 TF3
κ0 1.0 1.0 1.5
ϕ0 1.0 1.0 1.5
p0 1.5 1.0 1.7
q0 0.10 0.15 0.05
ˆ p 0.05 0.05 0.05
ˆ q 0.10 0.10 0.10
σ2
ˆ p 0.01 0.01 0.01
σ2
ˆ q 0.10 0.15 0.10
ˆ κ -0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0035
ˆ ϕ -0.0010 -0.0025 -0.0035
σ2
ˆ κ 0.15 0.15 0.30
σ2
ˆ ϕ 0.15 0.15 0.30
Table 6.1: Parameter Values
as with TF2). The variance of the growth in fuel costs in TF2 is considerably higher
than that in TF1, which is comparable to gas and coal again. The third technology
family is expensive in terms of capital costs, does not cost much in terms of fuels,
and has plenty of scope for technological improvements (even though it is not certain
whether it will live up to these promises) and may thus represent a promising, yet
underdeveloped technique based on a renewable resource such as biomass.
Not surprisingly, for the case of zero risk aversion displayed in Figure 6.5, we
ﬁnd that net investment (negative values refer to scrapping) is initially completely
focussed on TF1, and only after TF3 has suﬃciently improved, it is phased in. TF2
is not considered at all, although being more “secure” than TF3. However, since the
variance has zero weight in this case, this does not increase TF2’s value.
Figure 6.5: Base Run Investment With Zero Risk AversionModel Simulations 161
However, from the description of the data above, we know that TF3 should look less
attractive for investors, who are risk averse. The variance associated with technological
change is high compared to the other two candidates. By increasing the weight of the
variance in total cost in the objective function, we can investigate what happens to
the investment portfolio as investors begin to care more about the risks involved in
their investments.
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show that not only the spread across technology families in-
creases, as λ rises, but that there are also strong eﬀects with respect to the distribu-
tion of investment over time. In particular, we observe that most of the investment
is brought forward in time, the more risk averse investors grow. This is in line with
our ﬁndings from the symmetric case. The more investors dislike uncertainty, the
lower the “option value” of waiting. They rather invest in the beginning, when they
face relatively certain circumstances, than wait and be confronted with less favorable
and unexpected outcomes over the course of the planning period. If they are very
risk averse, they would even go so far as to invest into capacity only at the begin-
ning of the planning period, have a huge degree of underutilization during most of
the planning period, and start investing only marginally again at the very end of the
planning to make up for depreciation and demand growth (cf. Figure 6.7).
7 Note that
TF3 capacity in Figure 6.7 is actually scrapped in the end (negative net investment).
This is because TF3 is still not superior to TF2 and TF1 in terms of fuel and capital
coeﬃcients, even though its rates of improvement have been higher.
Figure 6.6: Base Run Investment With Moderate Risk Aversion
In Figure 6.6 that corresponds to the low risk aversion case, we see that TF3 is
phased in a little earlier, but in much more modest amounts than without risk aversion.
This is a rational choice when looking back at Table 6.1. TF1 is less volatile than TF2
7This makes even more sense in the case where fuel costs represent only a small fraction
of total costs, and little cost savings can be gained by waiting for cumulative embodied fuel-
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and TF3. However, its prospects of technological improvement are not as positive as
the those of the others. On the other hand, TF3 starts out with very unfavorable
fuel and capital coeﬃcients and has volatile technical change. Therefore, TF2 is now
used as a sort of “bridge” between the TF1-biased portfolio and an investment plan
that focusses more on TF3, which is the same phenomenon we have observed in the
previous chapter for the “nuclear-like” technology family. Here, it becomes even clearer
that TF2 hedges the risks emanating from TF3, while the latter is developing a cost
advantage over TF1. This resembles the present interest of phasing in nuclear energy
again in countries like the UK to buy some necessary “research and development time”
to be able to make the switch towards renewables as low-carbon policies become more
stringent.
For reasons of completeness, Figure 6.7 shows investment behavior in the case of
relatively strong risk aversion. In that case, all investment takes place under the most
certain circumstances, i.e. at the beginning of the planning period.
Figure 6.7: Base Run Investment With High Risk Aversion
From the exercises above, we conclude that portfolio selection is a useful analytical
tool to investigate investment choices in a context of uncertain embodied technical
change – in the sense that it generates a priori intuitive results, that are to some
extent “richer” than the results one would obtain from a “standard” portfolio model
without a vintage framework, as has been worked out in detail in the previous chapter.
We found that if we let one technology family diﬀer from the others by having higher
expected rates of technical change, but if at the same time there is uncertainty that
this technical change will indeed be realized, investors will prefer this family only if
they are not risk averse. Additionally, we have shown that there are not only portfolio
eﬀects across technologies, but also across time and vintages. The intertemporal eﬀect
does not exclusively depend on discount rates, but also on the degree of risk version.
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between the diﬀerent types of costs andSummary and Conclusion 163
technical change, since the uncertainty surrounding them triggers diﬀerent investment
patterns over the course of the planning period.
6.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have extended the basic vintage model of portfolio investment de-
veloped in the precious chapter, so that there are not only two but four sources of
uncertainty regarding future costs. We make a distinction between ﬁxed and variable
production costs. The ﬁxed costs are associated with investment. They are only ﬁxed
ex post but variable ex ante, and need to be decided upon in the context of an invest-
ment portfolio problem that involves simultaneous investment in multiple production
technologies or technology families in a wider sense. Each family is deﬁned using a
vintage setting that allows for technological improvements to have cost-reducing ef-
fects through embodied technical change. However, realization of these potential cost
reductions requires investment, which is why we have chosen to develop an intertem-
poral, variance-adjusted, minimum cost function that borrows elements from ﬁnancial
optimum portfolio theory.
The four sources of uncertainty are the volatility of user prices of fuel and capital
and the volatility of productivity changes of the same. Our experiments have shown
that the reaction of the model to changes in technological and investment price uncer-
tainty is qualitatively diﬀerent from its reaction to changes in fuel price uncertainty.
A decrease in uncertainty favors current investment in the case of lower fuel price
uncertainty, but it favors future investment in the case of a reduction in technological
and investment price uncertainty.
The reason for this seemingly “perverse” reaction is that a decrease in the variance
of the rate of technical change provides an incentive to actually postpone investment.
The latter enables the power plant owner to reap the productivity beneﬁts of the cu-
mulative nature of technical change that continues regardless of the rate of investment,
i.e. the uncertainty surrounding the beneﬁts of waiting decreases. In other words, the
initially negative but later positive relationship between investment and uncertainty
derives from the fact that the investor will be able to reap the beneﬁts of technical
change that will continue on regardless of people’s individual investment actions.
Reductions in the uncertainty surrounding the variable costs of operating a vintage
(i.e. fuel costs) have the expected eﬀects. We observe an increase in investment in
the technology, which has become less risky to operate and a decrease in the installed
capacity of the other technologies.
Furthermore, in performing the simulation experiments we found that a change in
the temporal distribution of investment generally also changes the technology family
distribution of investment, and vice versa, because both dimensions become intercon-
nected in this setting. The new approach therefore adds to the existing mean-variance
portfolio applications to real investments by adding a dynamic perspective to an oth-
erwise myopic framework. In this way it becomes possible to analyze the eﬀects of
inherently dynamic processes (like technological change) and the uncertainty surround-164 Technological & Price Uncertainty in the Vintage-Portfolio Model
ing them. While this is in line with what we have found in the previous chapter, this
chapter’s contribution is more in the distinction between the investment responses to
changes in uncertainty in fuel and investment prices and in fuel-saving and capital-
saving technical change.
First, the diﬀerence in the investment response that less investment and fuel price
uncertainty trigger can be explained by the diﬀerence in inﬂuence that investment
prices and fuel prices have on the composition of total cost: whereas fuel prices aﬀect
production costs on all vintages that have been installed and will be installed, invest-
ment prices only matter for the vintages to be installed from now on. Less fuel price
uncertainty is thus always beneﬁcial and should trigger more investment immediately,
while less investment price volatility should only result in more investment later on
when investors can beneﬁt from better developed technologies, as technological change
continues to occur. With respect to the diﬀerent behavior in investment subsequently,
one has to notice that there is a tradeoﬀ involved with investment prices that does not
apply to fuel costs – namely that investment prices continue to grow while investors
are postponing investment. So the beneﬁt of falling unit capital requirements to pro-
duce the same amount of electricity will be exceeded by higher investment costs at a
certain point in time. Consequently, for the case of less investment price volatility, we
see a decrease in the positive net investment deviations from the base run over time,
while the opposite is true for less fuel price uncertainty.
Second, a similar picture can be observed in the cases of less variance in fuel-saving
and capital-saving technical change: while both experiments ﬁrst depress investment
in favor of higher investment in the future, less uncertainty in capital-saving technical
change leads to gradually decreasing positive deviations from the base run due to the
tradeoﬀ described above, whereas less variance in fuel-saving technical change leads
to increasingly positive deviations from base run investment. The explanation for the
latter is that fuel prices are incurred on all existing vintages, so it is beneﬁcial to
invest as much as possible towards the end of the planning period because it means
that producers have to buy less fuel to operate the latest vintages. The old vintages
consume the same amount of fuel as they always have been (ex post, no substitution
is possible in a clay-clay vintage setting), but newer vintages allow for increasing cost
savings.
Finally, let us emphasize the parallels with Chapter 4 here. In that chapter we
incorporated uncertainty about technical change and fuel prices into a real options
model. We found that technological uncertainty led to a postponement of investment
because the option value of waiting increased substantially in response to a less cer-
tainty about the arrivals of innovations that would reduce investment costs. Please
note that we also have an “implicit option value” in the vintage-portfolio model: its
value derives from the cumulativeness of (exogenous) technical change. If it is not
certain when or whether this technical change will materialize, the value of waiting for
it decreases, which leads to the opposite result than in the real options model.
8 Fuel
8Technical change itself, however, leads to later investment also in the real options model,
which shows that there are similar embodiment eﬀects at work.Summary and Conclusion 165
price uncertainty, on the other hand, shows a similar eﬀect in both frameworks. Note
that this occurs for diﬀerent reasons again: in the portfolio model, more uncertainty
about fuel prices makes the corresponding technology unattractive because variance
is valued negatively in the objective function, whereas in the real options model it is




Change Policy in the UK
7.1 Introduction‡
In this chapter we extend the vintage-portfolio framework sketched out in Chapter 5
and further developed in Chapter 6 and apply it to investment in the UK electricity
sector with a special focus on the eﬀects of climate change policy.
During the 1990s the UK electricity mix, which up to that time had mainly been
based on coal-ﬁred capacity, became more diversiﬁed as the share of gas in fuels used
for power generation started to rise. At the end of the 1990s the share of nuclear
energy fell substantially, which was due to more frequent outages at nuclear power
stations for repairs, maintenance and safety case work. By 2004 still less than 4% of
all electricity produced in the UK came from techniques based on renewable energy.
The fraction of electricity coming from oil-ﬁred generators had been falling from the
late 1970s on and was negligible by the year 2004. Figure 7.1 illustrates the current
UK electricity mix.
Figure 7.2 shows that, over the last decades, CO2 emissions from power generation
have been decreasing, while electricity production has continued to increase. This
favorable trend was mainly due to the switch from coal to gas, eﬃciency improvements
‡This chapter is an updated and extended version of the submitted working paper “Irre-
versible Investment under Uncertainty in Electricity Generation: A Clay-Clay-Vintage Port-
folio Approach with an Application to Climate Change Policy in the UK” by van Zon and
Fuss (2006).
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Figure 7.1: 2006 UK Electricity Generation Mix
at the plant level and – over the last few years – an increasing contribution of nuclear
and renewable power to the overall electricity mix. However, greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions are a stock externality, and there is now wide agreement that further GHG
emissions will lead to considerable (and potentially irreversible) damages related to
global warming.
1 The Stern Review (2006) provides ﬁrst estimates of the economic
costs of the envisaged warming: “With 5-6
◦C warming – which is a real possibility
for the next century – existing models that include the risk of abrupt and large-scale
climatic change estimate an average 5-10% loss in global GDP, with poor countries
suﬀering costs in excess of 10% of GDP.” (Stern, 2006).
2 Consequently, UK policy
makers have taken up the challenge of realizing further emissions reductions and have
set out clear goals in a ﬁrst Energy White Paper in 2003, which has recently been
updated – or rather replaced – by the Energy White Paper 2007 (DTI, 2007a).
In line with the European Council’s climate change and energy package from March
2007, the UK has adopted the target to reduce GHG emissions by 30% by 2020 com-
pared to 1990 levels with a view to reducing them by 60% to 80% by 2050. To this
end, two instruments are emphasized to be of particular importance for policy makers
in the Energy White Paper (2007): (1) Capping and trading, which means that a cap
is ﬁxed for emissions, which determines the number of emissions permits that are then
traded.
3 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the ﬁrst implementation of this
principle and actively prices CO2 emissions for the ﬁrst time. The UK sees this as
a step forward to provide incentives to investors to improve energy eﬃciency and/or
invest into “green” energy. (2) Since 2002, the UK has been following a policy of pro-
moting renewable energy through the so-called Renewables Obligation (RO), which
12◦C is already thought to be a critical threshold, beyond which dangerous climatic con-
sequences can be expected (see e.g. Azar and Rhode, 1997). For more information about the
climate and the eﬀects of its change see Chapter 1.
2Chapter 1 analyzes the relationships between the economy/the electricity sector, the
climate and the government in more detail.
3See Chapter 3 for more background to the debate about cap and trade schemes versus
taxes.Introduction‡ 169
Source: DTI (2007b).
Figure 7.2: Power Station Emissions of Carbon Dioxide
requires electricity retailers to eventually acquire at least 10% of their electricity from
renewable sources.
4 Currently, at a level of 6.7%, this percentage has been updated
to reach 15.4% by 2015 in the new Energy White Paper and to remain at that level
until 2027, with an option to raise the level up to 20% if necessary (DTI, 2007a).
5
Due to technological uncertainties with respect to the development of renewable
technologies and high capital and O&M costs, investors in the electricity sector may
still be reluctant to adopt renewable technologies on a large scale, even though they
may have to expose themselves to a higher degree of fuel price risk by doing so.
By carefully composing a portfolio of technologies with diﬀerent (co)variances in the
respective price changes and rates of technical progress, producers have an opportunity
to eﬀectively hedge these kinds of uncertainties. This implies that producers generally
opt for a mix of technologies including such that are still in a relatively immature state
of development.
4See Mitchell et al (2006) for more information on the RO, and – more importantly – a
comparison between its risk reduction potential and that of the German feed-in tariﬀs. Edge
(2006) provides a detailed overview of the renewables industry and the involved policies in
the UK.
5The levels of envisaged CO2 savings from the RO might seem low relative to the total
level of required reductions. One might argue that e.g. large-scale hydropower techniques
are already very advanced and could easily provide a larger share of the electricity mix.
However, there is actually very little scope for any additional large-scale hydropower systems
as suitable sites are scarce. Therefore, any additional capacity relying on hydro techniques
must be small-scale. Likewise, the resources for some biomass technologies are limited, e.g. for
landﬁll gas. Furthermore, importing crops for biomass-ﬁred electricity generation is often not
economically viable, while at the same time such imports would also cause emissions related
to transportation that will reduce net potential savings. Without further improvements in UK
crop yields, it is therefore fair to assume that not much more than 20% of electricity demand
can be met by biomass technologies, which already take up the lion’s share of renewable energy
production nowadays. Similarly, wind will not constitute a higher share than 10% of demand,
since there is not much scope for expansion (at least not onshore; with the advancement of
oﬀshore wind turbines, this picture will deﬁnitely change) and it cannot be relied upon during
times of calm because storage possibilities are limited.170
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More speciﬁcally, they will try to avoid downswings in the aggregate return to
investment (or – in the setting of the two previous chapters – upswings in the cost
of installing and operating generation equipment) and therefore a portfolio approach
is ideal to determine the optimal investment strategy. In order to account for the
underlying dynamics, where technical change is typically embodied, we use an extended
version of the vintage-portfolio model developed in Chapter 5 and expanded in Chapter
6 to allow for uncertainties in diﬀerent cost items and diﬀerent types of technical
change. For the sake of realism and applicability to the UK electricity sector we
add a number of other features here: emissions, demand uncertainty, the diﬀerence
between peak and base load technologies, physical constraints for maximum installable
capacity, and policy measures such as emission caps and the Renewables Obligation.
This enables us to implement several important aspects of UK climate change policy.
Even though we are using a rather limited data set,
6 our preliminary ﬁndings are
roughly in line with current investment outlooks. Our ﬁnding that nuclear energy
might serve as a bridge to a more sustainable electricity mix, for example, is not in
contrast with the projections by the DTI (2007a). This is also consistent with the
views of a rationally behaving, risk averse investor.
The chapter is further organized as follows. Since the relevant literature has already
been reviewed in Chapter 2 and summarized and further analyzed in Chapters 5 and
6, we immediately proceed to the setup of our model in Section 7.2. Afterwards
presenting the results, potential implications for policy makers are addressed before
concluding.
7.2 The Vintage-Portfolio Model
7.2.1 The Basic Framework
The basic framework of the vintage-portfolio model is the same as the one described
in the previous chapter. In other words, Equations 6.1 to 6.3 remain unchanged. The
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Equation (7.1) resembles Equation 6.4, but for the new term ψ
f




which reﬂects the share of initial investment outlays that can be regarded as the
6Data were assembled from diﬀerent sources, such as Anderson and Winne (2004), the
DTI (2007b), the EIA (2006), and some sources had be aggregated. Furthermore, data on
technical change and fuel price growth projections are often only suggestive and even though
they serve the purpose of illustrating our new method perfectly, we want to warn against
mistaking the investment patterns we compute with our framework as an exact prediction.
7Typically, fuel and capital costs are the most important cost-items in electricity produc-
tion. As we just want to illustrate our points, we continue to leave out other cost-items like
maintenance for reasons of simplicity.The Vintage-Portfolio Model 171
discounted
8 ﬂows of factor payments (i.e. interest and depreciation charges) for the
years from t until the end of the planning period. The rest of the notation and
assumptions are unchanged from Chapter 6. Note that Y
f
v,t will decrease due to
depreciation, and it therefore limits actual output on a vintage v at time t, i.e. X
f
v,t,
in accordance with X
f
v,t ≤ e




In order to calculate the variance of the PV of total cost as given by (7.1), we have
made several simplifying assumptions. The ﬁrst one is that the (constant) discount
rate also reﬂects the required internal net rate of return on investment. The second
one is that forecasting errors are serially uncorrelated, and that (co)variances of the
growth rates of fuel and investment prices, but also of the rates of fuel-saving and
capital-saving technical change, are constant. In that case, it should be noted that for
constant expected values of the growth rates of prices and capital and fuel coeﬃcients,
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j , and where ε
x
j is the forecasting error associated with variable x for time j.
This is again similar to Equation 6.5 apart from the term including ψ.
Equation (7.2) can now be used to calculate the (approximated) expected forecast-
ing error in the PV of total capital and fuel costs. Given that N is the set of stochastic
variables, i.e. N = { ˆ P, ˆ κ, ˆ Q, ˆ ϕ}, while n1 and n2 are “running” elements of this set,
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where min(t1,t2) represents the minimum of t1 and t2. σ
f2,n2
f1,n1 is the covariance be-
tween the growth rates of the diﬀerent stochastic variables n1 and n2 for technology
families f1 and f2.




t2 are deﬁned in terms of the
actual control variables of the problem, i.e. investment in individual vintages of dif-
8These ﬂows during the period t...θ are discounted back until time t. The term e−ρ t then
takes into account further discounting costs until the beginning of the planning period, i.e.
time zero. Note that for an inﬁnitely long horizon, the share would approach a value of 1,
whereas for a very short horizon – the shortest one possible being 0 for investment taking place
in the ﬁrst year after the planning period – the share is equal to zero. So, for t approaching
θ, the share is falling towards zero. For further details see Appendix A.
9These inequality constraints are explicitly taken into account in the determination of the
optimum technology portfolio.
10In the actual calculations we will assume that all covariances are equal to zero, as we
have only relatively little data at our disposal to measure these covariances properly, and our
immediate purpose is to illustrate the working of the model. This has the added bonus of
considerably speeding up the calculations. We implement this by requiring that n2 = n1 and
f2 = f1 for all values of n1 and f1. See Appendix B for further details.172
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ferent technology families and the corresponding production plans for those vintages.
Appendix B provides the calculations leading to Equation 7.3.
7.2.2 Additional Features
In order to increase the degree of realism of the model, we have included a number
of new features into the basic framework of Chapter 6. First of all, it is not just
prices and technical change that are uncertain in this model, but also demand is no
longer assumed to be known with certainty. The risk of facing higher demand than
expected, is captured by the introduction of two demand scenarios, a low demand
scenario (1.5% growth, which is the standard extrapolation of known trends) and a
high demand scenario (2.5% growth). Weighing both scenarios by their probabilities,
we can determine the optimum value of investment that needs to be undertaken in
order to be able to meet demand in all circumstances. The revised demand constraints
















Second, additional capacity may not be installed without bounds, as mentioned
above. In the case of hydroelectric utilities, for example, the UK has almost reached
maximum installable capacity, i.e. there are not enough suitable sites left to realize
additional investments. Therefore, investment is constrained here by the estimates
for maximum installable capacity. We have implemented this here by including the












t is the maximum value of aggregate capacity by technology family and R
′
is the set of renewables.
Third, there are diﬀerences across technology families with respect to their tech-
nical characteristics. While coal-ﬁred turbines, for example, have capacity factors of
80% and more, wind energy and solar techniques depend on external circumstances,
that do not allow them to produce electricity continuously, and can thus not be used to
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where CF
f is the maximum capacity factor associated with technology family f.
Fourth, we make a distinction between base load and peak load technologies, where
typically coal, nuclear and renewables are used for base load production, whereas gasThe Vintage-Portfolio Model 173











′ is the set of technologies suitable for peak lead production (in our case only
gas) and where pl is the fraction of demand to be regarded as peak load demand. More
precisely, Equation (7.7) is a production constraint, where the highest peak determines
the required capacity peak load supply, and the average peak load size (amplitude and
duration) determines cumulative production under peak load circumstances (and the
corresponding partial underutilization of peak load capacity).
Fifth, by means of the Renewables Obligation, the UK government “promotes”
the actual production of at least some electricity using renewable fuels. We want to










where γ is the minimum share of renewable energy in total demand, which was initially
set at 10% by the government at the beginning of this decade, but which will probably
become stricter judging from the new Energy White Paper (DTI, 2007a).
11
Finally, as environmental concerns pertain for an important part to (cumulative)
CO2 emissions, we have included these in the model, too. In this way we can see
what the introduction of emission caps would mean for the technology composition
of the electricity production portfolio and the timing of investment without further
specifying the design of taxes or permit trading systems needed to realize such a cap.
12














i equal to emissions of type
i per unit of fuel consumption in technology family f, caps on emissions constrain
emissions in the following way:
e
s
i,t ≤ capi,t (7.9)
where capi,t is some exogenously imposed time path for emissions of type i.
7.2.3 Finalizing the Model
For a given demand scenario, indexed by s, we assume that producers want to minimize




s + λ   var(PV
s), (7.10)
11Of course, both Equation (7.4) and Equation (7.8) could have been formulated in terms of
expected demand instead of maximum demand. However, this would not change the results. If
anything, the current formulation makes the constraints more binding, which is not unrealistic
in the face of UK eﬀorts to intensify their renewables target, also for the sake of enhancing
energy security.
12The interested reader is referred to Appendix B for the technical details regarding the
formal implementation of these additional constraints on the technology portfolio.174
Extended Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment & Climate
Change Policy in the UK
where λ is the relative weight of the variance of the PV of total costs in the objective
function, as before. In fact Equation (7.10) is similar to Equation (6.7) except for the
adjustment for the respective scenarios.
Given the scenario-speciﬁc values of the objective function, the ultimate criterion
for the electricity investment program is the minimization of the expected value of
the variance-adjusted costs of buying new and operating total (i.e. both new and
old) capacity over the entire planning period, over all demand scenarios and over all
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s (7.11)
subject to all the constraints mentioned above. In Equation (7.11), πs is the subjective
probability of scenarios arising.
13 Furthermore, PV
s in (7.11) is evaluated using (7.2)
with all error sums set equal to zero in order to obtain the expected value of the PV
of total cost. Equation (7.3) is used to evaluate var(PV
s). In short, producers are
supposed to minimize (7.11) by choosing the optimum values of both initial vintage
capacity, Y
f
v , per family f for all vintages to be installed during the planning period,
and a corresponding production plan in terms of X
f,s





sen conditionally on the expected values and (co)variances of the stochastic variables
in this setting. It should be noted that capacity decisions are not scenario-speciﬁc,
whereas production decisions are. The reason for this is that capacity should be suﬃ-
cient to meet demand in all of the scenarios, in part through ex post variations in the
rate of capacity utilization.
7.3 Simulation Results
7.3.1 Technology Characterization
Before we describe the outcomes of the various experiments, we want to broadly cate-
gorize the various production technologies in terms of the growth rates and variances
of their capital and fuel costs, but also in terms of the growth rates of their capital
and fuel productivity and the corresponding variances. The technology characteristics
are summarized in Table 7.1.
14
Such a characterization will be of help to interpret the results obtained in the
various simulation runs described further below. It follows from Table 7.1 that the
13It should be noted that we could also introduce risk aversion at this level of decision mak-
ing, by amending (7.11) to include the variance in φs. For reasons of preserving tractability,
we have not done this here.
14A more precise representation of the data set can be found in Van Zon and Fuss (2006).
Most data have been taken from Anderson and Winne (2004), while the time series used to
compute the growth rates and variances mainly stem from the DTI (DTI, 2006, 2007b). The
growth and variance in κf have been calculated by looking at newly installed capacity and the
associated output, while the data for ϕf is computed as the amount of fuel used to produce
one unit of output.
15Due to lack of data the growth and variance of capital cost are assumed to be equal and
low (1%) for all technologies. n/r is short for “not relevant”. CF is the capacity factor.Simulation Results 175
Coal Gas Nuclear Hydro Biomass Biowaste Wind PV
Pf15 medium low high medium high high medium high
Qf medium high medium n/r medium low n/r n/r
ˆ Qf medium high low n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r
σ2
ˆ Qf medium high low n/r n/r n/r n/r n/r
ˆ ϕf low medium medium n/r high n/r n/r n/r
σ2
ˆ ϕf medium medium low n/r high n/r n/r n/r
ˆ κf low medium low low high high high low
σ2
ˆ κf low medium low low low high high high
CF high high high medium high high low low
Sources: Anderson and Winne (2004), DTI (2006, 2007b) and EIA (2006).
Table 7.1: Characterization of Technology Families
combination of low capacity factors and medium to high capital costs are likely to make
wind and photovoltaic generation unattractive substitutes for carbon-based technolo-
gies, but for the fact that they do not generate any CO2 emissions. In addition to
this, wind has a high variance in capital-saving technical change because the data also
take into account the less mature oﬀshore wind technologies. Biomass/biowaste has
similar cost properties as wind and photovoltaics, but the prospects of cost-savings
through technological change are more positive than for wind and photovoltaic gen-
eration. This also applies for the capacity factor that is an important determinant of
the eﬀective contribution of capital costs to total costs. Hydropower is an established
technology in the sense that there is little or no (capital-saving) technical change, but
also little variance in the same. Nuclear energy is a relatively secure technology with
respect to technical change, which is relatively slow but certain. This counteracts to
some extent the high capital costs, next to relatively low fuel costs and low variance in
the price-growth of nuclear fuels.
16 The latter does not hold for gas, which also suﬀers
from high capital costs. Therefore, gas can be expected to have a relatively low share
a priori. Also, even though technical change is relatively fast, it remains relatively un-
certain. However, with a CO2 emission cap, and given the fact that gas is a peak load
fuel, the share of gas in total electricity production must remain signiﬁcant. Finally,
coal is an “intermediate” type of fuel with medium capital and fuel costs and medium
or low rates of technical change and variances of those rates.
16Please note again that this analysis refers exclusively to technical and fuel price risks,
while the share of nuclear power plants in the national energy mix will always be inﬂuenced
by considerations of safety risks, decommissioning factors, nuclear waste disposal diﬃculties
and political commitment. Since our primary focus are technological and fuel price features,
we abstract from these risks, but keep in mind that they will probably have an adverse eﬀect
on the adoption of nuclear technologies.176
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7.3.2 Simulation Runs
In the following subsection we ﬁrst describe the base run, i.e. the outcomes associ-
ated with the investment program for a planning period of 30 years that ﬁts all the
constraints that were described in more detail before, except that it does not contain
a CO2 emissions cap yet. The base run has been performed with a value of λ = 0
implying that the variance of the cost of the entire investment program is not an issue.
The base run results are labeled R0 and they are discussed in more detail below. There
are four other runs, called R1-R4 that have the same parameter setting as the base
run with λ equal to 0.000015, 0.00003, 0.000045 and 0.00006.
17
The results associated with these runs are presented further below. They show
how increasing risk aversion inﬂuences the optimum composition of the capital stock
in terms of technology families. Furthermore, we present a run that is based on a
value of λ = 0.000015, i.e. R1, and on a CO2 emission cap deﬁned by the emission
path that grows at a constant proportional rate from a level of 150 MtCO2 to a level
that is about 25% lower than in R0 at the end of the planning period, i.e. to a level of
(1 − 0.25)   350 = 245 MtCO2. Section 7.3.3 contains run R6 with λ = 0.000015 and
twice the expected variance in the growth rate of gas prices, from the beginning of the
planning period. Finally, Section 7.3.4 contains the results of run R7 that pertains
to a large shock in the variance of the rate of fuel-saving technical change for nuclear
energy. We do this to see whether renewables could take over, more or less on their
own, from nuclear energy under these circumstances.
The Base Run
These are the results for the base run, disregarding the variance in fuel prices and
rates of technical change by setting λ = 0. For the low growth (1.5%) demand scenario
(S1) and the high demand growth (2.5%) scenario (S2), we have plotted the actual
production shares for both scenarios, as obtained in the base run.
In both scenarios, we start out with the same distribution over technologies in
the beginning. However, it is clear that gas-based generation takes over to meet the
additional demand in the case of the second scenario. This increased production from
gas-based electricity generation goes at the expense of coal-ﬁred capacity, but also of
hydropower and nuclear energy by a smaller margin. This can be explained by the
fact that gas has the lowest investment prices and can be installed at less additional
cost than any of the other technologies. This more than outweighs the disadvantage
of being more expensive in terms of fuel, since the high demand scenario has a much
lower probability of occurring than the standard scenario S1. Indeed, gas is also a
peak load fuel, and as such its higher share in S2 is not very surprising.
In Figures 7.5 and 7.6 we present the underlying capacity composition. Without
any risk aversion, the weight of the variance in the objective function is equal to zero.
In other words, all technologies become perfect substitutes, with gradually evolving
17It should be noted that at a value of λ = 0.000015, which might seem low at ﬁrst glance,
the standard deviation of total costs relative to total costs is of the order of 10%, which looks
like a reasonable order of magnitude a priori.Simulation Results 177
Figure 7.3: Production Shares for the First (Low) Demand Scenario
Figure 7.4: Production Shares for the Second (High) Demand Scenario
costs characteristics per fuel technology driving the intertemporal variations in the
composition of the technology portfolio. Total unit costs evolve according to increases178
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in investment and fuel prices, but may also shrink as a result of either capital- or
fuel-saving technical change. Other features that matter in this respect are related
to constraints on maximum installable capacity, peak and base load characteristics
and initial conditions (i.e. production using old vintages may continue as long as
variable (fuel) costs are lower than total unit costs on new vintages (this is essentially
Malcolmson’s scrapping condition, cf. Malcolmson, 1975).
Figure 7.5: Development of Capacity Shares
Figure 7.5 illustrates the points made above more clearly. Without risk aversion,
the technologies are perfect substitutes to the extent that one consistently invests in
the cheapest alternative, when the PV of total unit costs for one technology falls below
those of another one. In the beginning gas and hydro are the only technologies that
undergo some investment, which is observable from their increasing capacity shares.
The other technologies actually see a decrease in their capacity shares, which is due
to depreciation, so there is no net investment in those technologies.
One may wonder why wind and biomass do not constitute a higher share of capacity
here. This is in part due to the constraints that we have imposed on these technologies
(and also hydro). Since it has not proven economically viable to import biomass, while
domestic supplies will be limited in the future, we have applied an upper bound on the
use of this technology. Investment in wind occurs after technical change has suﬃciently
reduced capital costs. However, the share stays rather constant afterwards, for the
reason that we have excluded the much more expensive alternative of oﬀshore wind
turbines in this analysis, even though it becomes more and more infeasible to buildSimulation Results 179
Figure 7.6: Composition of Capacity
additional large-scale wind farms onshore, especially in the more densely populated
areas of the UK.
This leaves us with the composition of electricity generation equipment shown
in Figure 7.6. Overall, we can say that gas still constitutes the major share of the
electricity mix, followed by coal, whereas wind and biowaste have gained at the expense
of nuclear power, hydropower, biomass and solar photovoltaic generation.
Introducing Risk Aversion
In this section we present the results of introducing increasing risk aversion. Figure 7.7
displays the relation between variance and cost. We can draw ﬁve conclusions from its
shape: (1) The variance falls with increasing cost. (2) The variance is convex in costs.
(3) The variance-cost proﬁle deﬁnes the set of all (cost-)eﬃcient portfolios. (4) The
point of tangency between the variance-cost proﬁle and the objective function deter-
mines the optimum portfolio. (5) Greater risk aversion makes the objective function
ﬂatter, i.e. there is a tradeoﬀ between lower variance and higher total cost. These
results are quite intuitive from a standard portfolio point of view and show that a
portfolio approach combining irreversible investment and embodied technical change
still generates the type of results known from “standard” ﬁnancial portfolio theory as
introduced in Chapter 2.
In Figures 7.8-7.10 we show what happens to the shares of coal, gas and nuclear
in total capacity output, as the reduction in variance can essentially only be brought180
Extended Vintage-Portfolio Approach to Electricity Investment & Climate
Change Policy in the UK
Figure 7.7: Variance against Cost
about by a reshuﬄing of the technology portfolio and the associated production plans.
In Figure 7.8 one can see that the swings in the share of coal during the base run
are stretched out more evenly over time. Shares are lower at the end of the planning
period and higher at the beginning. For gas, shares fall structurally below the base
run in the beginning, picking up at the end again, thus also leveling out ﬂuctuations
in shares to some extent. However, one should recall that gas is a technology with
a relatively high variance both with respect to fuel price growth and with respect to
technical change. Hence, while smoothing out ﬂuctuations is always a good strategy
to decrease the variance, reducing the portfolio shares of high variance technologies is
especially good tactics in this particular case. In Figure 7.9 we see both principles at
work.
Figure 7.10 shows that risk averse investors would gladly accept nuclear power as
a “bridge” to a relatively carbon-free future. Of course, concerns about the negative
externalities associated with CO2 emissions should be weighed against the legitimate
concerns about the processing and quasi-permanent storage of nuclear waste material,
and the threats of micro-proliferation amongst terrorist groups. Nonetheless, nuclear
energy is widely regarded as a means to buy time to ﬁnd the ultimate solution to our
energy problems through carbon capture and storage from fossil-fuel-based generation
in combination with a more intensive use of renewables. Note from Figure 7.10 that
the lower the degree of risk aversion, the later the moment in time within the planning
period, at which people are starting to “build the bridge”. However, one should note
that they may want to postpone building such a bridge or abandoning it altogether if
the risks involved in decommissioning nuclear power plants would also be taken into
account, for example by introducing uncertain dismantling costs.Simulation Results 181
Figure 7.8: Capacity Shares Coal
Figure 7.9: Capacity Shares Gas182
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Figure 7.10: Capacity Shares Nuclear
Figure 7.11: Emissions
In Figure 7.11 we show the emissions corresponding to all runs. The Figure con-
tains the probability-weighted averages of total emissions in both demand scenarios
S1 and S2. The one in the base run (R0) generates the highest emissions at the end
of the planning period, mainly because coal is still an important portfolio ingredientSimulation Results 183
by then. This is shown quite clearly in Figure 7.11, where ﬂuctuations in emissions
follow those in the share of coal in total capacity quite closely (cf. Figure 7.8).
CO2 Emission Caps
We now combine R1 (for λ = 1.5   10
−5) with a cap on CO2 emissions. It should be
noted on beforehand that even a relatively slight degree of risk aversion generates a
reshuﬄing of the technology portfolio such that in R0, emissions at the end of the
planning period are signiﬁcantly lower than emission levels in the base run (by more
than 25%). This means that our time path for emissions – beginning at 150 MtCO2
and ending at (1 − 0.25)   350 = 245 MtCO2 – will not be binding at the end of the
planning period (see also Figure 7.11). However, it will be binding in the middle of
the planning period, as we can see quite clearly from Figure 7.12, in which the ﬂat
stretch of emissions for run R5 coincides with the emissions constraint being binding.
How the corresponding emission reductions are brought about can be seen from the
capacity composition in Figure 7.13.
Figure 7.12: Emissions With a Cap on CO2
Figure 7.13 shows the absolute diﬀerences between the percentage capacity shares
in runs R5 and R1. The carbon content of electricity production is decreased in period
6 through a simultaneous reduction in coal and an increase in gas. The more binding
the CO2 emission cap becomes, the more additional carbon-free capacity is installed –
in this case nuclear power. Then, as emissions are reduced anyhow from period 15 on
(see Figure 7.12), the technology distribution of power production almost reverts to
normal – except for the fact that the share of nuclear energy is slightly above the base
run, and those of gas and coal are correspondingly lower. This also leads to slightly184
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lower emissions at the end of the planning period, simply because once nuclear has
been installed it will remain for a relatively long time, since capital costs are sunk in
the beginning and old technologies are replaced by new ones only if the total unit costs
of the new technologies drop below the unit variable cost of the old technologies.
We see therefore that a temporarily binding emission constraint can induce semi-
structural emission reductions because the composition of the capital stock changes.
In addition, due to the ex post clay character of technologies themselves, the capital
stock only slowly adjusts to a situation where the caps are no longer binding.
18
Figure 7.13: Diﬀerences Between Capacity Shares in R5 and R1
7.3.3 Fuel Price Variance
In experiment R6 we increase the variance of fuel price growth by 100% for gas (λ =
0.000015). In order to see what such an increase implies, we have to compare runs R6
and R1, since in the latter case we do not have any CO2 emission caps either. The
absolute diﬀerences between capacity shares are presented in Figure 7.14.
It can be observed that the increase in gas price growth variance signiﬁcantly
reduces the portfolio share of gas. Biowaste and later on also coal take over, and –
after a slight dip in the middle of the planning period – nuclear energy is phased in as
well. At the end of the planning period, gas has become a very unattractive portfolio
component indeed, and coal and nuclear energy have taken over completely.
18This adjustment of the capital stock is occurring as quickly as technically feasible, since
the optimization program “knows” when the CO2 emission constraints will become non-
binding and can adapt ex ante to this situation.Simulation Results 185
Diﬀerences Between Capacity Shares in R6 and R1
Figure 7.14: Eﬀect of Larger Fuel Price Variance
7.3.4 Increases in Technological Variance
For technological uncertainty to have the largest possible impact, it is necessary to
implement it as increased variance in the rate of fuel-saving technical change, as fuel
consumption associated with a speciﬁc vintage is a continuous process, whereas invest-
ment takes place only at the moment of installation of that vintage. We have chosen
nuclear energy for increased uncertainty with respect to technological change, ﬁrst of
all because controlled fusion has been a technological promise for over 50 years – and
it still is. The second reason is that in our simulations, nuclear energy consistently
appears to be the “savior of last resort”. This leads us to wonder whether renewables
would stand a chance to take over this role if nuclear energy would become less attrac-
tive for some reason.
19 In order to shed more light on this issue we have performed an
experiment, in which we have increased the variance of fuel-saving technical change in
nuclear energy production by a factor of 100.
20
Run R7 is the same as R1, except for the shock in the variance of fuel-saving tech-
nical change. The results are presented in Figure 7.15. We see that the change in the
variance of technological progress in nuclear energy production, although implemented
from the beginning of the planning period, takes a while before it has an impact. This
19That could also happen through security risks or other channels that we have not included
here, of course.
20Since fuel costs are relatively unimportant in nuclear energy production as compared
to coal- and gas-ﬁred power plants, we need a relatively large shock for its eﬀect to become
noticeable.186
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is due to the fact that nuclear had not been invested in during the ﬁrst half of the
planning period in R1 in the ﬁrst place. Only from the period onward, where there was
investment in nuclear in R1 (i.e. in year 14), do we see a negative deviation from the
results with respect to R1 therefore. Also note the negative deviation in coal before
period 14, which is compensated by an increase in gas capacity. Since investors are
fully aware of the drop in nuclear at the beginning of the planning period already, and
they know that they will have to compensate this drop by investing more heavily in
coal, they actually have an incentive to decrease their installed capacity of coal earlier
on because this will enable them to install a larger amount of more modern and pro-
ductive vintages when the time has come to replace nuclear capacity. In other words,
by reducing the share of coal earlier on, investors create room for more advanced ca-
pacity later on. The gap is closed by gas, since gas has relatively low capital cost and
can therefore easily make up for the lack of coal in the short run. It should be noted
that this is perfectly inline with what we have found in the previous two chapters for
the impact of uncertainty on investment; only the extended model and inclusion of
more diverse technologies opens up more opportunities for the investor and triggers
interaction eﬀects of the kind just observed: now it is more beneﬁcial to immediately
decrease the share of nuclear in response to larger uncertainty rather than waiting to
do so and to decrease investment into its substitute earlier, so that more of the modern
vintages can be installed later on.
Diﬀerences Between Capacity Shares in R7 and R1
Figure 7.15: Eﬀect of Larger Technological VarianceThe Cost of the Renewables Obligation 187
This experiment is a good illustration of the mechanisms of the model, not only
in the technology dimension (i.e. diversiﬁcation over technology families leads to
substitution of coal for nuclear, which becomes less attractive through less certain
prospects of technical change), but also in the quality or vintage dimension: it pays oﬀ
to wait for ongoing technical change to take place and reap the full beneﬁts of being
able to install and operate higher quality vintages when investment becomes necessary
and thus to substitute investment in coal today for investment in coal at a later point
in time.
7.4 The Cost of the Renewables Obligation
What has not been analyzed so far is the cost, at which a measure like the Renewables
Obligation comes. It is very likely that producers will pass on the extra costs that
they need to incur in order to meet the target to end consumers, so both industry and
households will eventually face higher electricity prices as a result.
The new Energy White Paper (DTI, 2007a) itself states that the “[...] proposals for
changes to the Renewables Obligation [...] could add extra costs to ﬁnal consumer bills.
[...] the impact of the proposed changes to the Obligation could increase electricity
prices by around 2% in 2020, compared to the existing regime.” (page 289). We
therefore also want to investigate the magnitude of eﬀects from increasing the quota
beyond 10% in our framework.
To do so, we increase the Renewables Obligation by 1% and compare the results
back to the base run in order to compute the extra costs that this would impose on
producers and thus eventually on end consumers. What we observe is that total costs
do indeed exceed base run costs by more than 35 million dollars in both demand
scenarios. However, when we look at the variance of the portfolio, we see that the
11%-portfolio has a lower variance than the 10%-portfolio. This is due to fact that
more renewables in the energy mix always also imply less variance from volatile fuel
prices in the generating cost part. Therefore, the value of the objective function is
overall higher for the 11%-portfolio, but less so than would have been the case if the
variance had been disregarded. Moreover, from the point of view of the country as a
whole, a larger share of renewables also entails enhanced energy security because it
makes the country’s portfolio less dependent on fossil fuels. This is another point the
Energy White Paper (DTI, 2007a) emphasizes in various contexts.
Even though there are apparently advantages to increasing the Renewables Obli-
gation, however, the UK realizes that the costs to end consumers cannot be ignored.
In addition to the Renewables Obligation, other measures like joining the European
Trading Scheme for CO2 permits will exert further upward pressure on electricity
prices and consumers and industry need to be compensated for this in other areas,
although not many proposals have been advanced to that matter so far.188
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7.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented the outcomes of some simulations with an extended
version of the model developed in the previous two chapters. As before, it integrates
elements from optimum ﬁnancial portfolio theory with a clay-clay vintage model of
production for the electricity sector. The main novelties in this chapter’s model version
are the introduction of demand uncertainty through high and low demand scenarios
that are realized with diﬀerent probabilities, the addition of load proﬁles (peak load
versus base load technologies), the inclusion of capacity factors and physical constraints
on production capacity, the integration of cumulative emissions from electricity gen-
eration, accompanied by an emissions cap, and ﬁnally the allowance for a minimum
share of renewables as suggested by UK policy.
These extensions add signiﬁcantly to the realism and applicability of the vintage-
portfolio framework. In particular, it enables us to analyze existing trends in UK
climate change policy, which is nowadays exerting much more inﬂuence on investors
in the electricity sector than before. To achieve the goal of increasing the percentage
of renewables in the energy mix and curtail emissions in order to bring the rise of
cumulative emissions to a halt, so that potentially dangerous eﬀects can be dampened
and/or avoided, an ambitious policy framework has been set up, including the so-
called Renewables Obligation analyzed in this chapter. While we have focussed here
on a cap on overall emissions, it is important to note that such a cap will be realized
through a permit trading system. This implies that the price of a permit and thus
eﬀectively the price of CO2 will become asource of uncertainty as well. Such CO2 price
uncertainty has been analyzed in detail in Chapter 3 with the help of a real options
model, but could easily be implemented in a further extension of the vintage-portfolio
model, which could then also be reformulated to include electricity prices to allow for
the possibility that CO2 price spikes can (partially) be passed on to consumers (see
e.g. Reinard, 2007).
Using the present version of the vintage-portfolio model, we distinguish between
eight broad technology families, i.e. coal, gas, nuclear, hydro, biomass, biowaste, wind
and photovoltaic generation. We have performed a number of simulation experiments.
In particular, we ﬁnd that in the base run without any risk aversion, carbon emissions
in the UK electricity sector range from about 150 MtCO2 at the beginning of the plan-
ning period to 350 MtCO2 at the end of the planning period. For an increasing degree
of risk aversion we ﬁnd that expected costs will rise as well, whereas the expected cost
variance of the entire vintage investment program will decrease. The corresponding
standard deviation as a fraction of the expected costs also decreases. However, this
eﬀect diminishes for an increasing degree of risk aversion. As in ﬁnancial optimum
portfolio theory, we ﬁnd that the relation between the costs of the entire investment
program and the corresponding variance exhibits decreasing returns to variance: a
larger variance generates a less than proportionally higher rate of return in “ordinary”
portfolio theory, and in our case a less than proportionally smaller expected cost of
the investment program.
With respect to changes in fuel price growth variances or technological variancesSummary and Conclusion 189
the eﬀects are much more complicated to interpret than in our simple and illustra-
tive examples in Chapters 5 and 6. The eﬀect of technological variance now opens
up more opportunities than merely postponing the decrease in the concerned tech-
nology’s portfolio share. Furthermore, increased risk aversion reduces ﬂuctuations in
investment over time, as expected. We ﬁnd that with increased risk aversion, electric-
ity production becomes more diversiﬁed over technologies to such an extent even that
carbon emissions would be signiﬁcantly reduced, mainly by switching towards nuclear
energy production, rather than towards renewables.
21
When introducing a cap on CO2 emissions, nuclear energy turns out to be the
“savior of last resort”, but also gas increases in importance. “Punishing” nuclear
energy production by increasing its technological variance leads to gas and coal taking
over, rather than renewables gaining a higher share. We also ﬁnd that the anticipation
of a switch towards another technology in the future makes producers want to invest
less in that technology now and more in a substituting technology. In this way, they can
beneﬁt more from the cumulative nature of (ongoing) embodied technical change at the
moment they will actually execute the switch, which is plausible given the theoretical
insights gained in Chapters 5 and 6. Nonetheless, the fact that gas and coal will take
over from nuclear energy in this case, suggests that – given the admittedly crude data
set we have been able to use – none of the renewables is strong or promising enough
22
to take over from nuclear or coal in the medium term on its own. This implies that the
conclusions drawn in the ﬁrst part of the thesis – namely that large CO2 reductions
can only be attained through the help of active policy support such as CO2 taxes,
permit trading, subsidies for low-carbon technologies, etc – are also conﬁrmed from
the point of view of the new model.
For further research – that also extends beyond the UK case – it would be impor-
tant to obtain a data set that also includes the prospects for technologies with carbon
capture and storage possibilities, since it remains questionable whether countries pos-
sessing large fossil fuel resources will decline to use these and switch to renewables
instead.
21However, the level of risk aversion would need to be rather high for such a result to
become possible, so we cannot regard this as a very likely scenario.
22Some renewables such as hydropower are advanced enough to take up a larger share
of electricity production; however, hydropower is severely constrained through geographical
feasibility in the UK.190
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Appendix A: Irreversible Investment & Capital
Cost Adjustment with a Finite Planning Horizon
The assumption of a ﬁnite planning period implies that capital goods installed at
the end of the horizon are used for shorter periods of time than those installed at the
beginning, ceteris paribus. In terms of total costs, fuel costs will have a relatively large
impact on vintages installed at the beginning of the planning period, while capital costs
will mainly aﬀect vintages installed later. This depends on the notion that all capital
costs have to be expended at the time of the installation of the concerned vintage.
This is legitimate in case of an inﬁnite lifetime of equipment (and hence an inﬁnite
planning horizon) and if the interest and the discount rate match. In that case the PV
of all interest and depreciation charges adds up to total initial investment expenses.
We can thus simply assume that the total PV of interest and depreciation charge over
the remaining part of the planning period for a vintage installed at some point in time
during the planning period will represent the relevant (as opposed to total) capital
costs associated with the vintage under consideration. This assumption removes the
bias against installing relatively capital-intensive equipment at the end of the planning
period.
Let us ﬁrst assume that the interest rate is equal to the discount rate and thus
denoted by ρ. The rate of technical decay is δ. If depreciation at historic cost prices
has its impact at the end of a period, while interest payments also have to be made
at the end of a period, we can write the PV of the total ﬂow ψ(T,θ) of interest and
depreciation charger for a one dollar investment outlay at time T up to and including
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For θ → ∞, we ﬁnd that ψ(T,θ) → 1. For investment just after the planning period
has ended, i.e. for T = θ + 1, we ﬁnd that ψ(θ + 1,θ) = 0.Appendix B 191
Appendix B: Variance Calculations
We can obtain Equation 7.3 by noting that the expected forecasting error of the present
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Except for the ﬁnal term on the right hand side of Equation (B.2), the forecasting
error in the present value of investment and operating costs for technology family f
depends on a number of terms that themselves depend just on t. However, the last
term of the right hand side of (B.2) can be written as a sum of terms that also depends
on t only. In that case it is relatively straightforward to compute the variance of ε
PV f
.
To show this, we ﬁrst have to rewrite the last term as stated above. Dropping
the unchanging superscripts f and ˆ ϕ note that this sum can be reorganized in tabular
form as shown in Table B.1. From this Table one can immediately see that the sum of
all the elements in a given row can be expressed as a function of t only. Consequently,
the sum over all elements can be written as
 θ
t=0 St  
 θ
v=t bt,v.
v \ t 0 1 2 3 ... θ
0 b0,0 · S0 b0,1 · S0 b0,2 · S0 b0,3 · S0 ... b0,θ · S0
1 0 b1,1 · S1 b1,2 · S1 b1,3 · S1 ... b1,θ · S1
2 0 0 b2,2 · S2 b2,3 · S2 ... b2,θ · S2
3 0 0 0 b3,3 · S3 ... b3,θ · S3
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
θ 0 0 0 0 0 bθ,θ · Sθ
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where, as before, N is the set of stochastic variables for all technology families, i.e. N =
{ ˆ P, ˆ Q, ˆ κ, ˆ ϕ}, and n represents the individual elements of this set. The corresponding
forecasting error for the investment and operating costs over the entire technology
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Taking the expectation of (ε
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Under the assumption that the individual forecasting errors of all the stochastic vari-
ables are serially uncorrelated, whereas the contemporaneous co-variance of two dif-
ferent stochastic variables (indexed by {f1,k1} and {f2,k2}) is constant and given
by σ
f2,n2
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Since our main purpose is just to illustrate the principles involved, we have assumed
that all co-variances between diﬀerent variables are equal to zero in order to simplify
matters as much as possible. Hence, only the variances of the stochastic variables















min(t1,t2)   m
f1,n1
t1   σ
f2,n2





This thesis has contributed to investment decision-making under uncertainty and ir-
reversibility with particular focus on the transition towards a more sustainable mix of
electricity-generating technologies. The models introduced here do thus not only pro-
vide important insights for investors, but also for policy makers interested in curtailing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for the sake of a deceleration of global warming, who
therefore need to understand how investors respond to uncertainties, climate change
policy and other factors.
1 The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the main con-
clusions that have been drawn throughout the thesis and evaluate their signiﬁcance –
both from a theoretical and from a policy point of view.
We have started out in Chapter 1 by deﬁning the problems and characterizing
the stakeholders involved in investment decision-making in the electricity sector. The
ﬁrst player is obviously the electricity sector, which demands special frameworks for
its analysis because of its peculiarities – the uncertainties pervading the decisions of
investors and producers, the irreversibility of investment in the ﬁrst place and the
associated externality of GHG emissions. This brings us to the climate itself, which
is linked to the electricity sector through the GHG emissions the latter generates,
and which accumulate in the atmosphere and lead to a general warming with adverse
eﬀects that can already be felt today in terms of changed weather conditions, melting
ice sheets and glaciers and rising sea levels. However, since the electricity sector does
not internalize this eﬀect, a third player comes in to make up for this deﬁciency.
The government’s role is to protect society’s interests and therefore it strives to limit
the sources of climate change. By enacting policies that are designed to reduce the
GHG emissions from electricity production, the government thus aﬀects the electricity
sector again and creates additional factors and uncertainties that have to be taken into
1While uncertainty and irreversibility have been the main focus of the thesis, there are also
important conclusions with respect to the eﬀects of technological change itself (see Chapters
4 and 5-7).
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account in investment decisions. It is clear that this interrelatedness complicates the
decision-making processes in the electricity sector and at the same time also the task
of policy makers, who need to design an appropriate incentive structure for investors
to achieve their goals of preserving the climate.
There are multiple questions that arise in this context, most importantly the issue
of a transition to a more sustainable energy mix, the role of technical change and
rising fuel prices (which links to concerns about energy security, see e.g. Awerbuch and
Sauter, 2006), the eﬀect of (diﬀerent types of) uncertainty on investment decisions, the
integration of irreversibility into decision-making frameworks, and the appropriateness
of policies and what light the analysis can shed on ongoing policy debates.
In order to answer these questions we have ﬁrst discerned diﬀerent approaches to
investment decision-making under uncertainty and irreversibility in Chapter 2. We
have come to the conclusion that there are still some unresolved problems in the ex-
isting literature and that real options theory and portfolio selection oﬀer the most
suitable starting points for our purposes. The ﬁrst part of thesis has then used real
options to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of uncertainties, climate change policy,
and fuel price and technological uncertainty from the perspective of the individual in-
vestor, who wants to optimize the timing of setting up a power plant or switching from
one type of power plant to another. The second half of the thesis tries to overcome the
shortcomings of mean-variance portfolio theory as traditionally applied to investment
in the electricity sector to make it more suitable for such analysis (see Chapters 5 and
6), so that the resulting framework will be useful also for large-scale investors or the
analysis of aggregate investment and energy mix composition at the country-level. By
integrating elements from portfolio selection into a vintage model of investment and
production, we are able to not only add the dynamics underlying technical change, but
also to account for the irreversibility, which is not present in a ﬁnancial portfolio where
assets can be added and removed at virtually zero transaction costs (see Chapter 5
for all advantages of the new approach over standard mean-variance (M-V) portfolio
selection). Extending the basic framework in Chapter 7 makes it a suitable tool for the
analysis of climate change policy and the transition to more carbon-free technologies
over the long term.
8.2 Diﬀerent Types of Uncertainty
In Chapter 3 we have been focussing on the eﬀects that climate change policy will
have on an investor, who has to decide whether to install a coal-ﬁred power plant, a
coal-ﬁred power plant with a carbon capture and storage (CCS) module or whether
to retroﬁt the coal-ﬁred plant without CCS later in the planning period when CO2
prices have risen suﬃciently.
However, we do not only look at the ﬂuctuations in the CO2 price (that could arise
in the process of permit trading, for example), but we also examine what happens
when policy makers give no clear signals about their intentions during climate change
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path. That implies that CO2 prices might drop sharply or continue to rise after the
negotiations have ﬁnished. Not knowing which probabilities to assign to both events,
investors will thus face a large option value of waiting and postponing investment into
the CCS module, which could have saved a large amount of CO2 emissions in the
meantime.
The message to policy makers clearly is that they should convey the right signs to
the public and industry, as otherwise they will (a) fail to achieve their ultimate policy
goals by providing too weak an incentive structure, and (b) cause ﬁnancial losses
to investors, while the latter are waiting for the uncertainty, which we call “policy
uncertainty”, to be resolved.
The ﬂuctuations in CO2 prices, on the other hand, which can be referred to as
“market uncertainty” are of much less harm to investors than is sometimes claimed
(see Chapter 3). We have shown that optimizing under incomplete information, will
lead to earlier investment into the CCS module than in the case where optimization can
take advantage of perfect information. While this leads to slight
2 losses for the investor,
who exercises the investment option earlier than optimal under perfect information,
this is by no means as painful as the postponement in the face of policy uncertainty
and even beneﬁcial from the point of view of achieving GHG emissions reductions. It
is thus evident that a distinction between market uncertainty and the more radical
policy uncertainty is warranted and useful and it conveys important insights for policy
makers as well.
Another important conclusion to be drawn from Chapter 3 relates to the policy
debate about cap and trade approaches (i.e. CO2 permit trading, which leads to
ﬂuctuating prices) versus deterministic and possibly escalating taxes. In particular,
we do not ﬁnd that stochastic CO2 prices are necessarily worse for electricity producers
than a deterministic tax, so the message is that both approaches serve their goal of
providing incentives to reduce CO2 emissions rather well. Only the addition of a
price cap would be detrimental to this end. Introducing a ceiling on the price of
CO2 emissions, however, protects the proﬁts of carbon-intensive power plants without
oﬀering the same advantages to renewable energy technologies and do thus weaken the
promotion of less carbon-intensive energy generation.
In the following section we will see how our new approach of combining portfolio
selection with vintage modeling enters the picture and adds to the existing literature
on irreversible investment under uncertainty.
8.3 A New Theoretical Approach
The vintage-portfolio model introduced in Chapter 5, further expanded in Chapter
6 and extended and applied in Chapter 7 overcomes a number of disadvantages that
make standard mean-variance portfolio selection (as previously applied to electricity
2There is only a minor loss because the bringing forward of investment only concerns a
short period of time, while in the case of policy uncertainty the period of waiting and paying
rising CO2 penalties extends over a longer time horizon and is thus also more painful in terms
of the amount of expenses.196 Conclusion
investment problems) not very suitable for investment analysis in the electricity sector
when one wants to take into account dynamic features such as technical change and
the irreversible nature of investment. By setting the portfolio problem into a vintage
framework, both the eﬀects of technological progress and the uncertainties surround-
ing it can be examined. Moreover, it enables us to develop more elaborate investment
strategies that do not only take advantage of the gains from diversiﬁcation over tech-
nologies that rely on diﬀerent fuels and have diﬀerent technological prospects, but that
can also diversify over time.
The role of technological advance features importantly in this setup because we
primarily face embodied technical change in the electricity sector. Since investment
is irreversible, producers are “stuck” with what they have invested into, until they
can update their portfolio through scrapping and to make up for technical decay. An
important ﬁnding is that a decrease in technological uncertainty will therefore lead
to less investment, even though the real options model in Chapter 4 concludes the
opposite and “standard” M-V frameworks would also see an increase in the share of
more secure assets in the generating portfolio (see Chapter 5). However, the fact that
technical change will now occur with more certainty in our setting implies that more
gains can be reaped later on, when that technical change has materialized (and it
will do so now with larger certainty). Similarly, in the more elaborate framework of
Chapter 7 we can observe that a technology, which experiences a shock in technological
uncertainty is not immediately replaced by the most likely substitute. Again, it pays
oﬀ to wait for ongoing technical change to take place and reap the full beneﬁts of
being able to install higher quality vintages when investment becomes necessary and
thus to substitute investment in the concerned technology today for investment at a
later point in time. A technology with low capital costs and possibly lower equipment
lifetime will take over as a “placeholder” in the meantime.
The policy implications that we have drawn from this framework are that renew-
ables by themselves are not capable of taking over the larger part of the energy mix, for
reasonable rates of technical change and fuel price growth. The reason is that capital
costs are still high, the technologies themselves immature and technical change often
uncertain. While an increase in risk aversion would work in favor of renewables, a rel-
atively large increase in the risk aversion level would be needed to make the otherwise
still expensive renewables competitive. Other renewables might be developed enough,
but are constrained by e.g. geographical requirements, such as large-scale hydro dams.
Therefore, the phasing in of renewables will need some “assistance” from government
in terms of subsidies, legislation or taxing of their fossil-fuel competitors.
3 Moreover,
nuclear energy has characteristics that make it attractive as a “transition technology”
between electricity generation based on fossil fuels and a renewables-dominated gen-
erating mix. While this strategy has been voiced as a solution by many countries,
including France and the UK, to buy some time and secure energy supply while devel-
oping renewables to make them cheaper and more eﬃcient, the concerns of the public
about safety issues, proliferation of nuclear material to terrorists and issues of long
3This is a ﬁnding also emanating from the analysis in Chapters 3 and in particular 4.The Role of Technical Change, Fuel Prices & Uncertainty 197
term nuclear waste disposal need to be considered as well.
We will next see how technological change and fuel prices and the uncertainty
surrounding these feature in the investment decisions using both real options (Chapter
4) and the vintage-portfolio model (Chapters 5 and 6).
8.4 The Role of Technical Change, Fuel Prices
& Uncertainty
As already alluded to in the previous section, the newly developed vintage-portfolio
approach delivers results about technological uncertainty that are quite diﬀerent from
what we ﬁnd in real options and standard M-V portfolio models. In fact, investment
is temporarily postponed in the face of larger certainty about technological progress,
while fuel price uncertainty leads to less investment in all three types of models. To
put it diﬀerently, all three models ﬁnd a negative relationship between uncertainty
and investment for fuel prices, and the standard portfolio and real options models also
do so for technological uncertainty. Only the vintage-portfolio model ﬁnds a positive
relationship between technological uncertainty and investment at the beginning of the
planning period, which is due to the fact that technical change is embodied in the new
vintages of capital equipment, so if you can be more sure that improvements will take
place, it will pay oﬀ to wait for those improvements. Intertemporal optimization in
combination with the cumulative nature of technical change therefore generates results
that act as if an option value of waiting has been created in the vintage-portfolio
model.
4
The real options model presented in Chapter 4 also features embodied technical
change, so once the equipment is installed, no further cost reductions are possible.
We ﬁnd that larger rates of technical change lead to later investment, which is in line
with the conclusions from the vintage-portfolio model: if larger cost reductions can be
expected, it pays oﬀ to wait for them – unless risk aversion is high and increases the
importance of the variance in the objective function. In that case, most investment
takes place in the beginning of the planning period, so as to avoid surprises later on
(see Figure 6.7).
The real options approach shows that technological uncertainty leads to further
postponement of investment. This is due to the fact that larger uncertainty increases
the option value of waiting for another improvement to materialize because in this
model innovations arrive according to a Poisson process and larger technological un-
certainty is modeled through a lower arrival rate compensated for by a larger step
size of improvement. This makes it worthwhile to wait longer, an option which is not
actively valued in the vintage-portfolio model. In fact, for the case of the wind farm
4In Chapter 7 this eﬀect works through the substitute technology. Please note that this
is not a contradiction to earlier ﬁndings, since the investment-uncertainty relationship for
technological progress has on average always been negative: the only purpose of decreasing
investment into the less risky technology in the beginning of the planning period is to increase
it later by a larger amount, so that the investor ultimately ends up with a larger portfolio
share of the more secure technology.198 Conclusion
that we are examining in this chapter, this is not desirable from the point of view of
climate preservation: a high expected rate of technical change leads investors – with
both modeling approaches – to postpone investment into environmentally friendly, ex-
pensive, but rapidly developing technologies, while the eﬀects of uncertainty do not
need to be negative.
Looking at the possibility to switch from a coal-ﬁred power plant to a wind farm
adds the fuel price dimension to the real options setting in Chapter 4. Interestingly,
while the option value had been exponentially upward-sloping in the case of the wind
farm, the inclusion of the coal-ﬁred plant fundamentally reshapes the option value
by adding the value of keeping old capacity, which is subject to stochastic prices.
What we observe is a U-shape for the option value, which is crossed by the upward-
sloping plant value of the wind farm, which becomes more valuable as technical change
progresses, while the coal-ﬁred power plant looses attractiveness as coal prices rise. We
ﬁnd that higher growth in coal prices leads to earlier investment because it decreases
the option value of keeping old, coal-ﬁred capacity. Uncertainty about fuel prices
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect for the data we use, since fuel costs contribute much less to
total costs than capital costs and coal prices are projected to be relatively stable. If
anything however, the option value would be increased and investment postponed,
so the negative uncertainty-investment relationship is conﬁrmed for the real options
model of Chapter 4.
From a policy or climate change point of view, Chapter 4 shows that without a
penalty on the emission of CO2 the option value of keeping the coal-ﬁred plant will
always exceed the plant value of the wind farm for our planning period. That conﬁrms
our ﬁndings from the vintage-portfolio model (see above) that renewables are not ready
to take over from traditional technologies and need to be promoted by government.
To be more precise, a CO2 price triple the size of its current value in the European
permit trading system would be needed to trigger investment into wind technology
within the next thirty years. While this might seem enormous, the estimations of the
last IPCC report (2007) also project a CO2 price of around 100$ per ton of CO2 to
be necessary to stabilize emissions at a presumably “safe” level. This estimate even
somewhat exceeds ours and points to the validity and policy relevance of our ﬁndings,
even though we have been using a very simple framework. In the same vein, we have
used the vintage-portfolio in Chapter 7 to assess whether the UK goals of reducing
CO2 emissions by increasing the Renewables Obligation (amongst other measures) is
realistic. We have indeed found that extra costs are high, even though they do not
represent a substantial fraction of total cost. Moreover, these costs will most probably
be passed on to consumers. On the positive side, the variance of the portfolio will be
lower, which is a favorable side eﬀect in terms of energy security.
8.5 Further Research
From a theoretical perspective there is deﬁnitely a need to extend and apply portfolio
selection on a larger scale to investment in the electricity sector. We have shownFurther Research 199
that the combination with vintage modeling makes portfolio theory very suitable for
such analysis, but other approaches are possible and issues that have to be addressed
also pertain to the weakness of the M-V model as previously applied to electricity
investment when return (or cost) distributions are not normally distributed. Fortin et
al (2007) have made a ﬁrst step into this direction by using other risk-measures than
the variance that take fat tails into account as well. However, their framework is also
static with regard to the portfolio optimization part, but it could be extended in the
way that we have suggested in this thesis.
It has also been shown that real options theory is a very useful decision-making
tool in the electricity sector because it considers both irreversibility and values the
investment option in the face of uncertainty. By slightly adapting real options models,
Chapter 3 has taken diﬀerent types of uncertainty into account. Chapter 4 has shown
that complex processes such as technical change can be added without sacriﬁcing
much transparency. So, even though real options models tend to get complex and
too intensive to solve quite quickly, much can nonetheless be analyzed using relatively
simple models and this should also be taken advantage of in future research. Much
has still to be done in the area of climate change policy still and also uncertainties and
irreversibilities on the environmental side could be taken into account more explicitly,
for example.
Another area that warrants further research is the issue of technical change. While
we have treated technological progress as an exogenous process, it is obvious that
policy measures – as the ones reviewed here – can also lead to endogenous technical
change, as investment into research and development (R&D) is hoped to bring about
cost advantages in technologies that are or will be invulnerable to carbon penalties.
5
On the other hand, resources might not only be expended for R&D purposes in this
context, but also to lobby against carbon penalties in the ﬁrst place. This might be
the preferred strategy of owners of old capacity or fossil fuel resources. Depending
on the eﬀectiveness of the lobbying mechanism, this can then lead to further policy
uncertainty aﬀecting the whole sector again.
While this thesis has mainly been occupied with the diﬀusion of technical change,
further research should therefore go deeper in the sense that technological progress
should be endogenized and underlying incentive schemes could be elaborated to cap-
ture the political processes underlying climate change policy.
5Many (mostly European) ﬁrms that have specialized in renewable energy technology
already claim today that they have had a head start in R&D, which has made them very
competitive in international markets.Bibliography
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Duurzame energieontwikkeling onder onzekerheid
De opwekking van elektriciteit vormt met 40% de belangrijkste bron van CO2
emissies. Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat de mens inderdaad in belangrijke mate
bijdraagt aan de versnelling van de opwarming van de aarde door het gebruik van
fossiele brandstoﬀen en daarmee samenhangende CO2 emissies. Vanwege de stijging
van de temperatuur verandert het klimaat, hetgeen een groot aantal negatieve gevolgen
heeft, zoals de stijging van de zeespiegel, de uitbreiding van woestijnen en meer extreme
weersomstandigheden.
Aangezien de meeste landen van de OESO (Organisatie voor Economische Samen-
werking en Ontwikkeling) reeds bestaande productie capaciteit binnen de elektriciteits-
sector in de komende 10 tot 20 jaren zullen moeten vervangen, zullen de investeringen
voor de komende jaren de toekomstige energiesamenstelling en de daarbij behorende
ontwikkeling van CO2 emissies gaan bepalen.
Het is daarom van uitermate groot belang te begrijpen hoe investeerders in deze
sector hun beslissingen nemen. Investeringen in de elektriciteitssector worden geken-
merkt door hun onomkeerbaarheid, die is toe te schrijven aan de omvangrijke vaste
kosten waarmee de bouw van elektriciteitscentrales gepaard gaat. Daarnaast zijn
er verschillende bronnen van onzekerheid die investeringsbeslissingen be¨ ınvloeden,
zoals onzekerheid veroorzaakt door ﬂuctuerende brandstofprijzen, onzekerheid over
het tempo en de richting van technologische verandering, en onzekerheid ten aanzien
van het te voeren beleid. De ﬂexibiliteit om besluiten in het licht van deze onzekerheid
uit te stellen, maakt de zogenaamde “real option theory” tot een waardevol hulpmid-
del om het eﬀect van verschillende soorten onzekerheid op het investeringsgedrag te
onderzoeken.
In tegenstelling tot het standpunt van de industrie dat de schommelingen in de prij-
zen van CO2 emissie vergunningen tot een uitstel van investeringen in moderne, minder
koolstoﬁntensieve technologie¨ en zullen leiden, tonen de in dit proefschrift verkregen
resultaten aan dat bij onzekerheid voortvloeiend uit onvolledige informatie, optimaal
investeringsgedrag leidt tot investeringen die eerder plaatsvinden dan onder perfecte
informatie het geval zou zijn geweest. De onzekerheid die het gevolg is van onduide-
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lijke signalen over het te verwachten beleid ten aanzien van de sanctionering van
CO2-emissies, leidt tot het ontstaan van een hoge optiewaarde van wachten en dus tot
een veel latere overgang naar schone technologie.
Ook de onzekerheid waarmee de technische vooruitgang in hernieuwbare technolo-
gie¨ en gepaard gaat, leidt tot uitstel van investeringen zoals uit analyse met behulp van
het “real option”-model blijkt. De reden is dat de optiewaarde van wachten hoog is, in
het geval er grote sprongen in de productiviteit of sterke dalingen in de investerings-
prijzen van de betreﬀende technologie verwacht kunnen worden. Zelfs het gelijktijdig
opnemen van de onzekerheid van de fossiele brandstofprijs in het model leidt er niet toe
dat hernieuwbare energie concurrerend wordt met bestaande capaciteit die gebaseerd
is op fossiele brandstoﬀen, althans op basis van de relevante gegevens die hier gebruikt
zijn voor de korte en de middellange termijn. Dit impliceert dat de beleidsmakers
investeringen extra aantrekkelijk zullen moeten maken, bijvoorbeeld door middel van
een sanctie gekoppeld aan het uitstoten van CO2. Anders zal de vervanging van ver-
ouderde capaciteit plaatsvinden in de vorm van investeringen in capaciteit die op fos-
siele brandstoﬀen is gebaseerd, hetgeen tot een versterkte “lock-in” in niet-duurzame
elektriciteitsopwekking zal leiden.
Het jaargangen-portefeuille-model dat in deze thesis wordt ontwikkeld, biedt een
enigszins optimistischer beeld van de toekomst van duurzame brandstoﬀen door met
de voordelen van diversiﬁcatie rekening te houden. Weliswaar brengen in het geval van
bijvoorbeeld het Verenigd Koninkrijk de Britse doelstellingen om de emissies van CO2
te verminderen extra kosten met zich mee (die overigens nagenoeg verwaarloosbaar
zijn als fractie van totale kosten), door naast andere maatregelen, de “Renewables
Obligation” te verhogen. Daar staat echter tegenover dat de variantie van de elek-
triciteitsproducerende technologieportefeuille lager zal zijn, hetgeen op zichzelf (per
assumptie, maar ook in de praktijk) positief wordt gewaardeerd. Aangezien de analyse
zich toespitst op de kostenkant van de elektriciteitsproductie en aldus veiligheidsrisico’s
en kwesties rond de afvalverwijdering buiten beschouwing laat, komt kernenergie naar
voren als een alternatief om de kloof tussen de bestaande, op fossiele brandstoﬀen
gebaseerde, capaciteit en een koolstofvrij systeem te overbruggen.
Methodologisch levert de nieuwe jaargangen-portefeuille-benadering resultaten over
technologische onzekerheid op die verschillen van de resultaten van ‘real option’ mo-
dellen en standaard optimale portfolio modellen. Onder grotere technologische ze-
kerheid worden investeringen slechts tijdelijk uitgesteld, terwijl grotere onzekerheid
in brandstofprijzen tot minder investeringen leidt in alle drie types van modellen.
Alle drie modellen vinden dus een negatieve relatie tussen onzekerheid en investerin-
gen voor grotere onzekerheid rond brandstofprijzen, en het standaard portefeuille-
model en de ‘real option’ modellen doen dit ook voor technologische onzekerheid.
Alleen het jaargangen-portefeuille-model vindt een positieve relatie tussen technolo-
gische onzekerheid en investeringen aan het begin van de planningsperiode die is toe
te schrijven aan het feit dat de technische verandering belichaamd is in de nieuwste
jaargangen (“vintages”) van investeringsgoederen. Het is daarom verstandig (en dus
optimaal) om te wachten op de mogelijkheid te investeren in verbeterde jaargangen215
van investeringsgoederen, naarmate men er zekerder van is dat deze verbeteringen
ook daadwerkelijk zullen plaatsvinden. Intertemporele optimalisering in combinatie
met het cumulatieve karakter van technische verandering genereert daarom resultaten
die consistent zijn met de creatie van een impliciete optiewaarde van wachten in het
jaargangen-portefeuille-model.Curriculum Vitae
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